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INTRODUCTION

Corporate acquiSitiOns, particularly leveraged cost basis acquisitions by an
acquiring or purchasing corporation (P), of assets or stock of a target corporation
(T), have been a popular topic in recent years. • A key element in determining
the tax consequences of such acquisitions with respect to T, its shareholders,
and P, is the sales price of T's assets or stock. However, the tax consequences
remain uncertain in the following situations: (1) when part of the purchase price
I. See, e.g., Final Days of Free Lunch; Congress Tries to Plug a Treasury Leak, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 3, 1986, at 44; The Heart of the Matter, FoRBES, June 17, 1985, at 136; The Tax Muddle
That Could Spur More Takeovers, Bus. WK., May 14, 1984, at 166; Closed Loopholes That Open
Merger Problems, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1982, at 173. For a more scholarly look at the tax impact
on mergers and acquisitions, see STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
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consists of contingent payments by P; or (2) when T's assets include a contingent
claim that T either sells to P, retains in a T stock acquisition by P, or distributes
to its shareholders in connection with the sale of assets or stock.
The continuing uncertainty in an area rife with case-law doctrine and everincreasing technical attempts at legislative reform primarily is attributable to a
frequent, fundamental failure of such endeavors to utilize deep structure analysis. 2
The courts have failed to provide a functional rationale for attributing income
to a corporation and thereby overriding the General Utilities & Operating Co.
v. Helvering 3 shield of sections 336, 337, and 338 regarding: (1) the corporation's
liquidating distribution (section 336); (2) its sale of assets pursuant to liquidation
(section 337); and (3) the sale of stock by shareholders that is treated as a sale
of the corporation's assets (section 338). This failure is compounded by a dearth
of analysis that discusses why a complete liquidation should be held "open" in
certain circumstances thus deferring income outside of the installment reporting
provisions of section 453 at the T shareholder level.
First, this Article discusses the Internal Revenue Code context in a transactional framework. 4 Second, the conventional case-law doctrines that apply to
contingent items in a cost basis acquisition of T at the T shareholder and T
corporate levels are analyzed.' This section of the Article asserts that such
doctrines handle contingent items inadequately due to a confusion of the deep
structure policy of clear reflection of income with traditional tax accounting
rules. Third, the Article develops a correlative year 2 adjustment model that
achieves a clearer reflection of income than the conventional doctrine's treatment
of T's and T shareholder's income in cost-basis acquisitions that involve contingent items and create an effect in more than one tax year. 6 This model is
based on the conceptual premises underlying various year I and year 2 caselaw exceptions to the annual accounting principle under which year I stands on
its own with a final accounting based on events completed in that year and is
not readjusted by events completed in subsequent years. Fourth, the Article
compares the application of the conventional doctrine and the correlative adjustment model with the following contingent items: (I) P's contingent purchase
price for T's stock or assets; (2) contingent items sold by T to P; and (3)
contingent items distributed by T to its shareholders. 7 This section suggests
reformulation of the proposed and temporary section 338 regulations as well as
the section 337 regulations. Fifth, this Article analyzes the effect of recent

ASPECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS {AND S. 420,
S. 476 AND S. 632), 99th Cong., lst Sess. 2 (1985); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL
INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. {1985); Forman, Using
the Tax Code to Fend Off Corporate Takeover 'Sharks', 26 TAX NoTES 1162 (1985). For a summary
of the hearings before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on oversight and select revenue
measures concerning mergers and acquisitions, see Forman, Ways and Means Examines Tax Aspects
of Mergers, 27 TAX NOTES 121 (1985).
2. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 YALE L.J. 861, 861
(1976) ("(D)ifficulty in understanding tax law most frequently arises from failure by those who use
basic concepts to grasp their meaning, rather than from any excessive attempt at statutory precision.").
3. 296 u.s. 200 (1935).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 11-223.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 224-436.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 437-559.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 560-673.
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legislative enactments. 8 This section concludes that the legislative enactments still
fail to address the contingent income problem and suggests several alternative
legislative resolutions. Sixth, the Article evaluates the performance of the courts
and Congress in this area to date. 9 The Article concludes that the judiciary is
in the best position to achieve a deep structure analysis, but with clear thinking,
either the courts, the drafters of regulations, or Congress could adopt an analytical
framework that achieves a clearer reflection of income.
11.

STATUTORY REGIMES

A.

Introduction

In order to determine the tax consequences of a P cost-basis acquisition of
T's assets several major statutory regimes must be applied. If the acquisition
is direct-pursuant to T's complete liquidation-section 337 applies. 10 If the
acquisition is a stock purchase and is deemed a liquidation, section 338 applies. 11
These sections apply to all parties to the transaction if: (l) P's purchase price
of T's stock or assets is partially contingent; (2) T's assets include a contingent
claim that is purchased by P in a section 337 transaction, or is deemed purchased
by T as a new corporation (Neo-n under a section 338 election by P; or (3)
T distributes a contingent claim to its shareholders pursuant to its complete
liquidation and sale of its assets or the sale of its stock to P. 12

/.

Paradigm Asset Acquisition (Section 337)

If P acquires some ofT's assets pursuant to T's complete liquidation, section
337 applies at the T level to shield T from recognition of gain or loss on the
sale of the "property." 14 This shield applies during the twelve-month period
commencing on the date of the adoption of T's plan of complete liquidation. 1'
This shield is lifted in certain instances even if the item in question qualifies
11

8. See infra text accompanying notes 674-88.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 689-96.
10. I.R.C. § 337 (West Supp. 1986).
II. /d. § 338.
12. /d. §§ 337-38.
13. /d. § 337(a). Section 337(a) provides that no gain or loss is recognized to a distributing
corporation from the sale or exchange of property within the 12-month period beginning from the
date on which the corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation, provided that the corporation
distributes all of its assets other than those retained to meet claims within such period. Section 337
also shields the liquidating corporation from recognition of gain attributed to it from sales ostensibly
made at the distributee shareholder level within such period. /d.
14. Section 337(b) defines property as excluding: (I) stock in trade and inventory; and (2)
installment obligations generated by sales of such inventory. /d. § 337(b)(l ). However, a "bulk
sale," to one person in one transaction, of all of the inventory amibutable to the trade or business
of the liquidating corporation is included in the term "property" together with any installment
obligations generated by such a bulk sale. /d. § 337(b)(2). These definitional rules and counter rules
are intended to effectuate the statutory goal of denying § 337's shield to "sales in the ordinary
course of business !which) shall result in ordinary gain to the corporation as if the corporation
were not in the process of liquidating." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 259 (1954). See
generally Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 u.s. 848 (1970).
15. I.R.C. § 337(a) (West Supp. 1986).
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as "property." In particular, the "assignment of income" 16 and "tax benefit" 17
case-law doctrines, the statutory depreciation recapture provisions of sections
1245 1" and 1250, 19 and the clear reflection of income requirement of sections
446(b)ll' and 482 21 override the section 337 exemption. 22 If T distributes a contingent income item or any other property in complete liquidation while selling
its other assets to P (a "bootstrap acquisition"), 2 ·1 section 336 applies to shield

16. The "assignment of income" doctrine, which prevents taxpayers from avoiding taxation
by shifting income from the person or entity that earns it to another person, applies to § 337. See
Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682, 692-93 (1975); Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88;
see also infra text accompanying notes 331-36.
17. The classic tax benefit situation consists of a deduction in year I followed by an inconsistent
event in a subsequent year (year 2). See infra text accompanying notes 391-93. A sale under § 337
historically has been treated as an event that is inconsistent with a prior deduction so that courts
apply the rule to § 337 sales. See infra text accompanying notes 406-12.
18. I. R.C. § 1245(a) (West Supp. 1986). The personal property depreciation recapture provision
was enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1962. Section 1245 converts what otherwise would be
capital gain into ordinary income by requiring inclusion of any gain attributable to depreciation
and deductions previously claimed by the taxpayer on § 1245 property. Income must be included
to the extent that the depreciation allowed or allowable exceeds the property's actual decline in
value. Section 1245 is applicable primarily to depreciable personal property and certain real property
to which maximum accelerated depreciation and ACRS (Accelerated Cost Recovery System) life has
been applied. /d. §§ 1245(a){3), 1245(a)(5). Justice O'Connor describes §§ 1245 and 1250 as partial
statutory codifications of the tax benefit doctrine. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S.
370, 386 n.20 (1983). In short, the recapture provisions serve to correct the conceptual error that
was contained in Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947), under which ordinary depreciation
deductions can give rise to capital gains because such deductions reduce the basis arising from
indebtedness. /d. at 15-16; see infra text accompanying notes 496-503. The Revenue Act of 1962
also enacted investment tax credit recapture provisions that apply to premature dispositions of
property. I.R.C. § 47 (West Supp. 1986).
19. I.R.C. § 1250(a) (West Supp. 1986). Congress applied a more limited depreciation recapture
rule to certain real estate. Gain on disposition of residential real property held for more than one
year is recaptured as ordinary income to the extent that prior depreciation deductions exceed
depreciation computed on the straightline method. /d. § 1250(a)(I)(B). Gain on the disposition of
nonresidential real property held for more than one year, however, generally is subject to recapture
of all depreciation unless a straight line method has been elected, notwithstanding use of ACRS's
substantially shorter Jives. /d. § 1245(a)(5). See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: CoRPORATE TAXATION, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1985) (hereinafter TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS). For a list of other potential recapture provisions see id. at 41; Ferguson & Stiver,
Taxable Corporate Acquisitions After TEFRA, 42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 12.05, at 12-30 n.76
(1984).
20. I.R.C. § 446(b) (West Supp 1986). Section 446(b) provides that if no method of tax
accounting has been used regularly by the taxpayer, or if the method does not reflect income clearly,
the Treasury can recompute taxable income under a method that reflects income clearly. This
provision often has been the basis for a judicially fashioned quasi-common-law clear reflection of
income requirement, but at other times it has been limited to accepted accounting methods. See
infra text accompanying notes 373, 383 & 385-89. The clear reflection of income requirement,
however, overrides § 337. See Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 204~ (9th Cir. 1962).
21. I.R.C. § 482 (West Supp. 1986). Section 482 provides that the Treasury may distribute,
apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among two or
more businesses owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interest, if the Treasury
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent
evasion of taxes or to reflect income clearly. /d. On occasion, this provision has formed the basis
for a common-law clear reflection of income doctrine. See infra note 374.
22. See generally TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 40.
23. A "bootstrap" acquisition involves the transfer of control of a target corporation (T)
under which a substantial part of the stock owned by the existing T shareholders is redeemed so
that the purchasing corporation (P) pays only for the balance of the former T shareholders' stock.
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T from recognition of gain or loss on the assets distributed. Essentially, section
336 is subject to the same case-law and statutory exceptions 2• that apply to
section 337. However, in a bootstrap acquisition the assignment of income and
clear reflection of income doctrines generally have been held not to apply to
T's distribution of "inchoate" or contingent income items. 2 ~ These holdings are
the result of an erroneous limitation of the two doctrines to income "accrued"
under traditional tax accounting methods.
At the T shareholder level, liquidating distributions are treated as "constructive" sales or exchanges under section 331, thereby qualifying for capital
gains treatment. 26 1f P purchases the assets ofT pursuant to a complete liquidation
ofT to which section 337 applies, T's shareholders may report principal payments
received under any notes of P on the installment basis, 27 thereby applying a
portion of their basis in the T stock against each paymentY If P's purchase
price is partially contingent because it is based in part on events that will be
completed in a future tax year (year 2), each former T shareholder may opt
out of section 453 and hold the transaction "open" in the year ofT's liquidation
(year 1). 29 Such an election has the effect of deferring the recognition of any
gain until payments in excess of basis actually are received.-'" All gains retain
the same character as if they were received at the time of the initial liquidation,
but are subject to the time value of money rules.-' 1 Alternatively, if T distributes
a contingent income item in liquidation, the T shareholders may report the entire
transaction in installments under section 453.n However, a T shareholder cannot

8. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, fEDERAL TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS , 9.25, at 935 (4th ed. 1979). In the basic stock acquisition, transaction some stock is redeemed by T while
other stock is sold to P. In an asset sale, however, T more commonly sells part of its assets to
P and distributes the proceeds of this sale and the remainder of its assets to its shareholders in
complete liquidation of their stock. Under the current law, the same consequences occur at the
shareholder level with respect to liquidating distribution for the shareholder's stock in a §§ 331337 asset sale or a redemption of part of the shareholder's stock and a sale of the remainder to
P in a § 338 stock acquisition-bootstrap distribution. In the asset sale, § 336 would apply to the
asset distribution at the T level. A special provision under § 338 produces the same result in a
qualified stock sale. See infra note 38.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 383 & 385-86.
26. I.R.C. § 331(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 331(a) provides that amounts received by a
shareholder in a distribution in complete liquidation are treated as full payment in exchange for
the stock of the liquidated corporation. Under current law, capital gains and basis recovery result
from such a constructive sale or exchange. See id. §§ 1001, 1202, 1221.
27. /d. § 453(h)( I). Section 453(h)( I) is drawn narrowly in order to permit a shareholder
who receives an installment obligation acquired in respect of a § 337 sale or exchange from a §
331 liquidation to which § 337 applies to be treated as receiving payment for the liquidated stock
only upon receipt of payments from the purchaser. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
28. The former T shareholders apply the rules of § 453 to the installment reported P payments.
These rules generally provide for recognition of income in each tax year in proportion to the
payments received in that year. See infra text accompanying note 120.
29. I.R.C. § 453(d) (West Supp. 1986).
30. See infra note 122. If basis recovery (i.e., "open transaction") reporting is available, the
taxpayer may defer recognition of gain until payments in excess of basis are received. See infra
text accompanying notes 237-56.
31. The linkage of timing and character in the open transaction doctrine is discussed infra
in text accompanying note 242. The time value of money rules apply to the classic open transaction.
See infra text accompanying notes 151-82 & 203.
32. I.R.C. § 4530)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Section 4530)(2) provides for legislative regulations
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both opt out of section 453 and report any of P's notes distributed in T's
liquidation. Thus, if a substantial portion of P's noncontingent payments will
be made in the future, election out of section 453 is impractical.
P's basis in assets purchased pursuant to a complete liquidation of T is
equal to its costs in such assets. In addition, the basis includes any of T's
liabilities assumed as well as any of P's purchase liabilities,'-' unless these liabilities
are "contingent" or exceed the fair market value of the assets acquired.q

2.

Paradigm Stock Acquisition (Section 338)

As an alternative to the paradigm asset acquisition discussed above, P instead
may acquire T's stock and make a timely election under section 338.'; Section
338 provides in part that (Old) T is deemed to have sold all of its assets in a
single sale to which section 337 applies as of the date that P acquired control
of the T stock.'" The statutory goal of this hypothetical bulk sale is recognition
of income or loss by Old T to the same extent as if T actually had sold its
assets pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation. n If Old T distributes itemsincluding contingent items-in connection with a sale of its stock without actually

permiting installment reponing when the selling price is not readily ascertainable. Temporary regulations issued under this provision are discussed infra in notes 117-30.
33. See l.R.C. § 1012 (West Supp. 1986); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947); Bolger
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 760 (1973); Mayerson v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. Rev.
Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59; Redford v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 773 (1957).
34. For a substantial period, courts have denied an initial inclusion of contingent liabilities
in the basis. CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 281, 283 (3d Cir. 1982); Brountas v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 152, 157-58 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 73 T.C. 491 (1979); Gibson Prods. v. United
States, 637 F.2d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1981); Rodman v. Commissioner, 542 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1976);
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266, 1269 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Estate
of Baron v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 542, 549 (1984); Lemery v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 367, 37778 (1969), aff'd per curiam, 451 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1971 ); Columbus & Greenville Ry. v. Commissioner,
42 T.C. 834, 848 (1964), aff'd per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966). More recently, in the
face of tax shelter abuses, courts have begun to deny the inclusion of liability in basis when the
liability exceeds the fair market value of the property. Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544
F.2d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 1976); Estate of Baron, 83 T.C. 542 (1984); Wildman v. Commissioner,
78 T.C. 943, 952 (1982). Treatment of contingent liabilities is beyond the scope of this Article.
35. l.R.C § 338 (West Supp. 1986). The purpose of§ 338, in conjunction with the installment
reporting provisions, is to produce tax parity with asset purchases (§ 337) at the following levels:
(I) the former T shareholder level; (2) the T level; and (3) the P level. Therefore, in the paradigm
transaction, the former T shareholders may installment report the capital gains that are received
on the surrender of their stock to the P. P or its surrogate new target (Neo-T), is deemed to start
off with a clean slate of corporate attributes and a hypothetical cost basis in Old T's assets equal
10 P's basis in its T stock, adjusted for T's liabilities and other relevant items. The toll charge 10
Old T for such step up is recognition of the recapture income that Old T would have recognized
in a hypothetical § 337 bulk sale had it sold all of its assets at fair market value in a bulk sale
10 which § 337 was applicable. /d. §§ 338(a) and (b); see STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND
fiSCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT of 1982, 133 (Comm. Print 1982) Jhereinafter 1982 BLUEBOOK). However,
parity was not obtained in all circumstances. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[7],
at 12-54; Ginsburg, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx L. REv. 171, 269 (1983).
36. l.R.C. § 338(a)(l) (West Supp. 1986). The acquisition date is defined generally as the
first day that there is a qualified stock purchase of the stock of the T. /d. § 338(h)(2). The
requirements for a "qualified stock purchase" are discussed infra at note 113.
37. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
536, 539 (1982); S. REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1982).
-

1987]

Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions

145

liquidating and P elects section 338, the tax consequences at the Old T level
of this distribution, nevertheless, are governed by section 336 . .1x
In a stock sale to P, the T shareholders enjoy an actual sale or exchange,
and if P's payments are paid in installments the former T shareholders may
installment report any gain.-'~ Moreover, if P makes contingent payments, or if
T distributes contingent items in a bootstrap acquisition, •o the former T shareholders either may report their gain or may elect out of section 453 and treat
the contingent payments or items as though they were received in an open
transaction with common-law basis recovery reporting} 1 However, a former T
shareholder cannot both hold the contingent portion of the bootstrap acquisition
open by electing out of section 453 and installment report future P payments
for the T stock. Thus, as in a sale of assets by T, election out of section 453
may not be practical at the former T shareholder level.
If P is unrelated to the former T shareholders, payments by P and any
distribution by T to such shareholders in connection with the sale of their stock
of T to P will qualify for capital gains treatment under the "bootstrap acquisitions" doctrine. The bootstrap acquisitions doctrine combines the former T
shareholder level redemption by T and the sale at the former T shareholder
level for most tax transactions}~
Section 338 also provides that the Neo-T is deemed to have purchased Old
T's assets (on the day following the date P acquired control of Old T's stock)
for an amount equal to P's cost in Neo T's stock. This basis is adjusted for
T's liabilities and other relevant items}-' Consequently, in a section 338 stock
purchase, Neo-T's basis in its assets is the analogue of P's basis in T's assets
in a section 337 transaction.

B.

Historical Development of Sections 336 and 337: Asset Acquisitions
I.

Pre-1954 Code

Prior to the 1954 Code, there were no express statutory provisions governing
the tax treatment of a corporation that had distributed appreciated or depreciated
property in either liquidating or nonliquidating transactions}• However, longstanding Treasury regulations provided that no gain or loss would be recognized

38. I.R.C. § 338(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986). Section 338{c){2) provides that if, in connection
with a qualified stock purchase when § 338 is elected, T makes a distribution in complete redemption
of all the stock owned by a shareholder, § 336 is deemed to apply to the distribution as if it were
a distribution in complete liquidation. The purpose of § 338(c)(2) is to preclude gain from being
recognized by T under the provisions of § 3ll(c) which relates to stock redemptions by a continuing
corporation. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 134; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at
540.
39. I.R.C. § 543(c) (West Supp. 1986); see infra note 123.
40. In a bootstrap acquisition coupled with a § 338 election, T distributes unwanted assets
in a partial redemption of the former T shareholder's T stock. See supra note 13. I.R.C. § 338(c)(2),
discussed supra at note 28, applies in this context.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 237-318.
42. See supra note 23.
43. I.R.C. §§ 338(a)(2), 338(b) (West Supp. 1986); see infra note 101.
44. Wolfman, Corporate Distributions of Appreciated Property: The Case for Repeal of the
General Utilities Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 81, 82-83 (1985).
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from a mere in-kind distribution in partial or complete liquidation}~ Approximately twenty years prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, in General Utilities
& Operating Co. v. Helvering,~h the Supreme Court ruled that a nonliquidating
distribution of appreciated property did not constitute a sale at the corporate
level.., In addition, the Court stated that such distributing corporation did not
realize discharge of indebtedness income under the government's theory that the
distribution discharged the corporation's obligation to pay a dividend once
declared."" Interestingly, the circuit court in General Utilities held that the
distributing corporation was liable for the taxes on the appreciation because the
corporation, in substance, had made a sale of the distributed appreciated property.
The circuit court stated that the sale had been made by the shareholders because
the continuing corporation had negotiated the sale. 49 The Supreme Court declined
to address this issue because it was not raised in the trial court below. so
A decade later, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,~ 1 the Supreme Court
held that a shareholder sale of appreciated assets that were distributed to T's
shareholders by T in its complete liquidation could be recharacterized as a taxable
sale by T followed by a liquidating distribution of the proceeds to the share-

45. See Treas. Reg. § 39.22(a)-20 (1953) (originally promulgated as Treas. Reg. § 45, Art.
547 (1919)); Wolfman, supra note 44, at 82 n.3.
46. 296 U.S. 200 (1935); see supra text accompanying note 3. General Utilities involved a
dividend distribution, by the corporate taxpayer, of stock in a subsidiary to the taxpayer shareholders
with the understanding that the shareholders would sell the stock to the buyer according to the
terms of a prearranged, but not executed, sale between the taxpayer's officers and the buyer. The
Commissioner sloppily raised various arguments so that the precise holding of the Supreme Court
permitting nonrecognition by the continuing corporation upon the dividend distribution is difficult
to determine. See TAx REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 33.
[TJhe term "General Utilities rule" is often used . . . in a broader sense to refer to
the nonrecognition treatment accorded in certain situations to liquidating as well as
nonliquidating distributions to shareholders and to liquidating sales. The rule is codified
in several elaborate and often complex Code provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.
Section 311 governs the treatment of nonliquidating distributions of property (dividends
and redemptions), while section 336 governs the treatment of liquidating distributions
in kind. Section 337 provides nonrecognition treatment for certain sales or property
pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation.
/d.

47. 296 U.S. at 206.
48. /d.
49. General Utils. & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 74 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1935). The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the distribution of the stock of a subsidiary and subsequent
sale of the stock by the shareholders under a prearranged agreement was, in substance, a corporate
sale of the stock followed by distribution of the proceeds to the shareholders under the step
transaction doctrine. /d. at 976. This result is similar to the result reached ten years later by the
Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), except that in Court
Holding Co., the corporation liquidated completely.
50. 296 U.S. at 206; see also TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 35.
51. 324 U.S. 331 (1945). In Court Holding Co., T had negotiated the terms of the sale of
its sole asset, an apartment house. /d. at 332. Just before the sales contract was to be reduced to
writing and executed, the attorney for T and its two shareholders recommended that the sale be
consummated instead between the shareholders and the purchaser in order to reduce substantially
the federal income tax on the sale. !d. at 333. Accordingly, T distributed the apartment house to
its shareholders in complete liquidation. !d. The shareholders then sold the apartment house under
substantially the same terms as previously agreed upon to the same purchaser. /d.
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holders. This recharacterization was appropriate if T in substance had negotiated
the sale that was consummated in form by its former shareholders following
the liquidation. The Court's rationale was that under the step transaction doctrine
the former T shareholders act merely as a conduit for the sale made by T. ~l
Unfortunately, as is too often the case with the step transaction doctrine, form
came to control with postliquidating distribution sales generally not being attributed to a liquidated T when T had not negotiated the sale despite the fact
that T had contemplated such a sale.~-'

52.

/d. at 334. The step transaction doctrine has been defined as follows:

Under the step transaction doctrine, formally distinct transactions may be integrated
to determine the tax treatment of the entire series.
There is some controversy regarding the appropriate standard that is to be employed
in applying the step transaction doctrine. The doctrine has been variously expressed
as requiring a binding commitment, a mutual interdependence of steps, or merely a
particular end result.
Under the binding commitment approach, formally distinct transactions are integrated only if the affected taxpayers are contractually bound 10 take subsequent steps
after they take the initial step. Under the mutual interdependence approach, transactions
are integrated if they would have been fruitless without completion of the series. Finally,
under the end result approach, if a series of otherwise independent transactions, on
the one hand, and a single transaction, on the other hand, would have produced the
same end result, the series of independent transactions may be integrated.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON fiNANCE, 99TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE SUBCHAPTER C REVISION ACT
OF 1985: A fiNAL REPORT PREPARED BY THE STAFF, 16 (Comm. Print 1985) !hereinafter fiNAL STAFF
REPORT). See generally Biuker, Pervasive Judicial Doctrines in the Construction of the Internal
Revenue Code, 21 How. L.J. 693, 717-23 (1978); Murray, Step Transactions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REv.
60 (1969).
One case has held that the step transaction doctrine must take into account the particular
Code provision being addressed. McDonald's of Zion v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 972 (1981), rev'd
sub nom. McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1982).
53. In United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), the T shareholders
and purchasers danced an elaborate minuet under which the T shareholders first offered 10 sell the
T stock. The purchaser refused, but counteroffered to purchase some of the T's assets. T, in turn,
refused because it would have been compelled to pay a heavy capital gains tax. The T shareholders
supplied the solution by offering to sell the assets upon liquidation of the T. P accepted the offer.
T transferred the desired assets 10 its shareholders in partial liquidation and the remaining assets
were sold and the proceeds distributed in complete liquidation. The former T shareholders then
executed the previously contemplated sale to purchaser. The Supreme Court distinguished Court
Holding Co. on the grounds that T had negotiated the sale of its assets and then, belatedly
recognizing the tax consequences, purported to "call off" the sale at the last minute and distribute
the properties in kind to the shareholders who promptly conveyed them to the same persons who
had negotiated with T upon substantially the same terms. The Court reasoned that:
[f]he corporate tax was aimed primarily at the profits of a going concern. This is
lruc despite the fact that gains realized from corporate sales are taxed, perhaps to
prevent tax evasion, even where the cash proceeds are at once distributed in liquidation.
But Congress has imposed no tax on liquidating distributions in kind or on dissolution,
whatever may be the motive for such liquidation. Consequently, a corporation may
liquidate or dissolve without subjecting itself to the gains tax, even though a primary
motive is to avoid the burden of corporate taxation.
!d. at 455 (footnote omiued). Note the emphasis placed on the going concern. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951), cen. denied, 343 U.S.
934 (1952), taxed an ongoing corporation upon a shareholder executed sale of distributed inventory
assets that had not been negotiated, but was contemplated prior to the distribution, and was executed
by the corporation after the distribution.
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Post-1954 Code

In 1954 Congress addressed both the General Utilities and Court Holding
decisions by enacting sections 31 P~ and 336~~ which provide generally that no
gain or loss is recognized by T with respect to the distributions described above.
The purpose of sections 311 and 336 was to prevent recognition of market
appreciation that had not been realized by an arm's length transfer to an unrelated
party. ~ 6 Consequently, narrow exceptions to the corporate level shield of sections
311 and 336 were drawn for distribution of installment obligations. ~ Moreover,
the legislative history to section 311 noted an exception for common-law attribution of income. ~s The section 311 case-law exceptions were applied readily to
section 336. ~" T level treatment of contingent income items in liquidating distributions largely falls within this section 336 interstice. Subsequent legislative
and regulatory developments which began twenty years ago largely would repeal
General Utilities with respect to nonliquidating distributions and would override
7

54. I.R.C. § 311(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 311(a) provides that a distributing corporation
generally does not recognize gain on a nonliquidating distribution of appreciated property. For the
past 30 years, however, Congress steadily has whittled away at the general rule with a series of
exceptions that now virtually encompass the rule. As early as 1954, Congress carved out three
exceptions 10 the general rule that were targeted largely at the following specific types of potentially
abusive transactions: (I) nonrecognition was not available for distribution of installment obligations
to shareholders, id. § 4538; (2) upon distribution of LIFO inventory, a corporation recognized gain
to the extent that the basis of the inventory determined under FIFO exceeded the inventory's LIFO
value, id. at § 311(b); and (3) a corporation recognizes gain on the distribution of encumbered
property to the extent that liabilities exceed the basis of the property in the distributing corportion's
hands, id. § 31 l(c); see STAFF FtNAL REPORT, supra note 52, at 60-61. Congress also intended to
retain the judicially created exceptions to General Utilities, such as the assignment of income doctrine.
S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 247. Further exceptions and limitations were enacted in major
tax acts throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with the end result that distributions of appreciated
property, in redemptions or dividends, triggered gain unless certain historic shareholder or business
tests were met at either the corporate or shareholder level, or both. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West Supp.
1986). See generally Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilities Repeal: Further
Indigestions From Overly Processed Corn Products, 30 TAX NoTES 1375, 1376-77 ( 1986) (summary
of rules regarding distributions of appreciated property and comparison with proposed repeal of General
Utilities.).
55. I.R.C. § 336(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 336(a) provides for nonrecognition of gain
or loss by a corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation. Similar to § 311,
§ 336 provides for recognition with respect to distribution of installment obligations acquired other
than in a § 337 liquidating sale. More recently, § 336 has been made subject to a LIFO inventory
rule, similar to the rule applicable to § 311. /d. § 336(b). The depreciation recapture provisions
override § 336 distributions just as they override § 311 distributions. See infra note 57. Unlike §
311, however, § 336 "has survived with relatively few modifications since its enactment" and hence,
the rules that it provides are more liberal than the rules applicable 10 nonliquidating distributions
under § 311. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 38-39. The markedly different tax
consequences for nonliquidating and liquidating distributions create tremendous pressure in favor
of a §§ 336-338 transaction. "This pressure makes the system non neutral and subject to manipulation,
and adds great complexity to the area." FtNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 60.
56. See generally Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
57. I.R.C. §§ 311(a), 336(a), 4538 (West Supp. 1986). Similarly, subsequently enacted recapture
of income provisions override §§ 311 and 336. !d. §§ 1245(a), 1250(a); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1245-6(b),
1.1250-l(c)(2) (1982); see Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 398.
58. S. Rep. No. 1622, supra note 14, at 247; Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank, 460 U.S. at 398-99 &
n.35.
59. Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 528-29 (Ct. Cl. 1961); see infra text accompanying note 346.
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sections 311, 336, and 337 in the case of distributions of items subject to
"recapture" under various statutory provisions (recapture income).""
Having codified General Utilities, Congress finessed the issue of whether T
or T's shareholders had, in fact, made a sale of the property distributed in T's
complete liquidation by enacting section 337. Section 337 shields a liquidating
corporation from taxation on gain or loss with respect to its "property" if such
property is sold during the twelve-month period following the corporation's
adoption of a plan of complete liquidation, provided that the corporation also
distributes all of its assets in complete liquidation within the twelve-month
period."' Thus, in 1954 Congress generally intended identical shareholder level
tax consequences regardless of whether T "sells its assets and [then) distributes
the proceeds to its shareholders in complete liquidation or, conversely, distributes
[the) assets in kind to its shareholders" before subsequent sale by them-in
short, the goal sought by Congress was to achieve parity between sections 336
and 337 ."2 Ironically, General Utilities was extended to situations when clearly
there was a "realization" by the liquidating corporation."-'
As originally enacted, sections 336 and 337 contained similar exceptions for
distribution and sale of installment obligations. 04 The subsequently enacted "recapture income" provisions apply equally to both sections."~ As discussed more
fully below,"" the Supreme Court ended lower court conflicts in Hillsboro National
Bank v. Commissioner," 7 by ruling that sections 336 and 337 must be "construed
in tandem. ""x Thus, the rule adopted by the courts which provides that the tax
benefit rule overrides the nonrecognition provisions, applies equally to both
provisions."~ Additionally, some, but not all, courts construed the term "property" under section 337 to rule out nonrecognition of items to which the
assignment of income doctrine normally would apply. 711 Those are the T level

60. See the list of statutory recapture exceptions and limitations to §§ 311 and 336 set forth
in fiNAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 61. See generally Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, §
12.05, at 12-30 n.76. The legislative trend of denying the General Utilities shield to nonliquidating
distributions is traced in TAx REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 36-39.
61. I.R.C. § 337(a) (West Supp. 1986). "Thus, the distinction drawn in Court Holding Co.
and Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co. between a sale of assets followed by a liquidating distribution of
the proceeds and a liquidating distribution in kind followed by a shareholder sale, in large part
was eliminated." TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 36.
62. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110, 114-15 (6th Cir. 1973); S. Rep. No.
1622, supra note 14, at 258. See generally Bonovitz, Problems in Achieving Parity in Tax Treatment
Under Sections 337 and 334(b)(2), 34 INST. ON fED. TAX'N 57, 60-75 (1976).
63. See Wolfman, supra note 44, at 82-83.
64. I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 337, 453B(a), 453B(d)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
65. See supra notes 57 & 60.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 421-36.
67. 460 u.s. 370 (1983).
68. /d. at 400.
69. /d. at 401-02; see also infra text accompanying notes 357-58.
70. In Pridemark Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) the court equated the
definition of property in § 1221 with the definition in § 337(b). /d. at 44-45. Under this reading,
any gain on the sale of a noncapital asset would not be shielded by § 337(a) The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, refused to equate§§ 1221 and 337(b) and applied the doctrine announced
in Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) to § 337. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494, 500-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 848 (1970). Using the
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section 337 crevices into which contingent income items fall. While both sections
336 and 337 are subject to the proviso that the liquidating corporation's method
of accounting must reflect its income clearly, this doctrine traditionally fails to
meet contingent income problems. 71
C.

Historical Development of Section 338: Stock Acquisition
1.

Pre-1954 Code

Prior to 195472 the Internal Revenue Code provided, as does the current
Code, that when a parent corporation liquidates a controlled subsidiary the
parent does not recognize gain or loss. As a concomitant, the parent holds the
liquidated subsidiary's assets with a "carryover" basis, (the parent's "inside"
basis in the subsidiary's hands). 73 Several years prior to the 1954 Code the Tax
Court applied the step transaction doctrine relied upon in Commissioner v. Court
Holding Company, 74 in Kimbe/1-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner75 and
held that when P acquired control of T and liquidated it as part of a single
transaction in order to acquire T's assets, P's basis in such assets was its
"outside" cost rather than T's historic "inside" adjusted basis. The Tax Court
reasoned that, in substance, P had acquired T's assets, rather than T's stock,
by disregarding the acquisition of the stock as a transitory step. 76 As is the
usual case with the step transaction doctrine, certainty with respect to whether
P would succeed in linking the first step of buying T's stock with the last step
of acquiring T's assets in liquidation was not possible. 77

2.

1954 Code to TEFRA

In 1954 Congress effectuated the principles of Kimbe/1-Diamond in (now
repealed) section 334(b)(2),n which provided that if P purchased "control" of
T in a taxable transaction within a twelve-month period, adopted a plan of

"integral asset" reading of Corn Prods., the court held that the petitioner was liable for taxes on
the sale of the player contracts made during the liquidation period. 423 F.2d at 501-03. Finally,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed a functional approach to the definition of "property"
under § 337(b) in order to achieve parity between §§ 336 and 337. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United
States, 485 F.2d I 10, 116-18 (6th Cir. 1973). Under this approach, "property" is restricted to the
definition expressed in § 337(b). However, the case-law doctrines overriding § 336 are applied directly
to § 337. /d. at 118. For a more in-depth discussion, see Lee, supra note 54, at 1379-80.
71. I.R.C. §§ 446(b), 482 (West Supp. 1986); see infra text accompanying notes 377 & 38589.
72. I.R.C. § 112(b) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 332(a) (West Supp. 1986)).
73. I.R.C. § 332(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 332(a) provides that a parent corporation
does not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property distributed in complete liquidation of a
subsidiary in which the parent holds at least an 8007o interest. The distribution must take place
over a specified period. /d. § 332(b). In such a nonrecognition liquidation, the corporate shareholder
generally takes a carryover basis in the property received from the liquidating subsidiary. /d. §
334(b). In addition, the corporate shareholder inherits the tax attributes of the liquidated subsidiary.
/d. § 381. See generally FINAL STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 25.
74. 324 u.s. 331 (1945).
75. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827
(1951).
76. 14 T.C. at 80.
77. See B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 74 (2d ed. 1979).
78. /d.
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complete liquidation within two years thereafter and liquidated T within three
years after such adoption, P's basis in the T assets received in liquidation was
P's basis in the T stock, adjusted for T's liabilities and certain postacquisition
transactions including T income and distributions. Because section 334(b)(2)
required the liquidation of T in order for P to obtain a cost basis in T's assets,
section 336 applied at the T level to the liquidating distributions. 79 P did not
recognize a gain or loss on the liquidation of such a controlled T under section
332. Whether Kimbe/1-Diamond itself remained alive after the enactment of
section 334(b )(2) was uncertain. xo
The goal of section 334(b)(2), albeit unarticulated, was parity: this time
between a stock purchase and an asset purchase at the P Ievel.x 1 However, due
to the potentially long delay between P's acquisition of control of T and its
liquidation, substantial discontinuities existed at the T and P levels under the
original version of section 334(b )(2). 12 In addition, at one time discontinuities
were thought to arise at the T level between the application of section 336 to
T's in-kind section 332 liquidating distribution of its assets to its new controlling
shareholder P and the application of section 337 to the sale by T of its assets
to P followed by complete liquidation of T and distribution of the sales proceeds
to T's shareholders. 83 Furthermore, prior to the Installment Sales Revision Act
of 1980, substantial T shareholder level discontinuities existed between an installment sale of control of T's stock by the T shareholders to P and an
installment asset sale by T to P followed by T's liquidation.x• However, the
Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980 in new section 453(h), discussed below, xs
largely eliminated these T shareholder level discontinuities. Moreover, by 1982
the courts largely had eliminated any T level discontinuities between sections
336 and 337 with respect to common-law attribution of income.x• Indeed, Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner,x 7 decided by the Supreme Court in 1983,
expressly stated that the function of sections 336 and 337 "reveals that they
should be construed in tandem. "MM Nevertheless, due to the potential five year
gap between acquisition of control of T and its liquidation under old section
334(b)(2), discontinuities remained at the T and P levels.

3.

TEFRA Reform: Section 338, Consistency at What Price?

In 1982, Congress focused on the inconsistencies inherent in permitting the
continuation of T's tax attributes, including net operating losses (NOL's), x9 for

79. See Bonovitz, supra note 62, at 87.
80. See B. BtTTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, , 11.45, at 11-48 n.ll3.
81. The legislative history of § 334(b)(2) did not speak of parity. See S. Rep. No. 1622,
supra note 14, at 257.
82. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 25, at 132.
83. /d.
84. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20-22 (1980).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 146-47.
86. See, e.g., Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975); Rev. Rul. 77-190, 1977C.B. 88.
87. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
88. /d. at 400.
89. I.R.C. § 172(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 172(a) provides a deduction for net operating
loss carryovers and carrybacks. "If consolidated returns were filed by the acquiring corporation,
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up to five years after a cost basis stock acquisition while also treating the
transaction as thoughT's assets had been purchased.'~<' Moreover, if consolidated
returns~ 1 were filed by P and T, T's tax attributes, subject to certain limitations,
continued to be reflected in P's postacquisition consolidated returns until T's
complete liquidation. 92 Perhaps even more significantly, T's "recapture income,"
triggered by its liquidation, could be offset by losses of other members of the
P consolidated group.~ 3 Additionally, the technical adjustments for T's earnings
(including recapture income) or deficits during the period between acquisition
and liquidation, as well as the rules for allocation of P's basis adjusted for T's
liabilities (including any recapture income tax liability), could lead to a step-up
basis exceeding what would have been P's cost basis in a section 337 asset
acquisition.~4 Finally, the congressional modifications of the stock purchase treated
as asset purchase rules were supported by the following rationale:
[The pre-1982 law] provided unwarranted tax motivations for structuring a corporate acquisition as in part a purchase of assets and in
part a purchase of stock or as a purchase of several corporations
historically operated as a unit in order to preserve selectivity of tax
treatment. These motivations included the ability to achieve a steppedup basis for some assets while avoiding recapture tax and other
unfavorable tax attributes with respect to other assets.~j
For these reasons, in 1982 Congress repealed section 334(b)(2) and enacted new
section 338.
Section 338 abandoned the liquidation of T as the triggering event for P's
obtaining a cost basis in T's assets when P purchased control of T's stock.
Instead, Congress introduced an explicit election and at long last laid Kimbe/1Diamond to rest. 96 Indeed, the requirement of T's liquidation was eliminated,
and instead Congress sought to achieve parity at the T and P levels with respect
to asset acquisitions (section 337) and stock acquisitions treated as asset acquisitions (section 338), through the mechanism of a "deemed bulk sale" of
T's assets to which section 337 applied.~ 7 Thus, in order to achieve parity at
the T level between a T shareholder sale of stock and a T asset sale pursuant

the tax attributes of the acquired corporation (including carryovers, subject to certain limitations
in the Code and the consolidated return regulations) were reflected on such returns for the period
prior to its complete liquidation." 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132-33; see also S. REP. No.
494, supra note 37, at 192.
90. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132; see also S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 192.
91. See generally B. BtTTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, , 15.21, at 15-52 to -56.
92. /d. , 15.24, at 15-74 to -82.
93. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133.
94. R.M. Smith, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 317 (1977); 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35,
at 133; Bonovitz, Taxable Dispositions of a Corporate Business Before and After TEFRA [Part If,
60 TAXES 812, 820 (1982).
95. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133. These attempts to close the loophole included
stringent section 311 (d) restrictions on target level escape of recognition with respect to distribution
of appreciated property in a partial liquidation. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 239-45. Similarly,
the § 338 consistency rules fall into this pattern.
96. S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 192; 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133.
97. I.R.C. § 338(a) (West Supp. 1986). See generally 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 13334.
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to a plan of its complete liquidation, Old T is treated under a section 338
election as having sold all of its assets on the date that P acquired control of
T at fair market value in a single transaction to which section 337 applied.""
To preclude Old T's "recapture income" from being sheltered by losses of the
P group the deemed bulk sale is bifurcated:"" the continuing purchased target
corporation, Neo-T, is deemed to have purchased Old T's assets on the day
following the deemed sale by Old T."x' Neo-T's basis under a section 338 election
is derived from P's cost adjusted for T's liabilities and other relevant items. 101
However, Congress eliminated the old section 334(b)(2) interim adjustments' 02
and provided numerous refinements for circumstances such as postacquisition
outstanding T minority shareholders"'3 and T stock purchased by P prior to the
twelve-month acquisition period ending on P's acquisition of control.'""'
Section 338 was intended to provide nonrecognition of gain or loss at the
T level to the same extent that gain or loss would not be recognized under
section 336. In order for section 336 to apply there had to be an actual liquidation
of T on the acquisition date to which old section 334(b) applied. •os Nevertheless,

98. See TAX REFORM PROPOSALS, supra note 19, at 41-42; S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37,
at 192-93.
99. See S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193; 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 135.
100. l.R.C. § 338(a) (West Supp. 1986). Congress intended that the T be treated as a "new"
corporation (Neo-T) after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to its tax liability either as
Old T or as a surrogate for P. S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193. The different direction
that the temporary regulations take regarding contingent income of Neo-T is discussed infra at notes
572-73.
101. l.R.C. § 338(b) (West Supp. 1986). The adjusted grossed-up basis (AGUB) must be
allocated among Neo-T's assets beginning the day after the acquisition date pursuant to the rules
under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986). Generally, the AGUB is allocated first to Class I
assets, then in turn to Class II, III, and IV assets. Class I assets consist of cash, demand deposits,
and similar bank or savings and loan accounts. Class II assets include certificates of deposit,
government obligations, and other readily. marketable stock and securities. Class II I assets consist
of all assets other than Class I, II, and IV assets. Class IV assets are intangible assets in the nature
of goodwill and going concern value. Within each class, the basis is allocated according to the fair
market value. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(b) (1986). The amount of AGUB allocated to an
asset (other than a Class IV asset) is limited to the asset's fair market value the day after the
acquisition date. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l) (1986). However, this fair market value
subsequently may be modified with respect to certain contingent income assets. /d.; Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(g) (1986).
The Temporary Regulations also provide a "transitional allocation election" for stock acquisitions
that occur after August 31, 1982 and before January 30, 1986, or under a written contract entered
into between those dates. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-4(T) (1986). A corporation that makes such
an election may allocate AGUB pursuant "to the rules of Federal income tax law that apply to
the purchase on the acquisition date of a combination of assets for a lump sum." Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.338(b)-4T(e)(2) (1986). In other words, an electing corporation is not bound by the fair
market value limitation in the Temporary Regulations. However, any allocation that exceeds an
asset's fair market value will be scrutinized carefully by the Internal Revenue Service. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § I .338(b)-4T(e)(4) (1986). For a discussion of the old allocation rules under § 338, see Rogers,
Purchase Price Allocations in Taxable Acquisitions: New Frontiers-New Hazards, 62 TAXES 813
(1984). Under 1986 legislation (l.R.C. § 1060 (1986)), the tier system of allocation in the § 338
Temporary Treasury Regulations will also be applicable to § 337 transactions. See infra note 653.
102. See supra text accompanying note 94.
103. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 289-93.
104. See generally STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98th CONG., 2o SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION AcT OF 1984 995-96 (Comm.
Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 BLUEBOOK].
105. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133.
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numerous instances may arise in which section 338 is more favorable than an
actual liquidation, because its shield is available in instances when section 337
would not be available if T actually sold its assets pursuant to a plan of complete
liquidation. 1116 More significantly, discontinuities arise because T actually is not
liquidated under section 338 107 (although a liquidation is permissible, in which
case P or any drop-down subsidiary takes Neo-T's carryover "cost" basis), wx

106. A number of discontinuities (including one in which § 338 is favored) arise because of
this situation. First, the collapsible corporation prohibition in an actual § 337 sale and the installment
reporting requirement under § 453(h) will arise, particularly when a bootstrap acquisition is involved.
See I.R.C. § 341(e) (West Supp. 1986); Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 169. Second, an actual liquidation
pursuant to a § 337 asset sale serves double duty for the dividends received credit rules under the
accumulated earnings and personal holding company provisions. See Bonovitz, supra note 94, at
335. A similar credit does not appear to be available to Neo-T in a T stock sale when § 338 is
elected. See id. at 335. Third, a discontinuity in favor of a § 338 stock sale arises when T has
sold a portion of its inventory to someone other than P. The remaining portion of the inventory
would be shielded under § 338, but would not be protected under an actual § 337 sale because
the bulk sale exception would not be reached. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 278-79. Fourth,
more significant discontinuity can arise with regard to T's NOLs. Recapture income at the T level
in the case of an actual asset sale under § 337 can be shielded by the NOLs of the entire T
consolidated group, if any NOLs exist, whereas under the § 338 temporary regulations, only T's
deconsolidated share of any T consolidated group NOL is available to shield T's recapture income.
See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[8), at 12-55; Temp. Treas. Reg. § 51.338-1T(f)(3)(iv)
(1984). Fifth, T may be able to obtain greater deductibility with respect to its share of the cost
of the transfer of its assets under a § 337 sale, than in a sale of its stock accompanied by a §
338 election. See Stone, Planning Cash and Other Nonreorganization Mergers, 37 lNST. ON FED.
T AX'N § 1.04[5), at 1-22 to -25 (1979). Sixth, conventional wisdom holds that an allocation between
T and P of purchase price in a § 337 transaction is more efficacious than an allocation between
P and Neo-T in a § 338 transaction. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 289. In reality, allocations
are not tax adverse in classic cost basis acquisitions when T's nonrecapture gain is sheltered by §§
337 or 338. Only when T does not shelter recapture income with NOLs, will the allocations between
P and T reach sufficient tax adversity to establish fair market value under the willing buyer-willing
seller definition. See Grow v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1057 (1984). See generally Black
Indus. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 242, 252-53 (I979); Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill:
Allocating a Lump Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. CoRP.
T AX'N Ill (1980). Any allocation between P and T must be completed at the time of the stock
acquisition. Cf. Bane One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 494-95 (1985). Current allocations
between P and T may not be able to vary the tiers of allocation set forth in the temporary
regulations. Last, minor discontinuities between stock and asset acquisitions exist because of the
differing rules between purchases of stock from related parties for purposes of § 338 and purchases
of T's assets by a related P, followed by distributions to common shareholders for purposes of
"D" reorganization status. See Ginsburg, Stepped Up Basis Corporate Acquisitions, 37 VA. CONF.
ON FED. TAX. 507, 516-17 (June 7, 1985).
I07. Congress addressed one discontinuity between an actual § 337 asset sale and a s!Ock sale
with a § 338 election. If a T adopted a plan of complete liquidation and subsequently made sales
intending to obtain the shield of § 337, but the control of stock was sold and § 338 was elected
prior to the liquidation of T, then the technical requirement of complete liquidation of T in the
12 month period under § 337 was not met. Section 338(h)(l2) provides that in such circumstances,
for purposes of § 337, T is treated as having distributed all its assets as of the close of the acquisition
date. See H.R. REP. No. 432 Part 2, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1619-20 (1984). The double duty actual
§ 337 liquidation-dividend credit for accumlated earnings and personal holding company taxes,
described supra at note 106-has not been addressed by Congress. Nor has Congress addressed clearly
the contingent income discontinuities when T is not liquidated in a § 338 acquisition.
108. Once P has control ofT, it then can liquidate T under § 332 and obtain T's assets with
a carryover basis. Of course, if § 338 has been elected, the carryover basis is that of Neo-T.
Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 260-61. In this case P also inherits Neo-T's tax attributes, but only
from the day following acquisition in the case of a § 338 election. Therefore, any consequences
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despite the fact that Congress intended treatment of Neo-T as a "new" corporation after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to its tax liability
either as the selling or purchasing corporation. u» The absence of an actual
liquidation of T in a section 338 transaction creates problems with respect to
a contingent income item because the conventional rules, at times, are more
favorable to T when it liquidates pursuant to section 337 rather than continuing
to transact business.
Section 338 was "crafted" during intense congressional scrutiny of asset
selectivity transactions. 11 " Consequently, Congress included a "consistency" requirement in section 338. 111 This requirement probably is the raison d'etre for
section 338. 112 Under the "consistency" requirement, P and its affiliates must
be consistent in their treatment of qualified stock purchases of, ll.1 and asset
purchases 11 • from, T and any of T's affiliates 115 during a two to three year
consistency period. 116 A direct purchase of assets from T or its affiliates by P
or its affiliates during such consistency period is treated statutorily as a section
338 election by P. 117 The temporary regulations attempt to force the transaction
into a carryover basis with respect to the T assets acquired by P or its affiliates. 11M
In any event, P cannot easily obtain cost basis for some assets and a carryover
basis for other T assets, as was possible prior to 1982.
that would apply to Neo-T with respect to contingent income should apply to P if Neo-T has been
liquidated because P inherited Neo-T's tax attributes and status as successor to earner of the contingent income.
109. See supra note 100.
110. See Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 299.
Ill. I.R.C. §§ 338(e), (f), (h)(4) (West Supp. 1986). The goal of these rules is to preclude
P from obtaining a cost basis in some T assets and a carryover basis in other T assets (by not
electing§ 338), as it could prior to TEFRA. See Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.01[2), at
12-7. The consistency rules have been criticized, however, as the "one major misconception" in §
338. /d.; accord Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 299.
112. See 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 132-33 & 137; S. REP. No. 494, supra note 37,
at 192, 195.
113. Section 338(f) requires consistency with respect to all stock acquisitions by P or affiliates
from the same T affiliated group during the consistency period by mandating that any election with
respect to the first such qualified stock purchase will apply to each subsequent purchase, and no
election may be made with respect to a second or subsequent purchase if a § 338 election was not
made for the first such qualified stock purchase. I.R.C. § 338(f) (West Supp. 1986).
114. Section 338(e) similarly mandates that P "shall be treated as having made an election
under [§ 338) with respect to any target if, at any time during the consistency period, [P) acquires
any asset of the target corporation." However, a laundry list of exceptions is provided, the most
important of which include sales by the T in the ordinary course of business and carryover basis
acquisitions of property. /d. §§ 338(e)(2)(A), 338(e)(2)(8).
115. The term "target affiliate" is defined as each corporation that was "at any time during
so much of the consistency period as ends on the acquisition date of the target corporation, a
member of an affiliated group which had the same common parent." /d. § 338(h)(6)(A).
116. The consistency period is defined as "the period consisting of-(i) the 1-year period
beginning before the beginning of the 12-month acquisition period for the target corporation (ii)
such acquisition period (up to and including the acquisition date) and (iii) the 1-year period beginning
on the day after the acquisition date." /d. § 338(h)(4)(A). The Secretary can extend the period to
"include any period during which . . . there was in effect a plan to make a qualified stock
purchase." /d. § 338(h)(4)(8); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4T(g) (1985).
117. I.R.C. § 338(e) (West Supp. 1986).
118. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338-4T(f)(6)(i)(A) (1985); Income Taxes; Questions and Answers
Relating to Domestic Maners Under Section 338 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954; Temporary
Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 16,402, 16,403 (1985).
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D. Historical Development of Section 453: Installment Reporting of
Leveraged Acquisitions; Legislative Regulations for Open Transactions
Sections 453(a) 119 and 453(c) 120 require a seller of realty, or a nondealer seller
of personalty, 121 to report gain on the installment method in qualifying circumstances, unless the seller otherwise "elects out." 122 Installment reporting contemplates ratable recognition, that is, the seller's basis in property conveyed,
and hence the gain, if any, is prorated among all payments present and future. 1 ~'

119. I.R.C. § 453(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453 provides that income from an installment
sale is to be taken into account under the installment method. /d. § 453(a). In turn, "installment
sale" is defined as a disposition of property with at least one payment being received after the
close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs. /d. § 453(b)(l). Section 453(b) excludes
from the simplified installment reporting provisions dealer dispositions of personal property and
inventories of personal property. /d. § 453(b)(2). This simplified version, enacted in the Installment
Sales Revision Act of 1980, eliminated various technical requirements such as a 300Jo initial payment
limitation and a requirement of two payments. See S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 3.
120. l.R.C. § 453(c) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453 is the operative provision and defines
"installment method" as recognition of income for any taxable year, under a fraction applied to
that year's payments. The fraction is equal to the proportion the gross profit from a sale bears
to the total contract price. Generally, the contract price is the amount that will be paid to the
seller. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7.
121. Dealers in personal property must report installments under § 453A(a), which is identical
to the pre-1980 general installment ·reporting provisions. See I.R.C. § 453A(a) (West Supp. 1986).
122. I.R.C. § 453(d) (West Supp. 1986) provides that a taxpayer may elect to have the
installment method of reporting income not apply to the disposition of any property-an "election
out." The pre-1980 law provided that the taxpayer had to elect to report gains from an installment
sale-an "election in"-on a timely filed return, a delinquent return, or an omitted return for the
year of sale that was not barred by the statute of limitations if the facts indicated that no taxpayer
position inconsistent with the installment election had been made with respect to the sale. Rev. Rul.
65-297, 1965-2 C.B. I52. See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7; Emory, Installment
Method of Reporting Income: Its Election, Use, and Effect, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. 181, 220-27 (1968);
Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAX L. REv. 469, 527-56 (1975). Alternatively,
if the return that was filed included the entire gain from the installment sale, under pre-1980 rules
an amended return or claim for refund could not be used to elect installment sale reporting; the
reporting of the gain in full in the year of sale was treated as a binding election not to report on
the installment method. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 10. As Ginsburg pointed out, the pre1980 election in rule was a prime illustration of "[o]ne of the few reliable rules of human conduct
... if something can go wrong, it will." Ginsburg recommended the election out. Ginsburg, supra,
at 478-79. Congress chose this method, and the temporary regulations draw narrow lines requiring
essentially a timely election on the tax return for the year of sale. The regulations permit elections
after the due date only in rare circumstances when the Service concludes that the taxpayer had
good cause for failing to make a timely election. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 15a.453-l(d)(3)(i) to l(d)(3)(ii) (1981). Conditional elections are forbidden expressly. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(3)(ii)
(1981).
123. I.R.C. § 453(c) (West Supp. 1986). "Gain is recognized as payments are received; the
gain recognized for any taxable year is the proportion of the installment payment received in that
year which the gross profit, realized or to be realized when the contract is completed, bears to the
total contract price." Temporary Income Tax Regulations; Installment Sales-General Rules, T.D.
7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296, 297. See generally Friedman, The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980,
35 MAJoR TAX PLAN. , 700, at 7-3 (1983). "Gross profit" consists of the "selling price" less adjusted
basis. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(v) (1981); see Friedman, supra 1 701.4, at 7-14 to -15.
"Selling price," in turn, is defined as the gross selling price, without any reduction for existing
encumbrances or selling expenses. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(ii) (1981). "Contract price"
is defined as the total contract price reduced by the "qualifying indebtedness" assumed by the
buyer, to the extent that such assumed indebtedness does not exceed the seller's basis in the property
and adjusted upward for selling expenses. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(b)(2)(iii) (1981). "Qualifying
indebtedness" consists of indebtedness encumbering the property (e.g., a mortgage) and unsecured
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Under current law only a single future payment is required. 12 ~ Although first
enacted in 1926, m the installment method for reporting gain was inapplicable
to contingent payments or items until the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980. 126 The pre-1980 rationale was that installment reporting traditionally turned
on the ratio of the "gross profit" to the "total contract price," 127 neither of
which were known when the sales price was contingentY" Moreover, prior to
1980, installment reporting at the T shareholder level could not be achieved
readily when T sold its assets on the installment basis to P, pursuant to a plan
of complete liquidation, and distributed P's installment obligations to the former
T shareholders. This situation existed because the liquidating distribution of such
obligations constituted payment for the former T shareholder's stock in the year
of distribution. m In some jurisdictions installment reporting could be achieved
by T shareholders selling their stock under the installment method to a related
party who, in turn, liquidated T and subsequently sold its assets on the installment
method, or even for cash, to P. 130

1.

Legislative Regulations For Installment Reporting
of Contingent Payments

In 1980 Congress overturned prior case law and permitted installment reporting of contingent sales price transactions by authorizing regulations that
provide for "ratable basis recovery in transactions where the gross profit or the
total contract price (or both) cannot be readily ascertained." 131 Temporary regulations provide for basis recovery when the aggregate selling price in a sale or

indebtedness incurred or assumed by the purchaser incident to the acquisition, holding, or operation
of the property in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's business or investment activities. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l (b)(2)(iv) ( 1981 ). Taxpayer obligations that are unrelated or incurred instant
to the disposition are excluded. /d.
124. I.R.C. § 453(bXI) (West Supp. 1986). In defining "installment sale," § 453(b)(l) requires
only a disposition of property in which at least one payment is to be received after the close of
the taxable year in which the disposition occurs. Thus, no more than one payment, albeit a future
payment, is required. This requirment is in contrast with prior law which required two payments.
See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 482-84.
125. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 23 (1926). Prior regulations permitted installment
reporting. The rationale of the statutory installment reporting option was to relieve taxpayers who
adopted it from having to pay an income tax in the year of sale, based on the full amount of
anticipated profits, when in fact the taxpayers had only received a small portion of the sales price.
S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 7.
126. See S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 22-23; Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 493-95.
127. See supra notes 120 & 123.
128. Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158, 1160 (lOth Cir. 1972); accord In re Steen 509
F.2d 1398, 1402 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975); Rev. Rul. 76-109, 1976-1 C.B. 125. See generally Pusey, When
Adjustments to Selling Price Bar Use of Installment Reporting, 47 J. TAX'N 22 (1977). When
taxpayers desired installment reporting and faced a possible contingent payout, a sophisticated
technique was developed in order to provide a fixed payment that was reducible in the event of
the occurrence of certain contingencies. Installment reporting was available as to the fixed amount.
See Rev. Rul. 77-56, 1977-1 C.B. 135.
129. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 14; Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 484-85.
130. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 888 (1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 107, at 113-14; Newman, Structuring the Sale of the
Closely Held Corporate Business: Alternate Strategies, 41 INST. ON fED. TAX'N § 3.03[1], at 3-29
(1983).
131. I.R.C. § 4530)(2) (West Supp. 1986).
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disposition of propertym cannot be determined by the close of the taxable year 1-'-'
in which the disposition occurred. These regulations carefully overrule various
case law analogues of, and variations on, the common-law open transaction
doctrine which is discussed below. 1-' 4 In addition, the regulations echo the opinion
of both the Commissioner and Congress 13 ~ that the value of an installment
obligation for a contingent amount cannot be ascertained reasonably only in
rare and extraordinary circumstances. 136 The temporary regulations divide contingent payments into three categories of prescribed basis recovery: (I) when
the maximum selling price is determinable, but the period over which payments
are to be received is not; 137 (2) when such period is determinable, but the

132. A "sale" or "other disposition" constitutes a prerequisite for installment sales reporting.
When an indefinite sales price payable over an indefinite period is involved, the initial issue is
whether a sale has, in fact, occurred. Ginsburg pointed out that in such circumstances it is "proper
to inquire at the threshold whether the transaction fairly qualifies as a sale or whether, instead,
the taxpayer has retained a continuing economic interest in the property which might more appropriately be accounted for on a royalty or similar basis." Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 495. The
temporary regulations state that "[i]f the agreement neither specifies a maximum selling price nor
limits payments to a fixed period, a question arises whether a sale realistically has occurred or
whether, in economic effect, payments received under the agreement are in the nature of rent or
royalty income. Arrangements of this sort will be closely scrutinized." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453l(c)(4) (1981).
133. Historically, the Service has taken the position that the opened or closed status of a sale
or other disposition is determined as of the close of the tax year. See Rev. Rul. 76-109, 1976-1
C. B. 125. The temporary regulations define "contingent payment sale" as "a sale or other disposition
of property in which the aggregate selling price cannot be determined by the close of the taxable
year in which such sale or other disposition occurs." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453(c)(l) (1981).
134. This doctrine is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 237-55. The temporary regulations, in the context of an election out and reporting on other than the installment basis, state
that "[a] taxpayer who elects not to report an installment sale on the installment method must
recognize gain on the sale in accordance with the taxpayer's method of accounting." Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2) (1981). Fair market value is determined without regard to any provision of
contract or local law that restricts the transferability of the installment obligation. Furthermore,
the receipt of an istallment obligation is to be treated as receipt of property in an amount equal
to the fair market value of the installment obligation, regardless of whether it is the "equivalent
of cash." "An installment obligation is considered to be property and is subject to valuation ...
without regard to whether the obligation is embodied in a note, an executory contract, or any other
instrument, or is an oral promise enforceable under local law." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453l(d)(2)(i) (1981). Under the regulations an installment obligation for a fixed amount obligation is
not considered an "open" transaction. Additionally, "[i]n no event will the fair market value of
the installment obligation be considered to be less than the fair market value of the property sold
.. " Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2)(ii)(A) (1981).
135. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 24.
136. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1 (dX2)(iii) (1981 ).
137. A contingent payment sale is treated as having a "stated maximum selling price," if the
agreement provides a basis for determining, as of the end of the taxable year in which the sale or
other disposition occurs, the maximum amount of sales proceeds that may be received. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(2)(i) (1981). See generally S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23 (Generally
the maximum selling price is to be "determined from the 'four corners' of the contract agreement
. . . assuming all contingencies, formulas, etc., operate in the taxpayer's favor."). Thus, incidental
or remote contingencies are not taken into account initially. Using the general basis allocation rules,
the stated maximum selling price as determined initially is thereafter treated as the selling price,
unless and until the maximum amount is reduced. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(2)(i)(A) (1981).
If the price ultimately paid is less than the stated maximum selling price as determined originally,
the gross profit ratio is recomputed in the subsequent tax year. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453l(c)(2)(i)(A) (1981). The legislative history indicates that in the event of such year 2 recomputation,
the taxpayer would repon reduced income as adjusted with respect to each installment payment
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maximum selling price is not determinable; 138 and (3) when neither a maximum
selling price nor a definite payment term are determinable. 139 In addition, the
temporary regulations provide for "income forecast" reporting in certain limited
circumstances. 140
Stated maximum selling price payments, fixed period payments, and payments
when neither the stated maximum selling price nor the period is fixed are subject
to special rules designed to prevent substantial distortion of income. One set
of rules involves substantial and inappropriate deferral, in which case the taxpayer
will seek to have a more rapid basis recovery. The taxpayer may use an alternate
method of basis recovery if he is able to demonstrate prior to the date that
the return is due that the application of the normal basis recovery rule will

received in the taxable year of adjustment and subsequent taxable years. If the taxpayer already
had "reported more income from installment payments received in previous taxable years than the
total recomputed income, the taxpayer would be permitted to deduct the excess in the adjustment
year as a loss." S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23.
138. "When a stated maximum selling price cannot be determined as of the close of the
taxable year in which the sale or disposition occurs," but the installment obligation is payable over
a fixed maximum period, the basis of the property sold (inclusive of selling expenses) generally is
allocated in equal annual increments to the taxable years in which the payments may be received.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(3)(i) (1981). If the payment in any taxable year is less than the
basis allocated to that year (or if no payment is received), the temporary regulations deny any loss
until the final payment year, unless the future payment obligation of the agreement has become
worthless under the general tax rules applicable to worthless debts. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453l(c)(3)(i) (1981). When no loss is allowed, the unrecovered portion of the basis allocated to the
taxable year is carried forward to the next succeeding taxable year. The rules in this context are
subject to the substantial distortion of income provisions discussed infra in text accompanying notes
141-45.
139. When both the selling price and the term for payment are indefinite, Congress intended
that the legislative regulations would permit a ratable basis recovery over some reasonable period
of time. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 23-24. Indeed, the temporary regulations provide for
a recovery of basis in equal annual increments over a period of 15 years commencing with the
date of sale. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(4) (1981). These payments are indefinite and are
scrutinized closely by the Service. See supra note 132. As in the case of fixed period payments
without a stated maximum selling price, when in a given taxable year no payment is received or
the amount of payment received is less than the basis allocated to that year, a loss is not allowed
generally, unless the remaining debt is worthless. Rather, the excess basis is allocated in equal
amounts to the balance of the 15 year term and is allowed as a loss to the extent unrecovered,
but only after it has been carried forward to the final year or until the future payment obligation
has been determined to be worthless. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(4) (1981). These rules also
are subject to the distortion of income exceptions discussed infra in text accompanying notes 14145.
140. While the nature and productivity of the property sold generally is not relevant to basis
recovery rules, when the property sold is of a type normally eligible for depreciation on the income
forecast method, or for cost depletion in which total future production must be estimated and
payments under the contingent sales price agreement are based upon receipts for units produced
for the property, the taxpayer's basis may be recovered appropriately using an income forecast
method. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(i) (1981). Appropriate situations that meet such criteria
consist of sales of mineral property, motion picture films, television films, or taped television shows.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(ii) (1981). Other taxpayers must seek specific rulings. /d. The
income forecast method uses a fraction, the numerator of which is the payment (exclusive of interest)
received in the taxable year under the contingent payment agreement and the denominator is the
forecast or estimated total payments (also exclusive of interest) to be received under the agreement.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(6)(iii) (1981). This fraction is multiplied by the taxpayer's basis
to determine the basis recoverable in the given tax year. An adjustment may be provided when the
income forecast is overestimated (or underestimated) substantially by reasons of circumstances
occurring in subsequent tax years. /d.
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defer the recovery of basis substantially and inappropriately. 141 The taxpayer
must request a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) before using
an alternative of basis recovery. The I.R.S. will not allow the use of an alternative
method unless the taxpayer can show that the alternative is a reasonable method
of ratably recovering the basis, and that the alternative method reasonably
supports the conclusion that over time the taxpayer likely will recover his basis
at a rate that is twice as fast as the rate under the otherwise applicable rule. 142
Conversely, the Service may find that the normal basis recovery rule will
accelerate the recovery of basis substantially and inappropriately, in which case
an alternate method of basis recovery may be required. 143 The taxpayer may
escape such a requirement if he can demonstrate either that the method of basis
recovery required by the Service does not constitute a reasonable method of
ratable recovery or that it is not reasonable to conclude that the taxpayer over
time is likely to recover basis at a rate that is twice as fast under the normal
rule as the rate at which the Service is proposing. 144 In some cases contingent
sale payments that would have been reported properly under the applicable
recovery rule, are reported improperly because of changes in circumstances during
the term of the agreement. In such cases the special rule is applicable as if the
subsequent year were the initial year. 145

2.

Shareholder Installment Reporting of a T Level
Section 337 Credit Sale to P

The 1980 amendments provide explicitly, in section 453(h), that a liquidating
distribution by T of P installment obligations from T's section 337 sale of assets
to P is not treated by the former T shareholders as payment for their T stock. 146
Rather, principal payments under such P indebtedness are treated upon receipt

141. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 15a.453·1(c)(7)(i) and (ii) (1981). To demonstrate that the application
of the normal basis recovery rule would defer recovery of the taxpayer's basis substantially and
inappropriately, the taxpayer may rely in appropriate circumstances on "contemporaneous or im·
mediate past relevant sales, profit, or other factual data subject to verification." Ordinarily, the
taxpayer may not rely upon projections of future productivity, receipts, profits, etc., unless the
projection is based upon a specific event that has occurred already. Temp. Trea~. Reg. § 15a.453l(c)(7)(iii) (1981).
142. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(ii) (1981).
143. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(iii) (1981).
144. /d.
145. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(c)(7)(iv) (1981).
146. I.R.C. § 453(h)(l) (West Supp. 1986). Section 453(h)(l) provides that if in connection
with a § 331 liquidation to which § 337 applies, the former T shareholder receives, in exchange
for T stock, an installment obligation acquired in a sale or exchange by T during the 12-month
period set forth in § 337(a), then for purposes of § 453 the former T shareholder's receipt of
payments under such an obligation (but not the receipt of such obligation) shall be treated as a
receipt of payment by the former T shareholder for the T stock. Congress intended for this statutory
mechanism to work in lieu of the Rushing approach which was subject to abuse. S. REP. No. 1000,
supra note 84, at 20-22. Rushing itself was overturned statutorily by § 453(e) (related party resales)
discussed infra in note 148. Thus, parity in most, but not all cases, was obtained with respect to
installment sales ofT stock. See.Friedman, supra note 123, at 7-53. In order for the P obligations
received by T from the sale of inventory to qualify for installment treatment by the former T
shareholders, the inventory must have been sold in a bulk sale to P. I.R.C. § 453(h)(I)(B) (West
Supp. 1986). This treatment is available in cash option mergers of T with a transitory or phantom
subsidiary of P. S. Rep. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 21 n.27. Complete parity, however, is not

1987]

Cost Basis Corporate Acquisitions

161

as the payments to the former T shareholders for their T stock. 147 Conversely,
sales by T to a related party followed by resales by such party generally cause
the initial sale to be "accelerated" to the extent that the resale directs income
more quickly to the related economic group. 14M
For installment reporting purposes, the distribution of a T contingent claim
to its shareholders in connection with their sale of stock to P is treated as a
single transaction. A section 337 liquidating distribution together with P installment obligations for the purchase of T's assets is also treated as a single
transaction. 149 As long as P's purchase price is for a fixed amount, basis recovery
reporting probably is no longer available under the "cash equivalency" doctrine.
Therefore, if the former T shareholders elect out of section 453, the present
value of P's future payments and its current payments must be reported in year
1. 15° Consequently, open transaction reporting with respect to any contingent T
claim or P purchase price, through election out of section 453, effectively would
preclude installment reporting of the balance of P's purchase price. Hence,
election out is not practical. Shareholder level treatment of contingent income
items in connection with a liquidation of T after sale of T's assets to P or
sales of T stock to P by the T shareholders fits into this nonstatutory area.

E.

Time Value of Money Rules
1.

Pre-1984

Time value of money generally means the difference "in value between a
right to an amount today and a right to the same amount at some time in the
obtained. For example, when T is collapsible, § 337 may not be available, particularly if a bootstrap
acquisition is involved. See supra note 106. If § 337 status is not available, § 453(h) also is not
available at the former T shareholder level following T's liquidation. In this instance installment
reporting is available only with a stock sale followed by a § 338 election.
147. I.R.C. § 453(h)(I)(A) (West Supp. 1986). When liquidating distributions are received by
a former T shareholder in more than one taxable year, he is required to recompute the gain when
the year 2 distribution varies from the amount estimated in year I. This recomputation is effectuated
by allocating the basis in the stock prorata over all actual payments received or to be received.
/d. § 453(h)(2). In this situation, Congress chose to reopen year I by requiring amended returns
if all of the liquidating distributions from T were not received during the same taxable year of the
former T shareholder. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 21.
148. I.R.C. § 453(e) (West Supp. 1986) provides that when a taxpayer makes an installment
sale of property to a related party who thereafter disposes of the property and receives cash or
other property from a third party more rapidly than he is obligated to pay under the installment
contract to the taxpayer, the taxpayer will be treated as the seller of the property to the third party
and will recognize income to the extent that the amount realized under the second disposition exceeds
the actual payments made by the related party under the installment contract. See S. REP. No.
1000, supra note 84, at 13-18. There is a two year cutoff exception for property other than marketable
securities, I.R.C. § 453(e)(2) (West Supp. 1986), and broad attribution rules for determining whether
the purchaser is a related person. /d. § 453(f)(l).
149. See Farha v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 526 (1972), aff'd, 483 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1973);
see Ginsburg, supra note I22, at 507.
150. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-l(d)(2)(iii) (1981), provides that "[ilf an installment obligation
contains both a fixed amount component and a contingent payment component, the fixed amount
component" is treated as an amount equal to the fair market value of the installment obligation
under the normal installment reporting rules (under which receipt of an installment obligation is
treated as a receipt of property). The contingent amount component will be treated under the open
transaction rules if installment reporting is elected out of and the contingent component has no
ascertainable fair market value.
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future." 151 Prior to 1984, the predecessors to the current time value of money
rules primarily dealt with character distortion of income and not timing distortion. 152 This approach is outlined in the legislative history of the enactment
of section 483 which states:
For example, an individual taxpayer might sell a capital asset
worth $1,000 for $1,300 payable over 10 years. In this case, if no
mention is made that part of this payment is to be treated as interest,
and the seller elects to report any gain on the installment basis, then
each payment might be treated [prior to section 483] partly as a
return of capital and partly as capital gain. Over the 10-year period,
the taxpayer would report $300 of capital gain (assuming he had the
full fair market value of $1,000 as his basis for the property). However,
had $300 of this $1,300 payment been specified as an interest payment,
this amount would have been ordinary income to the seller rather
than capital gain. From the buyer's standpoint, the $300, if treated
as part of the price of the property, would have been added to the
basis of the property and, in the case of depreciable property be
recoverable over the life of the property. He might also, if the property
qualified, be eligible for an investment credit with respect to this
$300. On the other hand, if this $300 were treated as interest, he
could receive an interest deduction for this amount. 15 -'
This character distortion was intensified under the accelerated cost recovery
system. 154 "In some cases, the present value to the purchaser of the ACRS
deductions and investment credit may far exceed the present value of the obligation to pay the seller amounts in the distant future." 155 Similar character
distortion of income arises when a debt is issued for less than its face amount.
"The difference between the issue price of an obligation (the amount received
by the borrower) and its stated redemption price performs the same functions
as interest; it compensates the lender for the use of its money." 156 The earlier
time value of money provisions, however, by focusing only on the character of
the "disguised" interest, ignored the economic accrual of interest. 157 "An economic accrual formula would take into account the compounding of interest,
that is, the fact that more interest economically arises in later periods because
the amount of debt is increased by the accrued but unpaid interest from earlier

151. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER
TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 60 (1984) (hereinafter TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS). "The right tO $1 today
is worth more than the right to $1 ten years from today, by the amount that could be earned by
investing $1 for ten years. In many instances, the Code [prior to 1984] ignores, or fails to properly
account for, the time value of money." /d.
152. H.R. REP. No. 432, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1242 (1984).
153. H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess. 72 (1963).
154. The accellerated cost recovery system, I.R.C. § 168 (West Supp. 1986), was introduced
in 1981 as a substitute for a "reasonable allowance for depreciation" with respect to tangible
property. The system greatly accellerated depreciation deductions significantly by shortening useful
lives. See 2 TREASURY DEP'T. REP., Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth
152 (Nov. 1984).
155. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 61.
156. ld. at 62 (citing United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S: 54 (1965)).
157. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 62.
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periods." ~~M Distortion of income occurred if the agreement did not call for
interest to be paid currently and in accordance with such economic accrual. The
major pre-1984 statutory antidistortion of income tools in the time value context
were sections 1232 and 483. To a lesser degree, when related creditors and
borrowers were involved, sections 482 and 267 addressed time value problems.

a.

Section 1232

Section 1232 1 ~~ was enacted in 1954 and provided "constructive" sale or
exchange treatment'~><' for the premature retirement of corporate or governmental
bonds that are issued for money or publicly traded property. This "constructive"
sale treatment entitled bondholders to capital gains treatment on any redemption
premium. Conversely, section 1232(b) 161 mandated ordinary income treatment
for any "original issued discount" (OlD), that arose when a borrower holding
the debt as a capital asset received less from the lender (the "issue price") than
the amount owed to the lender (the "redemption price"). As enacted, the holder
of the bond was not taxed under section 1232 on any OlD until redemption
of the bond or upon an earlier disposition in a taxable transaction. However,
the borrowing corporation, in nonparallel treatment, was required to amortize
the OlD, that is, currently deduct a prorata portion of the "interest," over the
life of the bond. 162 In 1969 Congress mandated the same parallel timing treatment
for the bondowner by requiring the bondholder to include the OlD in income
on a ratable basis over the life of the bond. 16·1 As the holder included such
OlD in income, his basis for the bond was increased correspondingly. 164
By 1982 Congress realized that a ratable deduction of OlD gave rise to
larger deductions in the earlier years of a bond's term, relative to deductions
allowed to issuers of interest bearing bonds that were not issued at a discount."'~
This distortion as well as other inequities led to the enactment of sections
1232A"6 and 163(e) 167 in 1982. These sections imposed new rules for computing
the method of amortizing and including in income the OlD at the corporate
and bondholders level, respectively. The method parallels the manner in which
interest would accrue under interest-paying, nondiscounted bonds-that is, yield
to maturity. 16M
Nevertheless, sections 1232 and 1232A were relatively limited with respect
to covered transactions. Pre-1984 OlD rules "do not apply to obligations issued

158. /d.
159. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (1954) (repealed in 1984).
160. The "sale or exchange" requirement for capital gains treatment 1s discussed in the
authorities cited infra in note 270.
161. I.R.C. § 1232(b) (1954) (repealed in 1984).
162. S. REP. No. 552, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1969).
163. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) (1954) (repealed in 1984). See generally S. REP. No. 552, supra note
162, at 147.
164. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3)(E) (1954) (repealed 1984); S. REP. No. 552, supra note 162, at 147.
165. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 160.
166. I.R.C. § 1232A (1982) (repealed in 1984).
167. While I.R.C. § 1232A was repealed in 1984, I.R.C. § 163(e) simply was modified to
conform with the new original issue discount rules. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 65-66 (1984).
168. The yield to maturity (or technically, the internal rate of return) is the yield promised
to the buyer of a debt instrument under the assumption that all payments will be made in full
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by a natural person, obligations that are not capital assets in the hands of the
holder, or obligations issued in exchange for property where neither the obligation
nor the property received is publicly traded." ~ This broad exception was based
upon a perceived difficulty in determining the issue price of the obligation, 1711
that is, the value of the property sold.
16

b.

Section 483

In 1964 Congress extended the application of the limited time value of money
rules to most sales transactions in the form of "imputed interest." 171 Prior to
that time, buyers and sellers could disguise interest by not providing specifically
for interest payments. 172 To remedy this problem, section 483 17) was enacted.
Section 483 recharacterized as "unstated interest" a portion of the ostensible

and on time, and that interest rates will not change before he sells the instrument. The yield to
maturity may be determined by solving for "i" in the following equation: PB = C/(1 + i) + C/(1 + i)'
. . . + C/(1 + i)111 + A/(1 + i) 111 ;
where: PB = price of the bond or present value of the payments;
C = promised interest payments;
A= par or maturity value at m;
i = interest rate for m periods;
m = term to maturity;

G. KAUFMAN, THE U.S. fiNANCIAL SYSTEM: MONEY, MARKETS, AND INSTITUTIONS 74-76 (2d ed. 1983).
169. TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 63 (footnotes omitted). Other exceptions
included: (I) "obligations with a maturity of less than one year;" (2) "obligations exempt from
tax under § 103 or any other provision of law;" (3) obligations issued for the use of property;
and (4) "obligations issued in exchange for services." H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 124142 (footnote omitted).
170. See TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 63.
171. See generally S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1964).
172. /d. Arguably, case law would have imputed interest. Cf. United States v. Midland-Ross
Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965).
173. I.R.C. § 483 (West Supp. 1986).
Section 483 generally provides that if the total deferred payments of the sales
price under a contract for the sale or exchange of property includes any unstated
interest, a portion of each deferred payment will be treated as interest instead of sales
price (sec. 483(a)). In determining whether the total deferred sales price payments
include any unstated interest, the total deferred payments of sales price are compared
to the sum of the present values of such payments plus the present values of any
stated interest payments due under the contract (sec. 483(b)). If the total deferred sales
price payments exceed the total present values of sales price and stated interest payments,
there is unstated interest.
The present value of a deferred payment is the amount that the parties would
agree to pay and receive today instead of waiting for the deferred payment. The
determination of this value depends on two factors. The first is the length of time
until the deferred payment is to be made. The second factor is the interest rate that
represents the value of money over that period. Present values are determined by
discounting payments at an interest rate prescribed in regulations by the Secretary (sec.
483(b)). Under existing regulations, the interest rate used to determine whether there
is unstated interest is 6 percent simple interest. This rate is referred to as the "test
rate."
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS UNDER
SECTIONS 482, 483 AND 2032A OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 5-6 (Comm. Print 1981) (hereinafter
BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS).
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principle payments from the buyer-borrower to the seller-creditor if their sales
agreement did not require the buyer-borrower's payment of a minimum "safeharbor rate" of 9"7o interest by 1984. 174 The interest rate that the buyer-borrower
was required to pay is prescribed in the regulations. The imputation and safeharbor rates failed miserably due to the inflation that existed prior to 1984. 175
This failure occured despite the congressional directive that the regulations would
"reflect the going rate of interest and will not be higher than the rate which
a person, in reasonably sound financial circumstances and with adequate security
could be expected to borrow from the bank." 176
In addition to the inadequate stated interest rate and resulting inadequate
discount to present value, substantial distortion occurred because the test rate
was simple interest. 177 If the buyer and seller met the test rate, they could
allocate contractually the annual payments to principal and interest under various
noneconomic accrual tax accounting methods that could produce substantial
revenue abuses.m These methods had the effect of front loading the interest
deduction, whereas economic accrual placed larger amounts of interest at the
end of the loan term. 179
In addition, section 483 contained the following significant exceptions: ( l)
it applied only to sales or exchanges of property made more than six months
after the date of the sale or exchange; (2) it did not apply to contracts with
a sales price in excess of $3,000; (3) it did not apply to certain sales or exchanges
of patents; (4) it did not apply to "s·ates or exchanges that result only in ordinary
income to the seller;" 180 and (5) most significantly, for purposes of this Article,
a liquidating distribution was not treated as a sale or exchange. 181 Note that
section 483 applied explicitly to contingent transactions. 182

c.

Related Party Provisions

Provisions that are substantially identical to section 482 have been in the
tax law since the Revenue Act of 1921. 183 Section 482 permits the Secretary of
the Treasury to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions,
credits, or allowances" between two or more trades or businesses controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interest if necessary to prevent evasion of

174.
175.
176.
177.

Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (c), (d) (as amended in 1981 ).
TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 64.
S. REP. No. 830, supra note 171, at 102.
TAX SHELTER PROPOSALS, supra note 151, at 64.

[A) simple interest computation ignores the compounding of interest on unpaid interest
which occurs as an economic matter. For example, a debt obligation bearing a stated
rate of 9 percent simple interest payable at the end of 30 years actually bears interest
at a rate of 4-1/2 percent on a constant interest basis.

/d.
178. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 1243.
179. /d. at 1243 n.7.
180. See BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS, supra note 173, at 6.
181. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(b)(l) (1966).
182. /d.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(e)(2) (1966).
183. Revenue Act of 1921, § 240(d), ch. 85, 42 Stat. 227 (1921). See generally Cooper, Section
45, 4 TAX L. REV. 131 (1948-49).
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taxes or "clearly to reflect the income" in any such trade or business. 184 Extensive
legislative regulations, promulgated initially in 1968, define the purpose of section
482 as placing controlled taxpayers on a parity with uncontrolled taxpayers "by
determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true
taxable income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer" 18 ~
the arm's length standard. Section 482 regulations specifically deal with sales
and loans between controlled taxpayers. 186 In the case of loans, the regulations
provided safe-harbor rates that often were parallel to those provided in section
483. 187 Unlike section 483, which recharacterized a part of the sales price as
interest under the imputed rate, 188 section 482 imputed interest income and expense
on the stated principal amount. 18 ~
Section 267, 1 ~0 also has a long history in the Code. 1 ~ 1 Prior to 1983, section
267 combated some of the time value of money abuse that arose when the
borrower and the debtor were utilizing different methods of accounting. Prior

184. I.R.C. § 482 (West Supp. 1986). The § 482 regulations state that the allocation applies
to any controlled taxpayer, regardless of whether the taxpayer makes a separate or a consolidated
return. Treas Reg. § 1.482-l(b)(2) (as amended in 1968). Funhermore, in determining whether to
make an allocation under § 482, the district director is not limited to cases of improper accounting,
fraudulent or sham transactions, or devices used to reduce or avoid taxes. Rather § 482 may apply
to any case in which, by inadvertence or design, the taxable income of a controlled taxpayer is
other than it would have been had the taxpayer been an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's
length with another uncontrolled taxpayer. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(c) (as amended in 1968). Note
that if an allocation is made with respect to one controlled taxpayer, a correlative adjustment should
be made to any related controlled taxpayer involved in the allocation, if such allocation would
affect the tax liability. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1968).
The method of making an allocation generally depends on the substance of the particular
transaction. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(d)(l) (as amended in 1968). However, the regulations provide
special rules for the following items: (I) imputed interest on intercompany loans and advances; (2)
services performed by one member for another; (3) use of tangible property; (4) pricing of intercompany sales of tangible property; and (5) transfers of intangible property. Treas. Reg. § 1.4822 (as amended in 1983). A detailed discussion of these rules is beyond the scope of this Article.
See generally Fuller, Section 482 Revisited, 31 TAX L. REv. 475, 491-514 (1976).
185. BACKGROUND ON REGULATIONS, supra note 173, at 5. "The standard applied in every
case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm's length with another uncontrolled taxpayer."
/d.
The regulations define "controlled" as "any kind of control, direct or indirect, whether legally
enforcable, and however exercisable or exercised. It is the reality of the control which is decisive,
not its form or the mode of its exercise. A presumption of control arises if income or deductions
have been arbitrarily shifted." Treas. Reg. § 1.482-l(a)(3) (as amended in 1968). This definition
has been construed broadly such that voting rights or even stock ownership is unnecessary for
control. See Fuller, supra note 184, at 481-86.
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a) (as amended in 1983).
187. /d.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 171-74.
189. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(a)(l) (as amended in 1983).
190. I.R.C. § 267 (West Supp. 1986).
191. Congress enacted the predecessor to§ 267(a)(l) in 1934 to stop "the practice of creating
losses through transactions between" related parties. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §
24(a)6 (1934), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2) C.B. 554, 571. The predecessor prohibited the deduction
of losses on sales or exchanges of property between related parties. In 1937 Congress added the
predecessor to § 267(a)(2) which adopted the draconian approach of denying the accrual basis
debtor's deduction for interest or expenses owed to a related cash-basis creditor, if not paid within
2 months after the close of the tax year in which due. See Rose, Related Party Transactions under
Section 267, 102 3o TAX MAT. A-9, A-10 (1985).
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to amendment in 1984, section 267(a)(2) disallowed any deduction for an accrual
basis borrower when accrued interest was not timely paid to a related cash basis
creditor. 1~2

2.

Post-1984

By 1984, Congress became aware of a number of time value of money
abuses under the existing tax provisions. For example, the exception to section
1232 for obligations issued for nonpublidy traded property was often exploited
to achieve deferral of income tax on interest income and accelerated deductions
of interest expenses. In addition, tax shelters often exploited the imputed interest
rates under section 483. This exploitation was possible because the interest rates
failed to keep current with inflation and noneconomic accrual of interest formulas.
The exploitation produced substantial distortion by taking "advantage of the
artificially low safe-harbor rate to obtain excessive ACRS deductions and investment credits, stating interest at just above test rate and achieving an overstated
sales price and tax basis. Moreover, no Code sections had been applied to
deferred payment transactions involving services or the use of property." ~~J After
examining the entire area, Congress concluded that rules similar to the OlD
rules should be extended to a broader range of transactions including obligations
issued for nontrade or property, services and the use of property, and obligations
issued by individuals. Furthermore, obligations that were not capital assets in
the holder's hands were required to be included under periodic inclusion rules.~~~

a.

OlD Rules: Sections 1271-1275

Section 1271 performs the role of old section 1232A'~ 5 -supplying a constructive sale or exchange for the retirement of a debt instrument. 1"" Section
1272 is the successor to section 1232A. It requires inclusion of OlD in income
on the basis of a constant interest rate. 1 ~7 Section 1272(a)(3) provides for daily
allocation of OID. 1 ~x OlD is determined under the following sections: (1) section
1273 in the case of debt instruments that are not issued for property; 1w and
(2) under section 1274 in the case of debt instruments that are issued for
property. 21 x1 Section 1274, which is applicable when neither the debt instrument
nor the property received in exchange are publicly traded, performs two distinct
functions: ( 1) "testing the adequacy of stated interest" and, when inadequate,
imputing interest as discussed above; and (2) "placing the parties to a transaction
192. I.R.C. § 267 (1986).
193. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 152, at 1243-44.
194. /d. at 1244.
195. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (West Supp. 1986).
196. /d. § 1271(a)(l). If there was an intention at the time of original issue to call a debt
instrument before maturity, an amount of gain equal to OlD not yet included in income is treated
as ordinary income. /d. § 1271 (a)(2).
197. I.R.C. § 1272(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 1272(a)(2) lists the general exceptions to
such OlD inclusion. /d.
198. /d. § 1272(a)(3); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(a)(3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,049 (1986).
199. I.R.C. § 1273 (West Supp. 1986).
200. /d. § 1274. Throughout the process of enacting the new time value of money rules,
Congress constantly added to the § 1274 exceptions. See, e.g., 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at
119-20, 125-27; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1272-l(a)(2), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,049 (1986); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1274-l(b), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,964-65 (1986).
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involving nontraded debt and property on the accrual method of accounting as
to any interest whether stated or imputed but not paid currently. " 201
The post-1984 "time value of money" rules demand in the context of
contingent payments in a sale or exchange of property that when future contingent
P payments to former T shareholders do not provide for a minimum or "adequate" amount of interest, a portion of the stated principal amount of the
contingent payment must be recharacterized as interest for tax purposes. 202 New
sections 1271-1275 apply at the T shareholder level to any transaction treated
as a sale or exchange for tax purposes. These sections contain limited exceptions,
but these exceptions do not include a complete liquidation. 203
The proposed time value of money regulations provide that contingent
payments first must be separated from fixed payments. 204 The time value of
money rules are applied in year I and subsequent years to the fixed payments. ~
In addition, the proposed regulations provide that a contingent payment received
in year 2 that does not provide for adequate interest is treated as consisting of
a principal payment in year 2. This principal payment is equal to the discounted
20

201. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 114.
202. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). Generally contingent payments
are not taken into account in applying the original issue discount and imputed interest rules. Income
Taxes; Debt Instruments With Original Issue Discount; Imputed Interest on Deferred Payment Sales
or Exchanges of Property; and Safe Haven Interest Rates for Commonly Controlled Taxpayers; Proposed Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 12,021, 12,023, 12,026 (1986) [hereinafter Preamble]. Rather, contingent
payments are segregated from noncontingent payments and accounted for separately. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986). The noncontingent payment then is tested under
the general time value of money rules not taking the contingent payment into account. Preamble,
supra, at 12,023. Next, the contingent payments are examined and may be "recharacterized" as interest in certain situations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(ii), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986); Preamble, supra, at 12,026-27. In determining whether a payment constitutes a contingent payment, the
Commissioner may disregard incidental contingencies, but the parties to the transactions are bound
by its form. A payment is not considered contingent "merely because the amount of or the liability
for the payment may be impaired by insolvency or default" of the purchaser. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1275-4(b)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986).
203. For purposes of § 1274, "the term sale or exchange means any transaction treated as a
sale or exchange for tax purposes." Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.1274-l(a)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,063 (1986).
There is no exception similar to the old § 483 exception, discussed supra at note 181, for distributions
in a complete liquidation that are treated under § 31 as a sale or exchange.
204. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986).
205. To prevent the imputation of interest under § 1274, the noncontingent portion of the P
installment obligation must provide for adequate "stated interest." Preamble, supra note 202, at
12,023. For this purpose, a debt instrument generally provides for adequate stated interest if it calls
for interest over its entire term at a rate no lower than the applicable "test rate of interest." Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(a), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,066 (1986). If a debt instrument does not provide for
a fixed rate of interest at least equal to the test rate, the adequacy of the stated interest is determined
by comparing the stated principal amount involved with the sum of the "present value" of all payments
due under the debt instrument. The present value is determined by discounting such payments at
a rate equal to the test rate of interest. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. §§
1.1274-2(b)(l), 1.1274-3(c)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,066, 12,068 (1986). A debt instrument generally has
adequate stated interest if the stated principal amount of the instrument is less than or equal to the
sum of these present values. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-3(c)(l)(i),
51 Fed. Reg. 12,068 (1986). The test rate of interest varies depending upon the type of transaction
and the term of the obligation, but generaUy is based upon an applicable federal rate (i.e., yields
to maturity of outstanding marketable obligations of the United States, with special test rates for
installment obligations). Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023; Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274-6, 51 Fed.
Reg. 12,077 (1986).
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value of the contingent payment (using the applicable "test rate of interest") 2
from the date of the year 2 payment back to the date of the year I sale or
exchange. 201 The balance of the contingent payment in excess of a discounted
value is treated as interest. 20x

'1(,

b.

Imputed Interest: Section 483

In 1984 Congress reduced the scope of section 483 significantly by subjecting
a "debt for nonpublicly traded property transaction" to interest adequacy under
section 1274. Section 483 now tests the adequacy of interest only in sales
transactions specifically excepted from section 1274, for example, sales of a
principal residence, certain sales of farms, and transactions involving total payments of $250,000 or less. 2"" Unlike section 1274, section 483 applies only if
the contract for sale or exchange calls for payments that are due more than
one year from the date of the sale or exchange, and it does not apply to any
sale or exchange of property, if the sales price does not exceed $3,000 or in
the case of a purchaser, any amount treated as outstanding interest under section
163(b). 210 When section 483 is applicable, economic accrual rules that essentially
are equivalent to the OlD accrual rules apply in recharacterizing ostensible
principal as interest. Thus, the test and imputation rates are based on the
applicable federal rate. 211 Proposed section 446 regulations effect economic accrual
of such interest. 212 Essentially, the same rules as described abovew apply to
contingent payments214 in liquidations and other sales and exchanges. 215

c.

Unresolved Problems With Respect to Contingent Payments in Cost
Basis Acquisitions Under Proposed Time Value Regulations

The bifurcation of contingent payments and noncontingent payments and
the inclusion of liquidating distributions in covered sales or exchanges work at
the former T shareholder and P levels in contingent earn-out transactions that
involve either asset or stock acquisitions. The former T shareholders are treated
as receiving principal and interest income attributable to the contingent payment
in year 2, and P is treated as paying interest and principal in year 2. In a
section 337 asset acquisition, the time value of money rules should not apply
at the Old T level with respect to post sale date OlD unless Old T holds the
contingent P payment for a period of time prior to distributing it to the former
T shareholders. 216 A section 338 transaction seemingly is complicated by the

206. The "test rates" applicable to contingent payments in year 2 are based upon the applicable
federal rates in effect on the date of the sale or exchange or contract date in year I. It is based
upon a term beginning on the date the overall debt instrument is issued and ending on the date
the contingent payment is due. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(iii)(B), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,088 (1986).
207. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-4(c)(3)(ii)(A), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,087 (1986).
208. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027.
209. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 122; Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023.
210. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,023.
211. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(a), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,039 (1986).
212. See generally Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027-28.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 204-08.
214. Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-5(b)(l), (3), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,038 (1986).
215. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-l(a)(l), 51 Fed. Reg. 12,038 (1986).
216. Old T may hold its assets, including the P contingent claim, for up to 12 months following
the date of its adoption of a plan of complete liquidation. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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temporary regulation's treatment of Neo-T as a continuation of Old T. 217 However, because no actual sale or exchange of T assets between Old T and P
occurs, the time value of money rules should not apply as between Old T and

P.
The application of the time value of money rules to T's distribution of a
contingent claim that it held prior to the acquisition date in connection with a
section 338 sale of stock or section 337 asset sale is less clear. Under the proposed
regulations, the pattern of payment for the contingent portion of the time value
of money sale or exchange is to match the timing and character treatment of
the seller and the purchaser or payor with respect to principal and interest in
year 2 when the contingent payment becomes fixed and is paid. m A liquidating
distribution and a distribution in a bootstrap acquisition generally are treated
for tax purposes as a sale or exchange between the shareholder and the corporation. 219 Thus, applying the proposed time value of money regulations literally,
the former T shareholders and T constitute the seller and payor respectively
when T distributes a contingent claim in such transactions. However, this is not
the economic reality of the transaction and could cause further discontinuity
and lost deductions under the Neo-T year 2 continuation of Old T concept
relied upon by the proposed and temporary section 338(b)-3T contingent income
regulations. 220
The true payor of a contingent claim held by T at the time of the acquisition
is not T, but rather the obligor under T's claim. For example, if the contingent
claim arose from an actual or deemed sale or exchange of property by T prior
to its acquisition, the purchaser should be treated as the payor and the former
T shareholders should be viewed as the sellers for purposes of the time value
of money rules. Similarly, if the underlying claims were for senices rendered
by, or rents due to, T, the post-1984 time value of money rules applicable to
rents and services 221 should apply as between the former T shareholders and the
third party lessee or service receiver. If, however, the underlying contingent
claim does not fit into these categories (for instance, if T distributed a legal
217. See infra text accompanying notes 616-19.
218. Preamble, supra note 202, at 12,027.
219. This is clearly the case at the shareholder level. When §§ 331 and 302 apply to the
redemption portion of the transaction, it is treated as a sale or exchange. See supra note 23. Inside
at the T level, however, the presence of a deemed sale or exchange with respect to redemptions
or liquidations is far less clear. I.R.C. § 311(d) (West Supp. 1986) treats most dividend or redemption
distributions of appreciated property as if the property were sold at the time of the distribution,
but unlike §§ 302(a) and 331(a) no constructive sale or exchange itself is provided. Moreover, the
General Utilities premise of §§ 336-338 is that a liquidating distribution does not constitute a sale
or exchange, or at least a realization at the T level. 296 U.S. at 200.
220. Under the temporary § 338 regulation's approach of treating Neo-T as a continuation
of Old T for purposes of contingent payments and the usual workings of the assignment of income
and related doctrines, Neo-T would be entitled, in a separate return in year 2, to appropriate
deductions or basis adjustments when the contingent payments are distributed to the former T
shareholders. However, in the case of an actual liquidation of T, in year 2 there would be no
corresponding corporate obligor.
221. I.R.C. § 467 (West Supp. 1986). Section 467 applies to leases (§ 467 rental agreements)
that involve total payments in excess of $250,000 and that either increase (or decrease) rents or
constitute rents payable beyond the close of the calendar year following the year in which the
associated use occurs. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 891 (1984). Section 467
rental agreements that involve leasebacks or terms in excess of 7511Jo of the property's ACRS life
will be subject to a tax avoidance purpose test. /d. at 891-92. The tax avoidance standard basically
is a facts and circumstances standard. A major factor is the actual and expected tax brackets of
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claim for injury to it arising out of a transaction other than a sale or exchange,
rent or services), the statutory time-value of money rules should not apply. In
essence, the regulations here should adopt a pass through entity approach with
respect to contingent claims distributed by T in an asset or stock sale to P. If
the time value of money rules would have applied to T if T had held the
contingent claim until maturity, the rules should apply to the T shareholders
and the ultimate obligor.
If the statutory time value of money rules would not have applied inside
to T, they should not apply outside to the former T shareholders and T. Rather,
an interest factor between the former T shareholders and the ultimate obligor
should be imputed only under open transaction reporting. In open transactions,
a case-law interest factor modified by the model discussed below at times might
be appropriate at the former T shareholder and ultimate obligor levels if the
payment actually reflects time value of money concepts. 222
When T distributes the contingent claim in a tax year that is subsequent
to the year in which the claim arises, but prior to its maturity, a modification
to the above analysis must be made. Namely, any discount imputed under the
model in open transaction reporting that is attributable to the lapse of time
between year 1 (the year in which the claim arose) and year 2 (the year in
which it is distributed) should be accounted for by T and not the former T
shareholders. This interest element should be taken into account, however, only
in year 3 or even year 5 when the contingent claim finally matures. The proper
taxpayer in that year for reporting this discount element is discussed below in
Section v.m
III.

A.
1.

CoNVENTIONAL DocTRINE

T Shareholder Level Treatment
Annual Accounting Principle

A fundamental feature of the federal income tax system is the "annual
accounting principle," under which each tax year stands on its own and income

the lessor and lessee over the term of the lease. /d. at 893. If a tax avoidance purpose is found,
the rental payments will be "leveled" for tax purposes, that is, rent and interest will be deemed
to accrue on a level present value basis over the term of the lease. /d. at 891-92. A number of
tax avoidance safe harbors exist. ld. at 892-93. If a § 467 rental agreement does not involve
leasebacks or long-term leases or is not entered into for tax avoidance purposes, the rents specified
in the lease will be respected. However, these payments must be reported on an accrual basis,
regardless of the taxpayer's actual method of accounting. /d. at 891.
Lessors, who are not subject to rent leveling because of a lack of tax avoidance purpose will
be subject to a recapture provision if they dispose of the leased property. Any gain realized will
be treated as ordinary income to the extent of the excess of the accruals that would have been
taken into account had the lessor been subject to the rent leveling provision over actual accruals
of rents up to the date of the transfer. /d.
The conference agreement delegated authority to the Treasury Department to issue regulations
requiring reporting of the interest elements of deferred payment transactions involving services in
a manner consistent with the rules described above. ld at 895. These regulations will apply only
to transactions exempt from the provisions of I.R.C. §§ 404 or 404A. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note
104, at 284. See generally Whitesman, Section 467: Tax Planning for Deferred-Payment Leases, 5
VA. TAX REV. 345 (1985).
222. See infra text accompanying notes 543-45 & 552.
223. See infra text accompanying notes 560-73.
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is computed annually as the net result of all transactions within the tax year. 22 •
Events in a subsequent tax year (year 2) cannot, absent an express statutory
requirement, serve to reopen a prior year (year 1) and adjust a transaction
reported in year 1. This is true regardless of whether the statute of limitations
has run on year 1 transactions. 225 The annual accounting principle is an administrative rule226 and yields to statutory exception when Congress so provides.m
Most of these statutory exceptions operate by reopening year 1 and adjusting
the original transaction as in certain favorable redemption and liquidation provisions that depend on year 2 events.m
When a transaction has effects in more than one tax year, some commentators
have called for transactional reporting under which year 1 and year 2 events
would be taken into account in year 2. The transactional reporting system adjusts
for rate and bracket changes by charging an interest factor for any deferral of
reporting. 229 This "exact" transactional approach, after a false start, 230 has not

224. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931 ). See generally Note, Tax Benefit
Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21
VAND. L. REV. 995 (1968).
225. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 378 n.IO (1982); Note, supra note
224, at 995.
226. Burnet, 282 U.S. at 365.
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable,
and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it
practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting,
assessment, and collection capable of practical operation . . . . While, conceivably, a
different system might be devised by which the tax could be assessed, wholly or in
part, on the basis of the finally ascertained results of particular transactions, Congress
is not required by the [16th) amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the
more familiar method, even if it were practicable.

/d. (citations omitted).
227. A thesis of this Article is that the courts and the regulations cannot reopen year I upon
the occurrence of a year 2 inconsistent event unless Congress expressly so provides. See infra note
602.
228. If the acquisition of a "prohibited interest" within the 10-year look-forward period occurs
under a waiver of family attribution, then generally year I is reopened and what originally was
treated as "redemption" under §§ 302(a) and (b) may now be a dividend. See l.R.C. § 302(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1986). A tax free § 332 liquidation of a "controlled" subsidiary by a corporate parent
on a tax free basis may take as long as three years. However, if the transaction commenced in
year I does not produce a complete liquidation within the three-year period, year I is reopened
and any distributions treated as distributions in complete liquidation of a controlled subsidiary are
recharacterized as dividends in year I. l.R.C. § 332(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
229. Rabinovitz, Effect of Prior Year's Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences
of Current Receipts or Payments, 28 TAX L. REv. 85, 109-153 (1972); Note, supra note 224, at
995, 1009-10, 1015-16.
230. The Court of Claims initially ruled in Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl.
1958), nonacq. Rev. Rul. 59-141, 1959-1 C.B. 17, that in a tax benefit recovery, the taxpayer was
taxed at the year I rates in year 2 on the "restored deduction." However, a decade later the Court
of Claims overruled itself in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl.
1967). The court stated:
To insure the vitality of the single-year concept, it is essential not only that annual
income be ascertained without reference to losses experienced in an earlier accounting
period, but also that income be taxed without reference to earlier tax rates. And absent
specific statutory authority sanctioning a departure from this principle, it may only
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been accepted judicially. 231 A number of doctrines that modify the annual
accounting principle have evolved. All the doctrines are aimed at minimizing
distortion of income and approximating transactional reporting. 232 The failure
of these doctrines to explore adequately the deep structure tax policy of minimum
distortion of income constitutes the central problem with respect to contingent
income items at both the T shareholder and T corporate levels. The lack of
deep structure analysis is also the cause of many other inconsistencies and
complexities in the tax law.
Except in a nonrecognition transaction, a taxpayer generally must recognize
as a gain (or loss) under section 1001 the excess of the "amount realized" from
a sale or other disposition of property over his adjusted basis. A loss is the
excess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized. 233 The "amount realized"
is the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of any property
received in the transaction.B~ Section 331 treats the amounts received by a
shareholder in a complete liquidation as a "constructive" sale or exchange of
his stock. 235 Absent installment reporting, a shareholder normally would recognize
the entire amount distributed by a liquidating corporation in the year of receipt
of the distribution. 2 )(, T's liquidating distribution of a claim generally would
result in a recognition transaction to T's shareholders to the extent of its fair
market value in the year of the receipt of the claim (year 1).

a.

Open Transaction Exception

When the amount that the former T shareholders will receive under the
claim cannot be determined in year 1 because the determination of such amount
depends upon contingencies that will not be resolved finally until year 2, adjustments generally are made to the annual accounting principle to produce the
least distortion of income. Thus, the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Burnet v. Logan 231 found "the promise of future money payments wholly
contingent upon facts and circumstances not possible to foretell with anything

be said of Perry that it achieved a result which was more equitably just than legally
correct.

/d. at 403 (footnote omitted). The Perry approach ignored the time value factor in deferred restorations
and deferred deductions.
231. Hillsboro Not'/ Bonk, 460 U.S. at 380 n.l2; Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp., 381 F.2d at
403; see Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265, 270.71 (1978).
232. See infra text accompanying notes 442-52.
233. I.R.C. § lOOl(a) (West Supp. 1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-l(a) (1957).
234. I.R.C. § IOOI(b) (West Supp. 1986). Inclusion of indebtedness to which property is subject
in the amount realized fits poorly within this terminology, notwithstanding Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. I (1947), and Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a) (1980). See generally Rosenberg, Beller to Burn
Out Than to Fade A way? Tax Consequences on the Dispositon of a Tax Shelter, 71 CALIF. L.
REV. 87, 88-95 (1983).
235. I.R.C. § 331(a) (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 16.
236. Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 484.
237. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). Mrs. Logan owned stock of a steel company that in turn owned
a 120Jo interest in a mining company. The steel company received a 120Jo share of all the ore
extracted from a mine leased by the mining company. The Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company
purchased all the stock of the steel company, including Mrs. Logan's, for $2,200,000 and future
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like fair certainty. The promise was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It
had no ascertainable fair market value. The transaction was not a closed one. " 238
Accordingly, the taxpayer in Logan was not required to report P's promise of
future payments until she had recovered her basis in her T stock. The Logan
case arose prior to the enactment of the installment sales reporting provisions
and the capital gains provisions. 239 In short, Logan involved only a question of
the timing of income. More specifically, the Court in Logan had to determine
whether the taxpayer could recover her basis before being taxed on her profit. 240
The Court noted that the open transaction doctrine is an administrative rule
and can yield to necessity. The Court illustrated such a situation with an example
of a contingent claim that must be valued in year I for estate tax purposes so
the estate can be closed and the executor discharged from further liability. w
The open transaction doctrine was extended to the character of income
received under an open transaction by a series of decisions, 242 the best known
of which are Commissioner v. Carter 243 and Westover v. Smith. 244 In Carter,

payments of 60 cents for each ton of ore the steel company would receive from the mining company.
Id. at 408-12.
The Commissioner determined that the fair market value of Mrs. Logan's share of the future
payments along with her share of the $2,200,000 payment was less than her basis in the stock sold.
The Commissioner thus closed the ·transaction in the year of sale. Subsequently, when the future
payments were received, the Commissioner apportioned them between income and return of capital.
/d. at 411. Mrs. Logan argued that the subsequent payments should be considered a return of
capital to the extent of her basis because the transaction should have been kept open. ld. at 413.
238. /d. The "open transaction doctrine" has been discussed widely. See Ginsburg, supra note
122, at 559-74; Note, "Open" Transactions in Federal Income Taxation, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 62
(1969).
239. The sale in question in Logan took place in 1916. The installment method of reporting
income was first recognized in 1918 under Treas. Reg. § 33 Art. 116 and 117 (1918) and codified
in the Revenue Act of 1926. See generally 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §
15.02 (rev. vol. 1985). The capital gains provisions were first enacied in 1921. Sre Note, supra note
238, at 64 n.IO. See generally 38 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 22.02, at 229 (rev. vol. 1980).
240. Logan involved a higher basis than is found in many transactions because the taxpayer's
basis was the fair market value on March I, 1913, and by the end of the tax year in question
(1920) the taxpayer's receipts from the sale of the stock had not yet equaled their value on March
I, 1913. Logan, 283 U.S. at 411.
241. /d. at 412. Cases implementing or referring to this exception include Estate of Roberts
v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 128, 132 (1972) and Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 656
(1972). See McShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998, 1009 n.4 (1979); cf. Commissioner v. Estate
of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187 (1955) (involving valuation of conditional deduction from gross estate).
242. United States v. Yerger, 55 F. Supp. 521 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Bradford v. Commissioner,
22 T.C. 1057, 1072-73 (1954). See generally Farer, Corporate Liquidations: Transmuting Ordinary
Income Into Capital Gains, 75 HARV. L. REV. 527 (1962); Note, supra note 238, at 66-79.
243. 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
244. 173 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949); accord Lentz v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1157 (1957). In
Westover, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of Quickwork Company. Quickwork sold all its
assets, including certain patents, in exchange for cash and I0% of the gross receipts from the
buyer's sale of machinery manufactured pursuant to the patents. Quickwork thereafter liquidated
and distributed the cash and the rights to future royalties to the taxpayer. At the time of the
distribution, the parties stipulated that the rights to the future royalties did not have an ascertainable
fair market value. 173 F.2d at 91; see also Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 850, 853 (7th
Cir. 1961) ("Furthermore, in . . . Westover . . . the parties had stipulated that the contracts had,
in fact, no ascertainable fair market value."); accord Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195, 198
n.4 (9th Cir. 1959).
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the former T shareholder received, as a liquidating distribution, commission
contracts for which no material additional services were required. Both the
Commissioner and the taxpayer stipulated that these contracts did not have an
ascertainable fair market value at the time of the distribution in year I. 245 The
Commissioner argued before the Tax Court that the payments to the former T
shareholder under the commission contract were ordinary income when received
in year 2 because the payments did not result from a sale or exchange of a
capital asset. 246 Reasoning that the Logan decision spoke of profit and not
ordinary income after the recovery of basis, the Tax Court concluded that capital
gains applied to payments received in year 2 under an open transaction if the
transaction in year I was capital.247 The outcome in Carter did not present an
abuse by a liquidating corporation who was escaping tax on the distribution of
a contingent claim because the Tax Court, in the consolidated cases before it,
taxed the liquidating T at ordinary income rates on the distributed claim in its
final (year I) return. The decision of the Tax Court was based on the theory
that such treatment was necessary in order to reflect T's income clearly. Otherwise,
the court reasoned, a corporation could avoid liability on tax by the simple
expedient of liquidation. 248 Unfortunately, this insight was soon forgotten.
The taxpayers in Carter did not appeal the taxation of the liquidated T,
but the Service did appeal the Tax Court's decision to hold the transaction open
at the T shareholder level for capital gains purposes. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court, 249 stating that:
The Supreme Court spoke of the annual payments as constituting
"profit" after the seller's capital investment should be returned. Until
such return, it cannot be known whether gain or loss will result from
a sale; thereafter it becomes certain that future payments will result
in gain. No reason is apparent for taxing them as ordinary income. 250
Because a complete liquidation is treated as a sale or exchange at the shareholder level under section 331 and its predecessors, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals found that the open transaction doctrine equally applied to distributions
without an ascertainable fair market value received in a complete liquidation. m

245. 170 F.2d at 911.
246. Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364, 369 (1947).
247. /d. at 369-71.
248. The case before the Tax Court was a consolidated case with both Carter (the shareholder)
and Oil Trading Co. (the liquidated corporation) as petitioners. Thus, the Tax Court faced the
taxability of the claims that were stipulated to lack an ascertainable fair market value at both the
shareholder and target level. Apparently, the distributed claims for commissions were in a fixed
amount, but the lack of an ascertainable fair market value arose from a contingency of possible
nonpayment. /d. at 365. Furthermore, the claims were collected a short time after the liquidation.
ld. at 365-66, 373. The Tax Court taxed the liquidating corporation on the amounts of the claims
in year I (the year of distribution), despite the fact that the claims at issue were not collected until
the following year. /d. at 373.
249. 170 F.2d at 911.
250. ld. at 912-13.
251. /d. at 913.
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In Westover v. Smith/ 52 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals came closer
to the heart of the matter by reasoning that the predecessor to section 1001
did not require immediate measurement of market value when there was no
ascertainable fair market value at the time of liquidation. m The court stated:
In such a situation the only practicable and accurate method of
measuring the contract's value is through the application of money
to such valuation as it is received. The alternatives are to ascribe a
fictitious or speculative value to the property, which was condemned
in the Logan case, or to allow it no value, as urged by appellants
[taxpayers]. Such methods result in inaccuracies and inequities. We
think the proper procedure is to measure the value of the contract
as payments are received. 254
In short, Westover articulated an awareness of the open transaction rule as a
transactional exception to the annual accounting principle which otherwise would
require a fictitious or speculative closed value. More recently, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals provided a good explanation of the open transaction doctrine
stating that:
Upon collection the amount received relates back to the initial
exchange for tax purposes. Thus, if the "open transaction" event
qualified for capital gain treatment, the amounts ultimately collected
do also.
The "open transaction" doctrine is a rule of fairness designed
to ascertain with reasonable accuracy the amount of gain or loss
realized upon an exchange, and, if appropriate, to defer recognition
thereof until the correct amounts can be accurately determined. 255
The shortcomings of the classic open transaction doctrine as applied to time
value of money principles and the remedies provided by the proposed and
temporary regulations are discussed below. 256

b.

Transmutation of Income: A voidance of T Level Recapture Income

Contemporaneously with the developments presented in Carter and Westover,
the courts allowed a completely liquidated T to escape corporate level tax on
amounts earned by it and assigned to its shareholders while still contingent, if
T was not in existence at the time that the shareholders collected payments
under the matured claim. 257 Ironically, in the leading Tax Court cases developing
this doctrine, the transaction was held closed at the shareholder level. m The
252. 173 F .2d 90 (9th Cir. 1949).
253. /d. at 92.
254. /d.
255. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).
256. See infra text accompanying notes 542-52.
257. See infra notes 335-36, 350, 583, 385 & 398.
258. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 376 (1955); accord Poro v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.
641 (1963); cf. Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1969) (value of royalty licensing
agreement closed because of individual taxpayer's return position). Note also that the initial open
transaction-liquidating distribution decisions involving contingent claims were closed at the corporate
level.
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two trends converged in Shea Co. v. Commissioner 59 when the Tax Court
announced a two-part holding. First, the court permitted the liquidated T to
avoid a corporate level taxation on income that it had earned, but only when
it had no fixed and determinable rights at the time of liquidation. In addition,
the court held the transaction open at the T shareholder level, permitting recovery
of basis and, thereafter, capital gains under the open transaction doctrine. The
Shea court ruled that neither the clear reflection nor assignment of income
doctrines could be used to deflect income that was not then accruable to T's
final return, that is, income to which there was no fixed and determinable rights
in a certain amount of income. 260
At the T shareholder level, the Tax Court was troubled by the Government's
argument that due to the escape of the T level tax on the contingent claims,
the former T shareholders were able to "convert ordinary income into capital
gain. " 261 The Tax Court responded that in the absence of the collapsible corporation provisions of section 34J262 (not applicable to the case at bar and not

259. 53 T.C. 135 (1969). In Shea, the corporation formed a JOint venture with four other
corporations to build a tunnel pursuant to a contract with the Department of Interior's Bureau of
Reclamation. During the construction period, the joint venture asserted claims against the Bureau
for additional compensation and the Industrial Indemnity Co. for certain dividends on the workmen's
compensation policies carried with the company. Before the claims were settled, the joint venture
liquidated and distributed its assets, including the unsettled claims, to the four corporations. The
Shea Company, in turn, liquidated and distributed its individual interest in the unsettled claims to
its shareholders. The claims then were settled and the former shareholders of Shea received their
proportionate share. A precursor to the result found in Shea is the decision of Lentz v. Commissioner,
28 T.C. 1157 (1957), in which only the shareholder treatment was before the court. The court
distinguished eariler decisions that taxed a liquidated corporation on the income earned, but not
yet received, on the grounds that in the earlier decisions the right to receive income was fixed,
whereas in the case before it the distributed rights to future commissions had no ascertainable fair
market value at the time of liquidation and were contingent upon the fruition of future third party
actions. /d. at 1161.
260. 53 T .C. at 155-57. The identification of an assignment of income and an accrual of
income is criticized in the conclusion of this section of the text. See infra text accompanying notes
319-21.
261. 53 T.C. at 159. Conversion of ordinary income into capital gain often has been used
by commentators to describe the effect of the distribution of a contingent claim in a complete
liquidation. See, e.g., Farer, supra note 242, at 527. However, the reality is not a conversion, but
rather an escape of a corporate level ordinary income tax and a capital gains tax of the shareholder
on a greater amount (not reduced by the inside corporate level tax). See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 399 (1982).
262. 53 T.C. at 159. I.R.C. § 341 (West Supp. 1986) was enacted originally as § 117(m) of
the 1939 Code pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1950, § 212(a), which was amended by § 326 of
the Revenue Act of 1951. The collapsible corporation was a device used to convert corporate ordinary
income into individual capital gains. It was used generally in the motion picture and construction
industries. A newly formed corporation would produce a film, for example, and upon completion
of the film and perhaps an initial showing, but prior to realization by the corporation of any
substantial income therefrom the corporation liquidated and distributed the film in kind to its
shareholders. The corporation was not taxed on the distribution in complete liquidation of the film
under the General Utilities doctrine and would not be taxed upon receipt of income by the shareholders.
The shareholders would be taxed at capital gains rates to the extent that the fair market value of
the film exceeded the basis of their stock. If the subsequent income from the film did not exceed
its fair market value (i.e., basis), there was no further tax. Thus, the collapsible provisions were
passed because the corporation escaped taxation and the shareholders were taxed at capital gains
rates instead of ordinary income rates. S. REP. No. 2375, 8Ist Cong., 2d Sess. X(A)(6) (1950),
reprinted in, 1950-2 C.B. 483, 516. Under the collapsible rules, certain shareholders are taxed at
ordinary income rates on the sale or exchange (including liquidation) of stock in a collapsible
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presently applicable to any T when the contingent value is less than 1/3 of the
total consideration) 263 and the open transaction doctrine, the government's contentions would present a certain element of "simplistic appeal." Nevertheless,
the Tax Court in Shea rejected the closed transaction approach. The court stated:
[The Commissioner] argues that if we determine some ascertainable value, the difference between that value and the amounts ultimately collected would constitute ordinary income to the shareholders.
He however neglects to offer even so much as a hint as to how an
ascertainable fair market value may be determined . . . . It is because
of the impossibility of ascertaining the fair market value of contested
claims such as are here involved, that transactions of this type are
held open and the value ultimately determined when settlement and
collection occurs . . . . A determination of fair market value here
in accordance with respondent's [Commissioner's] contention would
not be an ascertainment; it would be fictitious, speculative, and a
wild guess which we are not willing to make. 264
The government's argument which won the hearts of the Tax Court dissenters
was the pragmatic or "rough justice" approach that a former T shareholder
level tax that was partially ordinary was better than nothing. ZM This surrogate

corporation. /d. Presumably, the prov1s1ons tax the entire production and sale of the film, for
example, as if the transitory corporation never existed. Thus, there is no need to impute income
to the corporation when the shareholders seU the film. For a general discussion of the collapsible
provisions, see B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 23, ,, 12.01·.09, at 12-1; 48 J. MERTENS,
supra note 239, § 22.53, at 22-412.
263. Section 341 does not apply to a corporation when the stock is sold or exchanged (or
redeemed by the corporation in a liquidation) after the realization of two-thirds of the taxable
income to be derived from the property by the corporation manufacturing, constructing, producing,
or purchasing property. I.R.C. § 341(b)(l) (West Supp. 1986). An interesting question is how
contingent income items of the corporation are accounted for in the two-thirds of taxable income
test. Two principal issues exist. First, whether the contingent income item is a § 341 asset. Second,
whether, and to what extent, the contingent income item can be valued. The answer to the first
issue can be found in I.R.C. § 341(b)(4) (West Supp. 1986), which defines unrealized receivables
as "any rights (contractual or otherwise) to payment for" goods or services. /d. If a contingent
income item is a claim for payment of goods or services it should be considered an unrealized
receivable and, as such, a § 341 asset under § 341(b)(3). Other contingent income items probably
would not be § 341 assets. The answer to the second issue depends on the ability to ascertain
readily a fair market value for the item. Presumably, a claim for payment of goods or services
can be valued so that its value can be included in the taxable income base.
264. 53 T.C. at 160-61.
265. The closest acknowledgment of this approach may be seen in Judge Simpson's dissenting
opinion in Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 634-35 (1968). Judge Simpson pointed out that
at least placing a year I value on the rights distributed in a complete liquidation achieves some
allocation of income between capital gains and ordinary income. "Although any value so determined
may be arguable, it is better to place some value on the rights than to treat the entire amounts
received as capital gains." /d. at 635. Judge Simpson did not disclose the basis for why some
allocation was better than none. Presumably some ordinary income allocation would either serve
as a surrogate shareholder level tax for an escaped corporate level tax (although this was not at
issue in Dorsey), or a partial ordinary income tax in lieu of an interest factor. The time value of
money rules in effect at that time did not apply to a liquidation treated as a sale or exchange.
See supra note 181. Other Tax Court judges also were opposed to the application of the open
transaction doctrine to corporate liquidations. However, these judges did not articulate fully the
underlying policy or rationale. See Osenbach v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 797, 804-05 (1951) (Turner,
J., concurring), aff'd, 198 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1952).
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shareholder level ordinary income tax, when the actual abuse was avoidance of
the corporate level tax, was the approach adopted by Congress in section 341,
a complex, ill working, statutory misfortune. 266 But two wrongs don't make a
right. Furthermore, they frequently obscure and retard the path to the correct
approach. The Commissioner's arguments for closing the liquidating transaction
on any basis fortunately were not adopted judicially.

2.

Closed Transaction and Arrowsmith

Under the closed transaction doctrine, when a claim with an ascertainable
fair market value is received in exchange for property, the gain is computed
and taxed at the time of receipt. The taxpayer is deemed to have received the
fair market value of the claim. 267 Thereafter, the claim is viewed as an independent
asset with a new cost basis equal to the fair market value previously charged
as income to the taxpayer. 26R Payments subsequently received in excess of this
new basis (as when the instrument was discounted in year 1 under the closed
transaction doctrine) traditionally do not enjoy capital gains treatment because
such receipts or collections in year 2 do not qualify as a sale or exchange ~
a traditional prerequisite for the sale or exchange of capital asset treatment. 210
The separation of the liquidating distribution of the (contingent) claim in
year 1 and its maturation in year 2 into two unrelated transactions, contrasts
starkly with the treatment of a liquidating distribution of property subject to
a contingent liability. In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 271 the former T shareholders of a liquidated T argued that their year 2 payment, as transferees of
the liquidated T's previously contingent liability, was ordinary income under
"the well-established principle that each taxable year is a separate unit for tax
accounting purposes." 272 In addition, the former T shareholders argued that the
resulting absence of a sale or exchange in year 2 precluded capital loss treatment. m
26

266. See Ginsburg, Collapsible Corporations-Revisiting an Old Misfortune, 33 TAX L. REv.
307 (1978).
267. Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274, 285 (5th Cir. 1973); accord Cowden v. Com·
missioner, 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
268. Dennis, 473 F.2d at 285.
269. Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235, 237 (4th Cir. 1952).
270. See generally Bittker, Capital Gains and Losses-The "Sole or Exchange" Requirement,
32 HASTINGS L.J. 743 (1981); Gallagher, Capitol Goins and Losses: A Primer (Part I of//), 7 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. (1979).
271. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). In Arrowsmith two shareholders liquidated a closely held corporation
receiving liquidating distributions in years 1-4. /d. at 7. The shareholders reported their gain as
capital gain. /d. In year 8 a judgment was rendered against the liquidated corporation (and hence
the shareholders as transferees) and against one of the shareholders individually. /d. at 8-9. Each
of the shareholders paid half of the judgment and deducted the payments as an ordinary business
loss in year 8. /d. at 7. See generally Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 85; Schenk, Arrowsmith and
Its Progeny: Tax Characterization by Reference to Post Events, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 317 (1981 ).
Conflicting readings of Arrowsmith are discussed infra at notes 468-70.
272. 344 U.S. at 8.
273. The sale or exchange prerequisite for capital gains treatment extends to losses as well as
gains. "Sale or exchange" has been given a broad interpretation, such that involuntary sales or
even abandonments constituted a "sale or exchange." See Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504
(1941) (foreclosure sale); Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981), off'd per curiam, 693
F.2d 124 (lith Cir. 1982) (sale or exchange took place at time of foreclosure); Freeland v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980) (sale or exchange took place at time of reconveyance of deed
to the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure).
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The Supreme Court held that the annual accounting principle was not breached
by considering the liquidation transaction events in years 1 and 2 together in
order to classify properly the nature of the former T shareholders' payment of
T's contingent liability in year 2. 274 No change was made to year 1. 275
Taxpayer attempts to apply the Arrowsmith rationale to payments received
in year 2, in excess of the amount at which a capital transaction was closed
in year 1, were rebutted judicially on the ground that Arrowsmith involved a
subsequent adjustment in year 2. The courts mechanically reasoned that when
a fixed amount is closed in year 1 at less than its face value, payment in year
2 is not pursuant to a subsequent adjustment to the year 1 obligation because
such payment unconditionally was required at all timesY~ The error in this
analysis and result, except to the extent of a discount factor, is discussed below. 277
In addition to the potential all or nothing choice presented by open transaction and closed transaction reporting, truly contingent claims could not be
installment reported prior to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980. This
was the case even if the taxpayer so desired. Courts reasoned that the contingent
portion of the sales price rendered impossible a determination of the total contract
price and, therefore, similarly impossible a calculation of the rate of proration
of each payment representing gain under the installment method.m This bar
probably was more apparent than real in that former T shareholders who assigned
a fair market value to a contingent claim distributed by T in its liquidation
universally found that the transaction was closed at the T shareholder level by
their own efforts. 279 Hence, installment reporting would have been available.
In any event, the all or nothing consequences of the open7closed controversy
have persuaded courts to hold a transaction open. zso As the Tax Court pointed

274. 344 U.S. at 8-9.
275. /d. at 9.
276. Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682, 685 (2d Cir. 1961); accord Grill v. United
States, 303 F.2d 922, 928 (Ct. Cl. 1962). The Arrowsmith principle has not been applied to characterize
the nature of a subsequent gain or "to treat unforeseen increases in annual receipts from income
producing property as capital gains, where such property was distributed on the liquidation of a
corporation but not thereafter sold or exchanged." /d. On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, in dictum, has indicated that the Arrowsmith doctrine might apply to a year 2 payment
in excess of the year I closed amount. See Ayrton Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741, 751
(2d Cir. 1962). Also the Tax Court has hinted that it might not follow the Osenbach approach
with respect to payments in excess of the closed amount by stating that:
While the history ... may provide a method of determining some minimum value
for the patents, it would not be the fair market value. And if, as respondent contends,
receipts in excess of this ascertained value are reportable as ordinary income (he relies
on Osenbach ... ) it would be inappropriate for us to assign to the patents a minimum
value which is likely to be less than fair market value. Certainly we would not be
justified in closing the transaction simply because we believed the fair market value
to be at least $1.
MacDonald v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840, 860-61 (1971).
277. See infra text accompanying notes 542-51.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 127-28.
279. See supra note 258; see also Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 631 (1968).
280. See Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Miller v. United States, 235
F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1956); Estate of Wiggon v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); MacDonald v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C. 840 (1971).
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out in MacDonald v. Comissioner, 2x1 if, as the government argued, year 2 receipts
in excess of some minimum ascertained value are reportable as ordinary income,
"it would be inappropriate for us to assign ... a minimum value which is likely
to be less than fair market value. Certainly we would not be justified in closing
the transaction simply because we believed the fair market value to be at least
$1. " 2M2 In Gersten v. Commissioner,m the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
similarly noted that the closed transaction doctrine posed a serious problem for
a taxpayer. 2 x4 The court stated:
If the fair market value as of date of dissolution be overestimated,
taxpayer might be subject to payment of capital gain taxes which the
event will not justify. If underestimated, taxpayer may be subjected
to payment of ordinary income taxes on sums received in excess of
fair market value figure set. These factors do not control or have
bearing upon the problem before the court, but do highlight its
seriousness. m

3.

Cash Equivalency Doctrine

The same concern with ordinary income treatment for payments in excess
of the closed amount lead the Tax Court in Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner2x"
to extend the open transaction doctrine to a situation when the property received
by the taxpayer had a fair market value and was marketable, but only at a
substantial or "deep" discount. In its most extreme application, the "cash
equivalency" doctrine dictated that a cash basis taxpayer realized no income
when he or she received, upon the sale of property, a mere promise of future
payment without any notes, mortgages, or other commonly negotiated evidences
of indebtedness.m Such contractual obligations were not thought to be the

281. 55 T.C. 840 (1971).
282. /d. at 860-61.
283. 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959).
284. /d. at 199.
285. /d.
286. 60 T.C. 663 (1973), rev'd, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975). See generally Llewellyn, Promises
to Pay in the Future-A Modest Proposal for Reform, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1337 (1977).
287. An accrual basis taxpayer realizes income when an obligation to pay becomes fixed and
the amount of such obligation can be ascenained reasonably. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(l)(ii) (1957).
Accordingly, a mere promise to pay in the future, even though not the equivalent of cash, consistently
has been taxable to an accrual basis taxpayer. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 562; Llewellyn,
supra note 286, at 1338. In contrast a cash basis taxpayer historically has not been taxed on a
mere promise to pay that is not evidenced by a separate promissory note or other indicia of cash
equivalence. In Johnston v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 560 (1950), lhe Tax Courl staled that:
An agreement, oral or written, of some kind is essential to a sale. If payment is made
at the same time that the obligation to pay arises under the agreement, then the profit
would be reponed at that time no matter which method [of tax accounting, cash or
accrual) was being used. However, the situation is different when the contract merely
requires future payments and no notes, mortgages, or other evidence of indebtedness
such as commonly change hands in commerce, which could be recognized as the
equivalent of cash to some entent, are given and accepted as a part of the purchase
price. That kind of a simple contract creates accounts payable by the purchasers and
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equivalent of cash and, hence, did not constitute an "amount realized" under
the "cash equivalency" doctrine. Under a less extreme application of the doctrine,
the test merely was whether the promise to pay was of a kind that frequently
is transferred to lenders or investors at a discount that is not substantially
greater than the prevailing premium for the use of money. zxx When the discount
for the year 2 payments to (year 1) fair market value did not exceed the prevailing
interest rate, the closed transaction doctrine produced the correct result because
the excess of the amount received in year 2 over the value closed in year 1
received ordinary income treatment in the T shareholders' hands similar to the
treatment accorded interest income. Indeed, this result more accurately reflected
income than did the classic open transaction reporting, which ignored the time
value of money. A discount factor that is greater than the appropriate cost of
money and risk return charge causes the conventional doctrine to produce an
incorrect result.
In Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,zxy the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Tax Court's decision with a sound reading of the legislative history
of the predecessors to section 1001(b). 2Y" The 1919 statute initially provided that
property received in an exchange was treated as "the equivalent of cash" up
to the amount of its fair market value. m This characterization clearly precluded
the application of the classic cash equivalency doctrine. In 1921 the statute was
revised to provide that no gain or loss would be recognized "unless the property
received in the exchange has a readily realizable fair market value. "m The 1922
regulations interpreted this section to mean that "[the property] can be readily
converted into an amount of cash or its equivalent substantially equal to the
fair value of the property, " 2Y3 in essence, the cash equivalency doctrine. However,
in a third revision, Congress acknowledged that the "readily realizable market
value" standard was most difficult and was not determinable with accuracy or

accounts receivable by the sellers which those two taxpayers would accrue if they were
using an accrual method of accounting in reporting their income. But such an agreement
to pay the balance of the purchase price in the future has no tax significance to either
purchaser or seller if he is using a cash system.

/d. at 565; accord Perry v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 183 (1945); Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
717 (1971); Ennis v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 465 (1950).
288. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir.
1961), stated that:
A promissory note, negotiable in form, is not necessarily the equivalem of cash.
Such an instrument may have been issued by a maker of doubtful solvency or for
other reasons such paper might be denied a ready acceptance in the market place. We
think the converse of this principle ought to be applicable. We are convinced that if
a promise to pay of a solvent obligor is unconditional and assignable, not subject to
set-offs, and is of a kind that is frequently transferred to lenders or investors at a
discount not substamially greater than the generally prevailing premium for the use
of money, such promise is the equivalent of cash and taxable in like manner as cash
would have been taxable had it been received by the taxpayer rather than the obligation.
/d. at 24
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

(footnote omitted).
524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
!d. at 794.
Revenue Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060 (1919).
Revenue Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 230 (1921).
Treas. Reg. 62, art. 1564 ( 1922).
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consistency. 294 Hence, Congress returned to the formulation of the term "amount
realized" as the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
property received. m This definition presently is contained in section I001 (b).
In Warren Jones Co., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
the last amendment to the predecessor to section 1001(b) manifested that Congress
intended to establish the rule that if the fair market value of property received
in an exchange can be ascertained, it must be reported as the amount realized. ~"
The court acknowledged that this reading of the statute could subject some
taxpayers to the hardships of the closed transaction rule, but noted that shortly
after the amendment in question, Congress enacted (in 1926) the installment
basis for reporting gain.m The court stated that this reporting method better
satisfies the various policy objectives supporting the cash equivalency doctrine
and in addition, applies equally to an accrual basis taxpayer, unlike the cash
equivalency doctrine. ~K Thus, in essence Warren Jones Co. restricted the open
transaction doctrine to truly contingent amounts or promises that have no fair
market value at a11.2w This restriction in itself was not erroneous.
Instead, the doctrinal error arose in the closed transaction doctrine's incorrect
refusal to extend Arrowsmith to year 2 payments in excess of the year I closed
amount plus an appropriate interest factor. Traditional treatment of such excess
as ordinary income distorted the taxpayer's income. At least fixed amounts that
were contingent, due to collectability factors similar to those in Warren Jones
Co., presumably could be installment reported by prorating gain to the actual
payments received.
2

4.

Countervailing Policies to Open Transaction Reporting

Unfortunately, the judicial focus on the distortions of the closed transaction
approach overlooked the greater distortions arising from the following statutory
shortcomings: (1) the avoidance of aT level tax upon its liquidating distribution
of a claim with no ascertainable fair market value in year 1; and (2) the historical
inapplicability of the time value of money concepts or interest charges in open
transaction reporting at the former T shareholder level. Indeed the Tax Court
has stated that open transaction reporting produces merely a distortion in timing
and not a distortion in the amount of income.-~" Recent developments have
revealed that the timing of the incidence of taxation, however, can have an
economic impact that is substantial.:~" Moreover, the old problem of the absence
of an ordinary income component in open transaction reporting, which may
have been a primary motivating factor to those who wished not to extend the

294. S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1924), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 266, 275.
295. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 202(c), 43 Stat. 256 (1924).
296. 524 F.2d at 792.
297. See supra note 125.
298. See 524 F.2d at 792.
299. See infra text accompanying note 316.
300. Simmons Precision Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 103, 118 (1980). The lack of
timing of income considerations in judicial doctrines has been criticized severely. Johnson, Silk
Purses From a Sow's Ear: Cost Free Liabilities Under the Income Tax, 3 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 231
(1984).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 136-77 (discussing pre-1984 time value of money
abuses).

The Journal of Corporation Law

184

[Winter

open transaction doctrine to character of income, has been obviated largely by
the new time value of money rules. This is true because the rules apply generally
to contingent amounts received by former T shareholders in a complete liquidation. 302

5.

Rare and Extraordinary Circumstances: In Whose Eyes?

The Service traditionally has attempted to confine Burnet v. Logan-"'-' "narrowly to its facts. " 3' 14 The Service has argued that almost every contract or claim
to receive indefinite amounts of income, such as those acquired by former T
shareholders in a liquidation of T, can, and should, be valued upon receipt
except in "rare and extraordinary cases. " 305 Those who oppose the Service's
position rely on the so called transmutation of income potentialities of a distribution of a contingent item in a complete liquidation.-"}{, Of course, the real
problem in the context of a liquidating sale is not the transmutation of income
at the former T shareholder level, but the avoidance of income at the T level.
On a practical level, however, the heart of the Treasury's opposition to open
transaction treatment probably lies in the intuitive premise that a transaction
held open until year 2 probably will not be reported in year 2. 3117 In any event,
the courts traditionally have disagreed with the Commissioner with respect to
whether a given set of circumstances is "rare and extraordinary." 30 x The debate
should have focused on whether such administrative concerns would override a
clearer reflection of income.
In 1980 Congress overturned prior case law to permit installment reporting
when the selling price is subject to some contingency. 3 '~'~ The legislative regulations
described above in the statutory discussion provide for ratable basis recovery
in transactions when the gross profit or total contract price (or both) cannot
be ascertained readily. 31 ° Congress did not prescribe specific rules for every
conceivable open transaction, but instead left this task to the regulations. This
decision was consistent with that suggested by the commentators.-'" Congress
did not preclude a basis recovery statutorily as suggested by the leading proponent

302.
303.
304.

See supra text accompanying notes 176-77.
282 u.s. 359 (1931).
Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606, 629 (1968) (citing Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B.

15).
305. /d.
306. See Cain, Taxotion of Promises to Pay, 8 GEO. L.J. 125, 143 (1973); Farer, supra note
242, at 527, 540-45; Note, supra note 238, at 72-76.
307. Congress explicitly pointed out in an analogous situation (reporting of 01 D at the
shareholder level prior to 1969 reforms) that much of the ordinary income from OlD probably was
not being reported by the owner of the bonds. "Not only is the fact that this discount is taxable
at the time of disposition [year 21 likely to be forgotten, but also the fact that it is ordinary income
rather than capital gain is likely to be overlooked." H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 109 (1969); see also Popkin, Taxation of Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 46 (1980).
308. See infra note 317.
309. See supra text accompanying note 131.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39.
311. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 472. See generally Committee on Tax Policy, Section
of Taxation of New York State Bar Association, A Report on Complexily and !he Income Tax,
27 TAX l. REV. 325, 348-49 (1972).
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of installment reporting reform. m Rather, in the legislative history to the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, Congress intended to redirect the common
law of open transaction reporting. The Senate Report provides that:
The creation of a statutory deferred payment option for all forms
of deferred payment sales significantly expands the availability of
installment reporting to include situations where it has not previously
been permitted. By providing an expanded statutory installment reporting option, the Committee believes that in the future there should
be little incentive to devise convoluted forms of deferred payment
obligations to attempt to obtain deferred reporting. In any event, the
effect of the new rules is to reduce substantially the justification for
treating transactions as "open" and permitting he [sic] use of the
cost-recovery method sanction by Burnet v. Logan . .. Accordingly,
it is the Committee's intent that the cost-recovery method not be
available in the case of sales for a fixed price (whether the seller's
obligation is evidenced by a note, contractual provise, or otherwise),
and that its use be limited to those rare and extraordinary cases
involving sales for a contingent price where the fair market value of
the purchaser's obligation cannot reasonably be ascertained. m
The effect of this legislative thumb on the common Jaw scales is difficult
to assess. -' 14 The pronouncement prohibiting open transaction reporting of fixed
amounts, echoed in the ensuing regulations, goes only a step beyond the Ninth
Circuit's Warren Jones Co. rationale of closing a fixed amount transaction
having a determinable fair market value, regardless of the depth of the discount. m
The Tax Court has not applied the Warren Jones Co. principle when a fixed
amount obligation does not have a determinable fair market value.-' 1' Historically,
the Service and the courts have disagreed with respect to whether a fair market
value can be ascribed. 317 Following the 1980 Congressional directive, courts
probably will be more receptive to closing a transaction by discounting predictable

312. Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 476-78, 481.
313. S. REP. No. 1000, supra note 84, at 24.
314. See generally Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment Sales After
the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAX LAW. 605, 644-49 (1981).
315. Closed transaction treatment had been applied on occasion prior to Warren Jones Co.
even when the fair market value was discounted far below face value. See, e.g., Campagna v.
United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961) (800Jo discount). In contrast to these liquidation transactions,
installment basis reporting was permitted when taxpayers "purchased" obligations that were deeply
discounted due to the potential loss of investment. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lift in, 317 F .2d 234
(4th Cir. 1963); Willhoit v. Commissioner 308 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1962); Phillips v. Frank 295 F.2d
629 (9th Cir. 1961).
316. Estate of Wiggins v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); McShain v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 998 (1979). But see Stanton v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 191, 195 (1967) (450Jo discount
is not indicative of a lack of ascertainable fair market value). On occasion, the Tax Court has
been receptive to the argument that a deep discount indicates that there is no ascertainable fair
.market value because no willing seller would sell at such a discount. See Simmons Precision Prods.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 103, 122 (1980).
317. See Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606 (1968). The Tax Court, in Dorsey, catalogued
decisions in which contingent payments were valued or placed into four major categories: (I) when
"there was an established industry with sufficient criteria for ascertaining fair market value;" (2)
when the courts concluded that the taxpayer presented insufficient proof to establish that there was
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future income streams. 318 After all, open transaction reporting is a rule of fairness,
and in this situation Congress has judged what is fair. Note, however, that in
fact and policy, deeply discounted fixed amount payments pose the same unfairness under the traditional closed transaction doctrine as truly contingent
payments.

6.

Conclusion

The open transaction doctrine started off with a correct underlying ideameasure income as it is received. Its major defect lies in the doctrine's failure
to account for the time value of money. This defect is remedied largely in the
proposed time value of money regulations. At the same time, the failure of the
closed transaction doctrine to account properly at the T shareholder level for
payments in excess of the closed value plus appropriate interest arose from a
rigid, mechanical approach that lost sight of the basic principle of clear reflection
of income. The contingent payment installment reporting regulations and time
value of money regulations now obviate most of these difficulties.
The fundamental flaw at the T shareholder level in the conventional doctrine
and the current Code is based on the following two factors: (I) legislative
regulations that provide for a mechanical recovery of basis and, hence, proration
of contingent payments to basis and gain; and (2) a case-law elective basis
recovery prior to gain recognition for payments that are contingent in amount
and have no ascertainable fair market value. Basis recovery no longer is necessary
and should have been supplanted by proration of basis under the regulations. 119
The failure of some players, in the collegial process 120 of tax "simplification,"
to rise above the narrow interests of their clients-a common failure of the
political process itself-apparently is the genesis of survival of the case-law basis
recovery reporting alternative to installment reporting. 321 The Treasury seems to
have responded in kind during the legislative process by encouraging Congress
to provide an election out procedure that "red flags" for audit any basis recovery
reporting and the above legislative thumb on the case-law scales. All factors
considered, it is fair to assume that only the most aggressive taxpayers will elect
out of section 453 for such basis recovery reporting.

no ascertainable fair market value; (3) when the taxpayer initially reported the contingent rights as
having an ascertainable fair market value, but later attempted to reverse this position; and (4) when
administrative necessity dictated "an immediate determination of value without awaiting future
experience." /d. at 630-32; see Note, supra note 238, at 72-78 (criticizing decisions closing contingent
payment).
318. See, e.g., Warren v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 846 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Estate of Wiggins
v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 701 (1979); McShain v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 998 (1979).
319. See Ginsburg, supra note 122, at 481.
320. The "collegial process" refers to the working together of representatives from the accounting and legal professions involved in taxation, the Treasury, and the Joint Committee on
Taxation. See Hoffman, Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 TAx L. REv. 413, 500
(1982).
321. The bar was split over whether to reduce the availability of cost recovery reporting, but
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) "argued persuasively that cost
recovery is necessary for some contingent sales where the value of the consideration is impossible
to ascertain." Hoffman, supra note 320, at 503.
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T Corporate Level Treatment

Prior to 1954, courts fashioned two major doctrines for taxing a liquidating
corporation on certain income or potential income items, notwithstanding the
general rule in the regulations that sheltered a corporation from recognition of
gain or loss in a liquidating distribution of its assets. The two doctrines were
the case-law prohibition of assignment of (earned) income and the Code-derived
requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect its income
which is now contained in section 446(b). 322 The court decisions often blended
the doctrines together, reasoning that clear reflection of income requires that
the taxpayer who earns income be taxed on such income when it is realized,
notwithstanding prior assignment. The "tax benefit doctrine" in this context
possessed antecedents prior to the 1954 Code, but only recently began to reach
its full fruition. The failure of these doctrines to deal with contingent income
at the T level arose from a tendency in the cases to equate clear reflection of
income and earning of assigned income with the tax accounting accrual concept
of a fixed right to a certain amount of ascertainable income.

1.

Assignment of Income Doctrine
a.

Pre-1954 Code

The assignment of income doctrine originated quite naturally with a focus
on who earned the income. This focus was the result of the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Lucas v. Earf3 23 which involved a nontax motivated assignment
of half of the husband-taxpayer's future income to his spouse in a community
property system. In Lucas, the Court interpreted the definition of "gross income,"
contained in the predecessor to section 61 (a)( I) as mandating taxation of salaries
to those who earned them and providing implicitly that such tax "could not
be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised
to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for a second in the man
who earned it. " 324 However, as the subsequent Supreme Court assignment of
income decisions dealt with income from property, rather than from services,
the focus shifted to the judicial "realization" requirement that was not deemed
to occur until the income was paid ..m The Supreme Court explained further in
Helvering v. Horst 326 that such a postponement of "realization" was an administrative rule postponing tax until the "final event of enjoyment" of the
income, usually its receipt. 327 Note, however, that such enjoyment could be
consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money

322. Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated By the P.G. Lake
Case, 17 TAX L. Rev. 293, 396-400 (1962).
323. 281 U.S. Ill (1930).
324. /d. at 115.
325. See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); accord Commissioner v. P.G. Lake,
Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). "Admittedly not all economic gain of the taxpayer is taxable income.
From the beginning the revenue laws had been interpreted as defining 'realization' of income as
the taxable event, rather than the acquisition of the right to receive it. And 'realization' is not
deemed to occur until the income is paid." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 115 (1940).
326. 311 u.s. 112 (1940).
327. /d. at 115.
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or property. 328 Under this view, such enjoyment of income, and hence "realization," occurred when the taxpayer who owned or controlled the source of
income also controlled its disposition. "The power to dispose of income is the
equivalent of ownership of it. The exercise of that power to procure the payment
of income to another is the enjoyment, and hence the realization, of the income
by him who exercises it. " 329 This focus on "power" undoubtedly arose from
the property context of these cases. 330 However, the metaphors and legal fictions
too often seized the mind's eye, blinding it to the absence of clear reflection
of income.
The implication of this assignment-enjoyment rationale is that the act of
assignment is the taxable event.J3 1 However, subsequent decisions, continuing to
draw gossamer lines, reasoned that the assignor realized income under the
anticipatory assignment of income doctrine only when the assignee actually
received the money or property. 332 Utilizing the rationale that the exercise of

328.

The Court in Horst stated that:

lnhe decisions and regulations have consistently recognized that receipt in cash or
property is not the only characteristic of realization of income to a taxpayer on the
cash receipts basis. Where the taxpayer does not receive payment of income in money
or property realization may occur when the last step is taken by which he obtains the
fruition of the economic gain which has already accrued to him . . . .
. . . The rule, founded on administrative convenience, is only one of postponement
of the tax to the final event of enjoyment of the income, usually the receipt of it by
the taxpayer, and not one of exemption from taxation where the enjoyment is consummated by some event other than the taxpayer's personal receipt of money or
property.
ld. at 115-16. (citations omitted).
One decision surveying the landmark noncorporate assignment of income cases noted that income
was attributed to the assignor because "his gratification in the assignee's possession of the proceeds
was income arising at that time. On that theory one would suppose that the doctrine would be
limited to occasions when the assignor and the assignee were associated by some affectionate
relationship." J. Ungar, Inc. v. Commissioner, 244 F .2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1957). Of course, as the
Unger court acknowledged, the assignment of income doctrine was extended to corporate distributions,
usually with even more strained metaphors or legal fictions. /d.; see infra note 335.
329. Horst, 311 U.S. at 118.
330. See infra note 336.
331. On occasion, the Service has been able to effect the super-accrual and taxation of a
liquidating corporation in its final tax year (year 1), even though an amount without an ascertainable
fair market value was not received until year 2. See Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364, 374-75
(1947), aff'd on other grounds, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948). In Carter, however, although the
parties stipulated that the payment had no ascertainable fair market value, it was in a fixed amount.
9 T.C. at 365-68.
332. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948).
Unrealized appreciation, since it is not taxable income, is not covered by the rule as
to anticipatory assignments of income. The latter rule is sui generis; it applies to debts,
including bad debts, to the extent that they represent income. The acquisition of the
right 10 receive payment of a bad debt is not necessarily a taxable event; and therefore
the realization of the gain by the assignor is not deemed to occur until the debt is
paid to the assignee. After assignment and prior to payment the tax liability is incomplete.
The rule is founded upon administrative convenience, and operates to postpone the
taxable event until realization is consummated by the assignees receipt of the money.
/d. at 1010 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940)). Several early decisions have taxed
the assignor in year 2. Austin v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 593, 596-97 (1946), affd, 161 F.2d 666
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767 (1947); Colby v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941). There
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the power to dispose of income is equivalent to realization, courts have applied
readily the assignment of income doctrine to a corporation distributing, in
complete liquidation, the right to payment of noncontingent income that was
earned prior to liquidation. 333 The former T shareholders were liable as transferees
for the liquidated T's year I tax liability.·134 Unfortunately, an analysis of the
assignment of income doctrine, in terms of enjoyment of economic benefit from
receipt of payment by its shareholders, led to a refusal to apply the doctrine
to the liquidating distribution of a contingent item that was not collected by
the former T shareholders by the end of the liquidating corporation's final tax
year.m
Another judicial basis for not applying the assignment of income doctrine,
which derived from the assignment of income from property authorities, was
that a liquidating T had not earned contingent income at the time of the year
I assignment because T was not entitled to the payment of the income at the
time of the assignment. 336 Unfortunately, these cases have focused on the nature

has not been a pre-1954 Code decision that has considered the time of realization when the taxpayer
sold a contingent claim prior to its maturity. See infra text accompanying note 339 for subsequent
developments.
333. Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952) (former shareholders of liquidated
corporation taxed as transferees on accounts receivable distributed by liquidating corporation, but
received by shareholders prior to its dissolution).
334. I.R.C. § 311 (1939) (reenacted in substantially the same form in I.R.C. § 6901 (1954)).
If a taxpayer transfers property to another, the transferee may become liable, at law or in equity,
for taxes owed by the taxpayer. The imposition of transferee liability is governed by state law while
§ 6901 provides for assessment and collection of the tax. Transferee liability will exist generally in
cases of transfers of property for inadequate or no consideration. See generally 13 J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 53.05, at 53-9 (rev. vol. 1982).
335. In United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to apply the assignment of income doctrine to tax a liquidated corporation on
items that were similar to the apples in a warehouse pool in United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718
(9th Cir. 1951), and the accounts receivable in Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952),
except that the items were not collected until after the corporation was liquidated. The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has rejected the government's anticipatory assignment of income arguments based
on Earl and Horst. The court's reading of Earl and Horst arguably was erroneous. The court stated
that:
The teaching of the cited cases was not based on the theory that the income was
"already earned" at the time of assignment, but on the hypothesis that it was anticipated,
used and realized before it was earned. The taxpayers were charged with the income
because they retained the control of the property or agency by which it was earned
and diverted the payments to others as a means of procuring the satisfaction of their
own wants. Thus, they obtain the economic benefit which was tantamount to realization
of the income.
205 F.2d at 648. This reasoning was adopted by the Court of Claims in Telephone Directory
Advertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 884, 889 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
336. Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957). The Tax Court
had applied the assignment of income doctrine on the grounds that the claims in question represented
income earned, although not accrued, prior to the date of assignment. This approach was the
approach taken under the 1954 Code by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Storz v. Commissioner,
583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978). However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Cold Metal
Process was led astray in part by the "fruit-and-tree" analogy adopted in the area. The court
distinguished such landmark cases as Horst, Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), and Harrision
v. Schafner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941), on the grounds that they "involved a gift of income payable in
the future [(the fruit)], as distinguished from a gift of income producing property [(the tree with
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of the claim at the time of the assignment, rather than on whose efforts generated
the ultimate income. Ironically, the Supreme Court's application of the assignment
of income doctrine to "contingent" items in a companion case to the landmark
Horst decision generally has escaped notice. m
If the assignment itself was not a taxable event, the next question was
whether the liquidated T was taxable when its former shareholders actually
received the contingent payment in year 2. Under the majority literalist approach,
if T no longer existed in year 2 when the former T shareholders received a
payment of previously contingent items, T was not taxed at that time, under
the rationale that a corporation that was not in existence had no duty to file
an income tax return.m Because T had no duty to file a return, the former T
shareholders were not subject to transferee liability. Conversely, if the distributing
corporation remained in existence until the contingent claim matured, it was
taxable under the assignment of income doctrine. 339 Not surprisingly, the Tax
Court frequently strained to find continued corporate existence in year 2. -'~"
Moreover, early corporate assignment of income cases, overriding the General
Utilities principle, articulated that the doctrine was easier to apply to a continuing
corporation than to a liquidating distribution by a T that is terminating operations. -' 41

fruit)) where the donor relinquishes to the donee not merely the income which is payable in the
future, but also complete ownership and control of the propeny which produces the income." 247
F .2d at 871. A transfer of ownership of the income producing property transfers the income to
the donee under this analysis. "In the present case there was no retention by Cold Metal of any
right, title or interest of any kind in the patents transferred to the Trustee. Both the income
producing property and the income therefrom were transferred in their entirety and unconditionally
to the Trustee." /d.
337. In Eubank, 311 U.S. at 122, the taxpayer (a general life insurance agent) assigned renewal
commissions payable to him in year 2 for services that had been rendered in year I. /d. at 126.
The Supreme Court held that the assignor was subject to tax in year 2 on the assigned amounts
that were uncertain and contingent at the time of the assignment. !d. at 127. The dissent in Eubank
adopted the now discredited "transfer of income producing property" analysis described supra in
note 336, stating that:
A mere right to collect future payments, for services already performed, is not presently
taxable as 'income derived' from such services. It is property which may be assigned.
Whatever the assignor receives as consideration may be his income; but the statute
does not undertake to impose liability upon him because of payments to another under
a contract which he had transferred in good faith, under circumstances like those here
disclosed.

311 U.S. at 127 (McReynolds J ., dissenting).
While Eubank thus applied the assignment of income doctrine to the assignment of contingent
claims, the taxpayer was in existence in year 2. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 409; see
also Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, and Assignment of Income- The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX
L. REV. I, 41-49 (1964).
338. Commissioner v. Henry Hess Co., 210 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1954); O'Brien v. Commissioner,
25 T.C. 376 (1955).
339. See, e.g., United States v. Jolliet & Chicago R. Co., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); Henry Hess
Co., 210 F.2d at 557.
340. Cold Metal Process, 25 T.C. at 1333; Henry Hess Co., 16 T.C. at 1363. See generally
Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 409-10.
341. Horschel, 205 F.2d at 650 (distinguishing Lynch on the grounds that it involved an
attempt by a "going concern" to distribute the profit from the sale of apples to its shareholders
as a dividend in kind).
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One court queried why T's transfer of a business or assets, for purposes
of liquidation, to its shareholders should be treated differently than a liquidation
conducted by a receiver which is treated as a continuation of the corporate
business.·' 42 The court stated:
We cannot help thinking, therefore, that it would better have
accorded with the underlying thesis of the Revenue Law for courts
to regard an assignment in liquidation by corporation to its shareholders, as no more than a procedural step in a corporate enterprise:
that is, its termination. However, there is enough contrary authority
to make it at least doubtful whether such a disposition of the case
at bar would be permissible. m

b.

Post-1954 Code

On their face, the original 1954 Code provisions governing corporate level
treatment of in-kind liquidating and nonliquidating distributions and sales pursuant to a complete liquidation (sections 311, 336, and 337) contained only
narrow exceptions to the general rule of corporate level nonrecognition announced
in General Utilities. 344 The legislative history behind section 311, however, manifested an intention to continue the existing case law "attributions of income"
from shareholders to their corporation as exemplified in Commissioner v. First
State Bank of Stratjord. 345 As noted above, the pre-1954 Code authorities
generally had applied the attribution or assignment of income doctrine more
readily to a continuing corporation than to a liquidating corporation, but the
legislative history accompanying sections 336 and 337 was silent on this point.
Nevertheless, in light of this legislative history the Court of Claims in Williamson
v. United States346 applied the assignment of income doctrine to section 336.

342. J. Ungar v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1957) (the court determined that
corporations that are in the process of liquidation in year 2 are in existence at the time of the
payment of the distributed claim).
343. /d. (footnote omitted).
344. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
345. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948); see also infra text accompanying note 395.
346. 292 F.2d 524, 530 (Ct. Cl. 1961). Closer to the mark, is the Second Circuit Court of
Appeal's reasoning in Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963), which
combined the enjoyment analysis with an earning rationale:
The philosophy underlying these cases [classic assignment of income decisions such as
Earl, Horst, and Eubank) is that the taxpayer has performed services or has a vested
interest in property which gives him an unrestricted claim to compensation or income
therefrom; the exercise of the unfettered power to dispose of that income is deemed
analogous to its enjoyment or realization, thus resulting in a tax upon the assignor
rather than upon the assignee who receives the income in fact.
/d. at 922.
Wood Harmon also pointed out the error in the conventional fruit-and-tree analysis:
It is true that United [the liquidating corporation) had divested itself of the claim
to the balance of the compensation award during the course of the liquidation distribution, but surely this is not the sort of "transfer of benficial ownership and
property" which transfers the incidence of taxation under Blair v. Commissioner. In
any case of an anticipatory assignment of rights to income, it is· not difficult to cloak
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The Williamson court properly reasoned that sections 311 and 336 were designed
as parallel provisions and should be interpreted consistently. Hence, "parity"
dictated that both provisions should be subject to the Bank of Stratford rule.
Unfortunately, Williamson wholeheartedly adopted the enjoyment of income
version of the assignment of income doctrine rather than the earned income
rationale. The Williamson court stated:
When the Williamson corporation paid the dividend to the plaintiff
it obtained the fruition of the economic gain which had accrued to
it upon the performance of the well services; it realized income.
Paying the dividend was the enjoyment of its income. A body corporate
can be said to enjoy its income in no other way. -' 47
Not surprisingly, the pre-1954 Code confusion of the assignment of income
doctrine with the rules of accrual tax accounting intensified. Indeed, the tribunals
ruled repeatedly, in the context of section 336, that allocation or assignment of
income depends upon the existence of accruable or realized income, that is, a
fixed and determined right to income in a certain amount. 34 R Under the restricted
assignment of income doctrine, distribution of a contingent claim did not result
in taxation at the distributing corporate level at the time of distribution. However,
if a corporation continued in existence until the assigned claim matured or
accrued in the hands of the shareholders, the corporation was taxed. 349 Yet if

the assignment so that it mascarades as a transfer of a property right or a capital
asset, by arbitrarily assigning this label to the taxpayer's claim for future income.
Wearing this disguise, even Lucas v. Earl, Horst, and Eubank would come within the
Blair principle. In terms of the omnipresent botanical analogy, the "fruit" of the tree
could always be transmuted into another "tree," the transfer of which would free the
transferor from taxation. The appellant's argument therefore proves too much.
/d. at 923.
347. Williamson, 292 F.2d at 530.
348. See, e.g., Shea Co. v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 135 (1969); Poro v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 641 (1963).
349. As the Tax Court explained in Siegel Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 15 (1966):

Ordinarily, in deflection of income cases, a cash basis assignor is accountable for
his assigned income in the year in which it is paid rather than in the year in which
he makes the assignment . . . . To be sure, as the Government contends, there is
language in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. I 12, susceptible of an interpretation that
would support charging the assignor with realized income in the year of assignment.
But no such problem was before the Court in Horst, since the bond coupons therein
matured and were paid during the same year that the taxpayer gave them to his son.
/d. at 23-24.
The court pointed out that in Eubank, a companion case to Horst, the Court taxed the assignor
in year 2 when the contingent payments were paid. The Tax Court, in Siegel Productions, stated:

To be sharply distinguished are those cases in which the corporation was liquidated
prior to the payments in controversy. In such situation there would be a distortion if
fully earned but unpaid income were not included in the taxpayer's income prior to
dissolution, and the Commissioner would thereby be amply justified in resorting to
section 446(b).
/d. at 25. This "superaccrual" explains decisions such as Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d
254 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959); Floyd v.
Scofield, 193 F.2d at 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718, 721 (9th
Cir. 1961); and Carter v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 364 (1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
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the corporation was no longer in existence at the time of this "accrual," neither
it nor its former shareholders as transferees were taxed on the inside corporate
level gain. 350 The former T shareholders were taxed on their outside gain under
the open transaction basis recovery method 351 or, alternatively, under the closed
transaction on present value in year 1 method. 352
One approach that closely paralleled the decline of the cash equivalency
doctrine at the T shareholder Ievel, 353 in effect, drew a distinction at the T level
between items that were "contingent" because the precise money value of an
uncontested claim in a fixed amount was not known due to a collectability risk
and items that were contingent because the validity or existence of the claim
was in doubt. Speculative payments that were fixed in amount were accruable
under traditional accounting principles, but contingent amounts were not accruable. 354 Similarly, some courts applied the assignment of income doctrine to
T in year 1, in effect, causing superaccrual of fixed amount speculative payments.355

In all of these decisions, however, the corporation remained in existence, or a fixed amount was
involved while the payments were contingent with respect to collectability. The abuse occurred when
the amount of payment itself was contingent. See the distinction drawn in Wood Harmon Corp.
v. United States, 311 F.2d 918, 924 n.6 (2d Cir. 1963).
Interestingly when a liquidating corporation remained in existence in year 2 and its shareholders
made direct payments of the liquidating corporation's obligations, the liquidating corporation was
allowed to claim a deduction for having paid the expense in form and in substance. Royal Oaks
Apartments, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 243 (1964). Similar approaches have been taken at one
time or another in the § 351 and § 337 areas. See Thatcher v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 1114 (9th
Cir. 1976); Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67, 71-72 (8th Cir. 1964).
If the liquidating corporation remains alive in year 2, the § 337 shield still may apply (assuming
that the corporation meets the requirement of distributing all of its assets within the applicable 12month period that could overlap years I and 2). See Messer v. Commissioner, 438 F.2d 774, 780
(3d Cir. 1971).
350. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); United Mercantile Agencies
v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 808 (1960).
351. Shea v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 135, 159 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 24256.
352. See, e.g., United Mercantile, 34 T.C. at 808; supra text accompanying note 236.
353. See supra text accompanying notes 286-99.
354. Under traditional tax accounting concepts, an item of income accrues when all events
necessary to entitle the taxpayer to a fixed and determined right to such income have occurred.
Treas. Reg. § 1.461-l(a)(2) (1957). Note, however, that the "all events" test will not be met before
an economic performance occurs. I.R.C. § 46l(h) (West Supp. 1986). See 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra
note 104, at 258. Conversely, a cash basis taxpayer under traditional principles realizes income only
when payment is made. In a strong parallel to the discredited cash equivalency doctrine once applicable
to property sales, income from service authorities permit deferral until receipt of payment when
the taxpayer receives a mere promise to pay, unsecured by note or other obligation. Rev. Rut. 6031, 1960-1 C.B. 174; see McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual Astigmatism, 24 TAX L.
REV. 201 (1969).
355. Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963). Similarly, in the
famous Carter decision the Tax Court applied superaccrual to a cash basis liquidating corporation
in its final year to preclude distortion of income. See supra note 248. Of course, this is the true
basis for the clear reflection of income doctrine and for its merger with the assignment of income
doctrine. Both doctrines are directed not at tax accounting rules, but at avoiding distortion of
income. Thus, like the model, practical correlative adjustments should be made to avoid distortion
of income. Superaccrual in year I does not yield the greatest accuracy, but is better than an escape
of taxation at the corporate level. The best approach is that advocated by the model (i.e. accurate
measurement in year 2 by taxing if necessary a surrogate comprised of the target shareholders as
transferees for hypothetical year 2 target level tax).
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After an inauspicious beginning the conceptual breakthrough of the assignment of income doctrine occurred under section 337. While one early authority
applied the assignment of income doctrine and the clear reflection of income
principle to section 337, primarily to achieve parity with section 336, 356 other
early authorities did not apply these doctrines directly to section 337 transactions.
Instead, these authorities denied the section 337 shield on alternative grounds.
One such ground provided that when the assignment of income or clear reflection
of income doctrines traditionally would apply, there was no sale or exchange
of "property." 357 Under an even more extreme approach, a few authorities
equated "property" for purposes of section 337 with "capital asset" under
section 1221 and hence, denied the section 337 exemption to ordinary income
property. 358 This exemption of ordinary income property generally was thought
to be yielded by the assignment of income doctrine.m
Subsequently, the courts came to recognize the weakness of these approaches,
particularly the lack of parity with section 336 that was generated by the
misidentification of "property" as a "capital asset." Instead, the courts applied
the assignment of income doctrine directly to section 337 transactions. ·160 The
Tax Court in this context also limited the assignment of income doctrine to
accrual concepts, declining to utilize the doctrine if T had "no fixed and
determinable right to an ascertainable amount of income at the time of its
liquidation. " 361 In Storz v. Commissioner 62 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Tax Court on this point. The court in Storz properly focused on .
whose efforts produced the income rather than on accrual concepts. The court
stated that:
[The liquidated corporation] cannot avoid taxation by assigning
the fruit of its efforts to another, when the fruit however green, has
a market value at the time of assignment. The assignment of income
doctrine causes income to be taxed to him who earns it.

356. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 202 (9th Cir. 1962).
357. The Tax Court, in Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 305 (1961), aff'd
on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962), denied the shield of § 337 to a sale of accounts
receivable on the grounds that the accounts did not meet the statutory definition of "property."
ld. at 210. The accounts receivable were not "property" because the court equated "accounts
receivable" with "installment obligations" which were excluded specifically from the definition of
"property" by § 337(b). ld. at 309-11. The taxpayer argued that the "installment obligation" was
an obligation that was reported under the installment method of reporting. /d. at 310. The court,
reviewing the legislative history, said that for purposes of § 337, "installment obligation" was an
obligation received for sales in the ordinary course of business, regardless of other installment
reporting provisions. /d. at 309-10.
358. See supra note 57.
359. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Commissioner, 313
U.S. 28 (1941); see also Shores, Reexamining the Relationship Between Capital Gains and the
Assignment of Income, 13 IND. L. REv. 463 (1980).
360. Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); Stewarts Trust v.
Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682 (1975); Rev. Rut. 77-190, 1977-1 C.B. 88. The parity approach to §§
336 and 337 as well as § 338, has now been adopted universally. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 400 (1982); 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 133.
361. Schneider v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 18, 29 (1975); see also Storz v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 84 (1977), rev'd, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978).
362. 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978).
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The Tax Court held that income is earned only when the assignor
has a fixed and determined right to the income. This position appears
to equate the concepts of earn and accrue, which are relevant to
different issues of taxability. Income is taxed to whoever earns it.
Thus, the concept of earn is relevant to determining the identity of
the proper taxpayer. The concept of accrue, however, is relevant to
the issue when income becomes taxable. Income is taxable only when
it has been realized under an acceptable accounting method. The
accrual method of accounting generally provides that realization occurs
when the taxpayer has a fixed right to a reasonably ascertainable sum
. . . . It is entirely possible that income may have been earned, but
not yet realized because not yet accrued. 363

Storz presented an easier case for assignment of income than most section
336 liquidations because in the paradigm section 337 transaction P purchases
T's assets and hence, an assignment of income arises by sale. J64 In a sale of
an earned income claim, income is realized as of the date of the assignment,
that is, the sale in year I, rather than when the claim is collected in year 2. -' 65
Furthermore, in Storz, P and T allocated the purchase price, in part, to the
anticipated income. 366 The Storz approach is correct, but by itself cannot deal
with a distribution under section 336, as contrasted with a sale under section
337, of a contingent income item that does not become fixed until year 2. If
the amount of the payments to be received under the claim cannot be determined
and the fair market value of these payments cannot be ascertained readily in
year I, the amount chosen if the year I transaction were closed might well vary
from the amount of payments actually received in year 2. Because T no longer
would be in existence in year 2, the problem of identifying the proper taxpayer
for the year 2 correlative adjustments would continue to exist. Hence, the Service's
attempts to allocate such contingent items to T's final return in year I generally
have been unsuccessful, except when the amount of the contingent claim was
fixed and collected shortly after year I by the T shareholders. _16 7

363.

/d. at 975-76 (citations omitted). The court further stated that:

In determining whether to tax the assignor or the assignee for future income the
question is whether the assignment transferred a right to receive future income as
distinguished from a transfer of property which produces the future income. "Earn"
is used in this context to distinguish the former situation from the latter. If the future
income to the assignee arises, as in this case, from the assignor's efforts prior to the
assignment and not from the property which he transfers, it is earned and subject to
the assignment of income doctrine.

/d. at 977.
364. The Storz decision acknowledged that an agreement between the buyer and seller, with
respect to the value of the assigned contract rights, makes it easier to establish the amount of
earned income. /d. at 977. "But the failure of both parties to agree, or the fact that one party
unilaterally fixes a value, does not mean there are no earnings, or that such an earnings amount
cannot be ascertained." /d. at 978.
365. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260, 270 (1958); United States v. Edison, 310
F .2d Ill (5th Cir. 1962).
366. 583 F.2d at 977.
367. See infra text accompanying notes 381-82.
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From a policy viewpoint of more accurate reflection of income, it is difficult
to distinguish between contingencies that arise because the amount of the payment
is unknown and contingencies that arise because the probability of collection is
not ascertainable. From the Service's viewpoint, however, fixed amount contingent
collection claims are more common than claims that are completely contingent
with respect to amount. Hence, the Service undoubtedly prefers a test that limits
holding the transaction open to claims that truly are contingent as to amount
and, thus, prevents postponement from becoming exemption. 36x Furthermore, a
fixed amount contingent collection claim gives the courts and the Service a basis
on which to close the transaction in year 1.
The assignment of income doctrine merely is an administrative rule postponing realization until the actual receipt of income. Superaccrual of the fixed
amount in year 1 at the T level is but an extension of the developments discussed
below, such as the switch of the taxpayer from completed contract to percentage
of completion and similar switches of taxpayers from cash to accrual methods.·169
Concededly, superaccrual takes a step beyond the tax accounting definition of
"accruable" as a fixed amount the payment of which is determinable with
certainty. If the choice is superaccrual of the fixed amount in year 1 versus no
taxation at the T level in year 2, the choice is clear. The model proposed below,
however, would choose neither alternative. Instead the model proposes year 2
taxation of T or a surrogate, on the then accurately determinable amount as
more clearly measuring income than super accrual in year 1. ·17"

2.

Clear Reflection of Income
a.

Pre-1954 Code

The predecessors of section 446(b) provided in pertinent part, that if a
taxpayer's method of accounting did not reflect its income clearly, the Commissioner could compute taxable income under such method as reflects the
taxpayer's income more clearlyY' The current section 446(b) contains a similar
provision. 372 Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissionerm was the first

368. See supra note 307.
369. See Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946); see
also infra text accompanying notes 374-75.
370. See infra text accompanying notes 536-37.
371. The "clear reflection of income" requirement apparently originated in the Revenue Act
of 1916, § 8(g), 39 Stat. 756, 762 (1986) and has remained largely unchanged.
372. I.R.C. § 446(b) (West Supp. 1986); see also Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 400-03
(discussion of clear reflection of income in context of corporate distributions). Note that clear
reflection of income, from a tax accounting standpoint and a financial accounting standpoint,
presents two different concepts. See Dubroff, Cahill & Norris, Tax Accounting: The Relationship
of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 ALB. L. REv. 354
(1983); Gunn, Molching of Cos/sand Revenues as o Goof of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX REv. I
(1984).
373. 153 F.2d 681 (1946). In Jud Plumbing, the taxpayer corporation who used the completed
contract method of accounting dissolved two-thirds of the way into its taxable year and distributed
all its assets and liabilities including four uncompleted contracts. /d. at 682. Under the completed
contract method, none of the income from the uncompleted contracts was included in the corporation's
final return. /d. The Commissioner sought to change the corporation's accounting method to the
percentage of completion method and thereby tax it on a percentage of the income to be derived
under the uncompleted contracts. /d. at 682-83. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with
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decision to apply the clear reflection of income requirement to a liquidating T.
The Jud Plumbing court fused the clear reflection requirement with the assignment
of income doctrine, in effect, reasoning that if income is not chargeable to the
person who earns it under the taxpayer's method of accounting, such method
does not reflect income clearly. 374 Jud Plumbing cited no case authority, but
instead, loosely rested its conclusion on the Code provisions that required clear
reflection of income. 375 Subsequent decisions explicitly have relied upon the classic
assignment of income decisions for the conclusion that clear reflection of income
requires taxation of income to the person who earned the income. 376 These early
decisions, however, were easy to decide by placing T (in its final year) on
another generally accepted method of tax accounting that would tax the T in
year 1 on income that it earned in the final year. The existing method of tax
accounting did not result in a taxation in year 1.
Later cases presented the more difficult issue of the treatment of income
that T had earned but had not yet accrued under traditional accrual tax accounting
principles. These issues were difficult to resolve because T did not have an
unconditional, fixed and determined right to a reasonably ascertainable amount
of income at the time of liquidation. 377 The initial decision addressing the issue
was rendered by the Tax Court in Carter v. Commissioner.m The Carter decision
is known more widely for its open transaction treatment, at the T shareholder
level, of receipt of claims without an ascertainable fair market value. 379 In Carter,
the Tax Court taxed T, under the clear reflection of income doctrine, on the
previously fixed amounts received by the former shareholders in the following
tax year. 380 The Court, following Jud Plumbing, reasoned:
[T]he corporation's earnings belong to it and liability to tax
thereon cannot be discharged "by the simplest expedient of dissolution" and distribution of the right to such income. In the instant
case, the corporation had fully earned the income, for the buyer and

the Commissioner because the court found that, under the circumstances, the completed contract
method, although proper in prior years, would not reflect clearly the income of the corporation in
its final year. /d. at 684-85.
374. /d.
375. Jud Plumbing cited the predecessor to § 482, as well as the predecessor to § 446(b), as
supporting the requirement that the taxpayer's reporting of the transaction should reflect its income
clearly. /d. at 685. This generalized clear reflection of income concept goes beyond traditional tax
accounting. Hence, the merger of the assignment of income and the clear reflection of income
doctrines in these cases is proper. Beyond tax accounting rules lies the principle that distortion of
income should be avoided and if necessary, correlative adjustments to the annual accounting principle
and methods of tax accounting must be made. To this extent, criticism of this melding by
commentators appears unwarranted. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 322, at 403. These commentators
recognize that there is an extra-Code clear reflection of income principle at work in this area.
376. See, e.g., Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594, 596 (5th Cir. 1952); United States v. Lynch,
192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1951); Standard Paving Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 330 (lOth Cir. 1951).
377. See United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1953); Telephone Directory Advertising Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 884 (Ct. Cl. 1956).
378. 9 T.C. 364 (1947), aff'd, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
379. See supra text accompanying note 345. At the Tax Court level, Carter was a consolidated
case involving both the liquidating corporation and its former shareholders. At the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal's level, only the shareholders and the government were involved. See supra note
248.
380. Carter, 9 T.C. at 370-76.
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seller had been brought together in contracts, the contracts had been
performed by them, and, because of such performance, the corporation
had sent out bills for its earnings. Though the corporation was upon
the cash basis, and had not, prior to dissolution, actually received
the money, we think ... [the predecessor to section 446(b)] authorized
the Commissioner to charge the income to it.-'x 1
However, in Carter the distributed claim apparently was for a fixed amount
that the government and the taxpayer stipulated had no ascertainable fair market
value. 3x2
When presented with transactions in which the claim was truly contingent
with respect to amount, rather than a fixed amount that had no fair market
value, the Tax Court mechanically refused to extend the clear reflection of
income concept to tax contingent income to a liquidated T or its former
shareholders as transferees. Rather, the courts equated clear reflection of income
with traditional tax accounting principles.-'x 3 Thus, the earlier Tax Court insightCarter's use of the clear reflection of income concept to preclude T from evading
tax by the mechanism of liquidation-was lost in the devolutionary process of
bad doctrine.

b.

Post-/954 Code

The post-1954 Code authorities readily merged the assignment of income
authorities with the clear reflection of income requirement for both liquidating
distributions under section 336 and sales pursuant to section 337 ..1x• However,
the cases continued to refuse to utilize the clear reflection of income concept
to tax T or its shareholders as transferees with respect to income items that
remained contingent at the time of T's liquidation. 3 x~ Indeed, the broad concept
of clear reflection of income, as it relates to the Code provisions manifested
in Jud Plumbing, was obscured completely by explicit limitation to existing
methods of tax accounting. This was true even when T's liquidation clearly
resulted in a tax abuse. Thus, in Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc. ,-'x'
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to utilize section 446(b) to tax T
on the built-in gain in crops that T had planted and cultivated, but that were
harvested by its new sole shareholder, P. The new sole shareholder in South
Lake Farms had purchased the T stock and then liquidated T receiving the
unharvested crop. 3x7 The court's refusal to apply section 446(b) was based on
the ground that no known "method of accounting" would achieve this result.m

381. /d. at 373-74.
382. A similar situation was involved in the landmark Westover decision, although there the
amount was truly contingent. 173 F.2d at 91; see supra note 244.
383. See Horschel, 205 F.2d at 649; Telephone Directory Advertising, 142 F. Supp. at 889·
91.
384. Commissioner v. Kuckenberg, 309 F.2d 202, 204-05, 207-08 (9th Cir. 1962); Family Record
Plan, Inc. v. Commission, 309 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
385. See, e.g., United Mercantile Agencies v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 808, 815·19 (1960).
386. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963); see also Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax
Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1257, 1261-62 (1984).
387. 324 F .2d at 838.
388. /d.
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The South Lake Farms court acknowledged that there was a tax windfall to
T's former shareholders who sold their T stock for a price that reflected the
value of the crop.-'~Y Note that some authorities would have disallowed T's
deduction in the year of liquidation under the clear reflection of income doctrine.·"~"

3.

Tax Benefit Doctrine
a.

Pre-1954 Code

The tax benefit doctrine in its classic (and misleading) form holds that a
taxpayer must include in income, in the tax year of "recovery," an item or
amount deducted in a prior tax year, unless the deduction failed to yield a tax
benefit to the taxpayer in the prior year.·m Thus, if a taxpayer deducts, as
wholly worthless, a bad debt in year 1, obtains a tax benefit, and in year 2
the debtor unexpectedly repays the loan, the taxpayer must include the repayment
or "recovery" in income in year 2. This is true despite the fact that the receipt
of a loan repayment usually constitutes a tax-free return of capital. m
Courts propounded a number of divergent rationales to tax such "recoveries"
of income that did not constitute economic gain in the ordinary sense in year
2. All these rationales required recoveries. The divergencies in the rationales are
demonstrated by the following examples: (1) a loan that has been written-off
was converted from capital to potential ordinary income; (2) the annual accounting
principle required a "balancing entry" or offsetting income adjustment in year
2 to balance the income item offset by the bad debt deduction in year 1; and

389. !d. at 840.
390. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Trans., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 440, 449-55 (1975)
(Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
391. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 265. White, An Essay on the Conceptual Foundations
of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MtcH. L. REv. 486 (1983).
392. In Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), the Court stated that:
An annual accounting system is a practical necessity if the federal income tax is to
produce revenue ascertainable and payable at regular intervals. Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931 ). Nevertheless, strict adherence to an annual
accounting system would create transactional inequities. Often an apparently completed
transaction will reopen unexpectedly in a subsequent tax year, rendering the initial
reporting improper. For instance, if a taxpayer held a note that became apparently
uncollectible early in the taxable year, but the debtor made an unexpected financial
recovery before the close of the year and paid the debt, the transaction would have
no tax consequences for the taxpayer, for the repayment of the principal would be
recovery of capital. If, however, the debtor's financial recovery and the resulting
repayment took place after the close of the taxable year, the taxpayer would have a
deduction for the apparently bad debt in the first year under § 166(a) of the Code,
26 U.S.C. § 166(a). Without the tax benefit rule, the repayment in the second year,
representing a return of capital, would not be taxable. The second transaction, although
economically identical to the first, could, because of the differences in accounting,
yield drastically different tax consequences. The Government, by allowing a deduction
that it could not have known to be improper at the time, would be foreclosed from
recouping any of the tax saved because of the improper deduction. Recognizing and
seeking to avoid the possible distortions of income, the courts historically have required
the taxpayer to recognize the repayment in the second year as income.
/d. at 377-79.

200

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Winter

(3) an estoppel or waiver theory under which the original bad debt deduction
is allowed, subject to an implied consent to be taxed later on future recovery
of the bad debt, regardless of whether such recovery actually is income.m
A recovery requirement obviously would pose problems when taxing T on
a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution because the distribution does not
readily give rise to a recovery as would a loan repayment.m However, in the
landmark case of Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,m the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in effect, merged the general tax benefit and the
assignment of income doctrines to reach a correct result when a continuing
corporation distributed loans that had been written-off to shareholders, who
then collected substantial payments in the same tax year. The Stratford court
reasoned that under the tax benefit doctrine, the charged-off debts had been
converted into potential income to the extent of the tax deduction allowed
previously. 396 The court further concluded that by distributing this income item
the corporation realized income because the power to dispose of income was
the equivalent of ownership. Following other assignment of income authorities,

393. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 267-69. "While divergent, these theories share the
notion that recoveries do not constitute economic gain in the ordinary sense, and that their inclusion
in income is an anomaly requiring an explanation." /d. In Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, the Court stated
that:
All these views reflected that the initial accounting for the item must be corrected to
present a true picture of income. While annual accounting precludes reopening the
earlier year, it does not prevent a less precise correction-far superior to none-in the
current year, analogous to the practice of financial accountants.
460 U.S. at 378 n.ll.
394. See Note, The Tax Benefit Rule-A Judicially Broadened Tool for Transactional Tax
Equity, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1351, 1368 (1984); Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit
Rule, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1257, 1261-62 (1984). White correctly explains that the tax benefit rule
(i.e., year 2 correlative adjustment under the model), applies to previously expensed supplies on
hand at liquidation because the liquidating corporation "is merely recognizing income that it realized
in year one-income that has nothing to do with its subsequent liquidation." White, supra note
391, at 505. White reads Hillsboro, as does this Article, as establishing that the purpose of the
tax benefit rule "is to reconcile certain inaccuracies in past reporting." /d. at 501 n.81. Feld
constructs a scenario of a distribution in kind of previously expensed supplies by an ongoing
corporation that illustrates the necessity of precluding a double deduction that the tax benefit rule
should preclude. Feld, Tax Benefit of Bliss, 62 B.U.L. REv. 443, 461 (1982).
Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank adopted Bittker's balancing entry or "rough" transactional parity approach
in 1983. 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll, 383. Bittker & Kanner stated that:
As a counterweight to the annual accounting principle, the tax benefit rule expresses
a preference, from the perspective of accretions to wealth, for transactional equality
of tax treatment over contemporaneous equality, that is equality of treatment of
taxpayers within a single year . . . with one short-lived exception, however, the courts
have been satisfied with rough and ready adjustment that results from taxing the
recovery at whatever rate prevails in the year of recovery, and have not insisted on
exacting a tax equal to the amount saved by the taxpayer in the earlier year.
Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 270-71 (footnotes omitted). As White
supports the application of the tax benefit doctrine to previously expensed
on hand at the liquidation, notwithstanding the lack of recovery and § 336's
White, supra note 391, at 503-05.
395. 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867 (1948); see
394, at 455-56; Lyon & Eustice supra note 322, at 400-01.
396. 168 F.2d at 1006.

explains, this concept
supplies that are still
nonrecognition shield.

also Feld, supra note
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the Stratford court held that the bank did not realize the gain until the debt
was paid to the assignee shareholders.m
Due to the absence of a deep structure analysis during this era, a liquidating
T was able to distribute, among other items, previously expensed supplies in
complete liquidation. The former T shareholders would dispose of these supplies
for cash shortly after termination of the corporation's existence. In order to
escape taxation under the assignment of income doctrine, the former T shareholders asserted that the connection between the corporation and the shareholders
had been severed.m This assertion was supported by the fact that when the
income was received, the corporation was not in existence and, hence, not taxable
under the conventional doctrine of that time.
In I942 Congress enacted a statutory version of the tax benefit rule excluding
from income any recovery that had not produced a tax benefit in year 1.-w~
This statutory version was enacted against a background of administrative and
judicial conflict with respect to the exclusionary component of the tax benefit
doctrine; that is, "recoveries" are not to be accounted for in year 2 to the
extent that there was no tax benefit in year 1. 4 '"' Nevertheless, this partial
codification of the tax benefit doctrine was not exclusive. 4111

b.

Post-1954 Code

The exclusionary component of the tax benefit doctrine, which excludes
from income a recovery of a· prior deduction that does not result in a reduction
of a taxpayer's tax, was recodified in section Ill of the 1954 Code. 4112 The 1954
version of section Ill applied to income attributable to the recovery of a bad
debt, prior tax, or delinquency amount during the tax year. 403 The regulations
extended this provision to other transactions and the courts ruled that the
provision was not exclusive. 4114 In 1984 Congress reformulated section Ill to
encompass any year I deduction or credit. 405
The interplay between the tax benefit doctrine and the "liquidation" provisions first arose under the 1954 Code in the context of a section 337 transaction
in which a liquidating T sold its accounts receivable with respect to which a

397. /d. at 1010.
398. See United States v. Horschel, 205 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1953). Horschel clearly is
now overturned by Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.5. at 370.
399. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 116, 56 Stat. 798, 812-13 (1942) (codified at I.R.C. §
22(b)(l2) (1952))_
400. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 271; Plumb, Tax Benefit Rule Today, 57 HARV.
L. REv. 129, 129-34, 151-75 (1943); Tye, Tax Benefit Rule Reexamined, 3 TAX L. REv. 329, 330
(1948).
401. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 505-07 (1943); see infra text accompanying note
404.
402. I.R.C. § Ill (West Supp. 1986).
403. /d. at § lll(a). Section lll(a) now provides that "if an amount attributable to a deduction
claimed in a prior year is recovered, such amount is excludable from gross income only to the
extent it did not reduce income subject to tax." 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 522. A similar
rule exists for an overstatement of a credit in year I due to a downward adjustment in the price
in year 2. I.R.C. § lll(b) (West Supp. 1986); 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 522.
404. For a discussion of§ Ill as it existed before the 1984 amendments, see Bittker & Kanner,
supra note 231, at 271-81; Note, supra note 394, at 1353-95.
405. See supra note 403.
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bad debt reserve previously had been taken.~'JO Again the decision was easy
because there was, in effect, a "recovery" by sale. After an initial conflict
between the Tax Court, 4117 various circuit courts, and the Court of Claims, the
courts uniformly extended the tax benefit doctrine to previously expensed supplies;'"x
prepaid expenses, 409 and written off inventory sold pursuant to a complete liquidation. ~ 10 The recovery was apparent in these instances because P had paid for
the various items and T's gain was, in effect, attributable to previous basis
deductions. 411 Note, however, that this focus on payment could lead to error
with respect to the amount of the "recovery. "~ 12

406. West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961).
407. The Tax Court initially took the JX)sition that the tax benefit doctrine did not override
§ 337. See Anders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 815 (1967), rev'd, 414 F.2d 1283 (lOth Cir. 1969).
However, other tribunals uniformly have arrived at the opposite conclusion. Connery v. United
States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970); S.E.
Evans, Inc. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 423 (D. Ark. 1970); Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d
1147 (Ct. Cl. 1972). Consequently, the Tax Court properly yielded to the majority position that
the tax benefit and other common-law attributions of income doctrines override the shield of §
337. See Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 633 (1975); see also B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE,
supra note 23, , 11.65 at 11-82 to -87.
408. Anders, 414 F.2d at 1283; accord S.E. Evans, Inc., 317 F. Supp. at 423.
409. Connery, 460 F.2d at 130 (pre-paid advertising); Spitalny, 430 F.2d at 195 (pre-paid feed).
410. Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105 (E.D. Ga. 1971).
411. As the court JX)inted out in Bishop:
Once these deductions were taken the hens took on a reduced basis and the result is
that the corporations had a 'gain' on the sale of the hens and that gain is actually
a recovery of part of the costs of the hens. It is only when an expense deduction is
allowed for the hens in issue and Section 337 is attempted to be applied to make the
sale price tax free that any "gain" to the corporation is involved. To allow this "gain"
to pass tax free to the corporations would confer a double tax benefit on the corporations, (I) a deduction of a cost of the hens in a prior year, and (2) what amounts
to still another deduction (through nonrecognition) in the year of the liquidated sale.
The purpose for precluding a double tax benefit through the use of deductions spawned
the tax benefit rule.
/d. at 1115.
Note the strong similarity between the alternative Crane double deduction reasoning, infra at
text accompanying note 490, and the Bishop court's analysis of the tax benefit doctrine. A major
thesis of this Article is that such an equitable approach to preventing double deductions underlies
the various manifestations of the correlative adjustment concept. See also Del Cotto & Joyce, Double
Benefits and Transactional Consistency Under the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAX L. REv. 473, 478
(1984).
412. In Allee Corp. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1795 (1977), the Tax Court measured
the tax benefit "recovery" of a target that was selling its assets pursuant to § 337. Previously
expensed drawings, tooling, and art work were sold on the basis of the fair market value of such
assets at the time of the sale, rather than on the deductions taken previously. See id. at 1797,
1803-05. The majority in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank did not resolve the question of whether the proper
amount of a tax benefit recovery (given that a tax benefit was enjoyed) is the amount of the prior
deduction or the lesser of such amount or the fair market value of the property (i.e., the basis
that the shareholders would take). 460 U.S. at 402 n.37; see also Feld, supra note 394, at 463-64.
In Justice Steven's dissent, he speculated that the majority's cancelling out an earlier deduction
approach would not be receptive to any limitation of fair market value or shareholder's basis. /d.
at 403, 419-20 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's response suggests that fair market
value can play a role. !d. at 402 n.37. Under the general concept of the model, the prior deduction
and not fair market value would be relevant, similar to other areas. See, e.g., Commissioner v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). However, because depreciation or other cost recovery deductions actually
do not reflect economic diminution in value, but rather a matching of cost and income, see Kahn,
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Commissioner v. South Lake Farms Co.m was the first post-1954 Code
case to consider the application of the tax benefit doctrine to section 336. South
Lake involved P's timely liquidation of T that was subsequent to P's purchase
of a T that had deducted the cost of planting and cultivating unharvested crops
at a price reflecting the value of the unharvested crops. The P in South Lake
thereby obtained a cost basis under old section 334(b)(2) in the T assets, including
the unharvested crops, and the only parties charged with a capital gains charge
were the T shareholders. As discussed above, 414 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the Commissioner's assertion that the clear reflection of income
requirement of sections 446(b) and 482 mandated that T include the fair market
value of the unharvested crop planted and cultivated by T, but harvested by
P. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invoked a narrow, technical reading of
the clear reflection of income requirement. The South Lake Farms court concluded
that the tax benefit doctrine was even less on point because the court could
not "see any theory on which it can be barely said that the old corporation
has recovered the expenses which it deducted. " ~
Over a decade later, the Tax Court in Tennessee Carolina Transportation,
Inc. v. Commissione,.. 16 adopted just such a theory. The Tax Court was motivated
primarily by a desire to attain parity between transactions under sections 336
and 337. The theory provided that the liquidated T had expensed the cost of
purchased supplies (tires and tubes) on the assumption that their useful life
would be exhausted fully in operations within a twelve-month period. Such
supplies were deemed for tax purposes to have been consumed fully in operation
so that upon a liquidating distribution, if such supplies have "a fair market
value in a transaction of consequence in the scheme of Federal income taxation,
it (T] would therefore necessarily be deemed to have received tires and tubes
identical to them immediately prior to that transaction. " 417
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the "fictional"
recovery theory and added that there was a recovery in still another sense-the
liquidated corporation was given its own stock in exchange for the assets trans41

Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income, 18
MtcH. L. REv. I (1979), to the extent items such as the drawings in A/tee had been used in business
and generated income, recovery of the full deduction upon their sale is inconsistent. In other words,
only to the extent that the prior deduction exceeds a proper economic matching with income should
there be an inconsistent event and recovery. Cf. Feld, supra note 394, at 450 n.35.
413. 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
414. See supra text accompanying notes 386-87.
415. 324 F.2d at 840. The facts and reasoning of South Lake Forms are discussed extensively
in Feld, supra note 394, at 452-54. For a theory under which T is properly taxed in its final year
on tax benefit items, see supra note 394.
416. 65 T.C. 440 (1975), off'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978). Feld, supra note 394, at 45860, discusses Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp. Judge Tannenwald dissented in Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp.,
65 T.C. at 449-55. Apparently, Judge Tannenwald felt that the same result could be achieved by
the clear reflection of income doctrine under § 446(b). See supra note 390. The clear reflection of
income doctrine is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 371-90. While case law 'by-and-large'
inappropriately has limited the § 446(b) version of the doctrine to traditional tax accounting systems,
see supra text accompanying notes 383 & 385, a thesis of this Article is that clear reflection of
income lies at the heart of year 2 correlative adjustments for transactional equivalency. See Del
Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 477-78; White, supra note 391, at 495-96 & n.60.
417. Tennessee-Carolina Tronsp., 65 T.C. at 447.
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ferred in the complete liquidation to its shareholders.418 The result of this exchange
was a recovery that had considerable value at the time the stock was returned
to the liquidating corporation. 419 More significantly, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that the tax benefit doctrine applied "whenever there is an
actual recovery of a previously deducted amount or when there is some other
event inconsistent with that prior deduction. " 420 The liquidating transfer of assets
that resulted in the former T shareholder stepping up its basis in assets with a
substantial useful life remaining, but which had a zero basis in T's hands, was
inconsistent with T's prior expensing of the assets.
Nearly ten years later, the Supreme Court in Hillsboro National Bank v.
Commissioner, 421 resolved the conflict between South Lake Farms and Tennessee
Carolina Transportation in favor of "parity" between sections 336 and 337 and
established an expansive reading of the tax benefit doctrine that eliminated the
absolute requirement of a "recovery. " 422 The Hillsboro National Bank majority
accepted the view that has been proposed by some cases and commentators that
the function of the tax benefit doctrine is to approximate the results of a
transactional tax accounting system by serving as a counterweight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle. 423
As noted above, the annual accounting system in essence provides that each
tax year stands on its own. 424 Hence, if an apparently closed transaction in year
1 unexpectedly reopens in a subsequent tax year (year 2), an adjustment is not
made to year l's return. 425 Rather, a "less precise correction-far superior to
none-" 426 is made in the year 2 return. Thus, in the case of the tax benefit

418. Tennessee Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378, 382 (6th Cir. 1978).
419. /d. at 384.
420. /d. at 382. The latter inconsistent event alternative is precisely the approach taken by
the majority in Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983). See also infra text
accompanying note 421.
421. 460 u.s. 370 (1983).
422. 460 U.S. at 397-402. See generally White, supra note 391; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra
note 411. The Court was influenced strongly by the §§ 336-337 parity argument.
423. 460 U.S. at 378 n.IO, 380 n.l1, 381. Judge Tannenwald analyzed the tax benefit rule
as just such a counterweight to the annual accounting principle in Estate of Munter, 63 T.C. at
678, (Tannenwald J., concurring). However, he saw a recovery as a necessary element under the
doctrine. /d. See supra text accompanying note 393; see also Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at
270, which was relied upon by the majority in Hillsboro.
White, supra note 391, at 501, and Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 477-78, believe that
Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank properly articulated the theory and purpose undergirding the tax benefit rule:
to require a taxpayer who has taken a deduction in year I to reconcile that deduction with what
has acutally happened in year 2 so as to achieve a transactional equity that prevents a false reflection
of economic gain. We agree with Del Cotto and Joyce's further conclusion that such "transactional
equity" underlies various year I inclusions (claim of right, Crane and Kirby Lumber doctrines).
See Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476, 482-83. Commentators, however, tend to have
problems with the "inconsistent events" test. See infra note 429.
424. See supra text accompanying notes 224-321.
425. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931). See generally Hillsboro Nat'/
Bank, 460 U.S. at 377; Comment, An Asset-Based Approach to the Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 1257, 1258-59 (1984).
426. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.11. The Supreme Court recognized that exact
transactional equivalence was not obtainable because of bracket or rate changes and, although
unmentioned by the Court, time value of money. /d.
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doctrine an income adjustment is necessitated in year 2 to back out the year
1 deduction to the extent that it produced a tax benefit. This is necessary in
order to achieve a rough transactional parity with a transaction in which all
events occurred in year 1. 427 The year 2 "correlative adjustment" approximates
the results produced by a transactional tax system that would reopen year 1.
However, complete transactional equivalence is not obtained necessarily because
rates or brackets may change and the time value of money is not accounted
for under the conventional doctrine. The model discussed below will remedy
the latter problem. m
Under Hillsboro National Bank, the triggering event for such correlative
adjustment must be "fundamentally inconsistent" with the premise on which
the deduction initially was based in year 1. 429 As an example, the Court explained
that a deduction might be allowed in year 1 on the basis of an assumption. 4 Jo
The following are examples of such assumptions: ( 1) a loan will not be repaid
and, hence, is worthless; or (2) supplies will be consumed within a twelve-month
period. If in year 2 an event inconsistent with such assumption occurs (the loan
is repaid or there is a liquidating or nonliquidating distribution of the remaining
supplies), a correlative adjustment or balancing entry is necessary to cancel out
the earlier deduction. The test is, had the year 2 inconsistent event occurred
within year 1, would it have foreclosed the deduction in year 1? 431
Hillsboro National Bank noted an inherent tension that arises when the
fundamentally inconsistent event in year 2 occurs in a traditional nonrecognition

427. See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 270.
428. See infra text accompanying notes 437-559.
429. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 383-85. The Hillsboro majority had precedents for its
"fundamentally inconsistent" event test. See, e.g., Tennessee-Carolina Transp., 582 F.2d at 382.
In response to Justice Stevens' charge in his dissent that the majority's formulation requires courts
to distinguish "inconsistent events" from "fundamentally inconsistent events," Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank,
460 U.S. at 418 (Stevens J., dissenting), Justice O'Connor pointed out "[t]hat line is not the line
we draw; rather, we draw the line between merely unexpected events and inconsistent events." /d.
at 383 n.l5. Nevertheless, even those commentators embracing Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank's transactional
deep structure policy of more accurate measurement of income with respect to the tax benefit rule,
find fault with the fundamentally inconsistent event test for application of this policy. White, supra
note 391, at 495. White gives convincing examples for her belief that "this test is overbroad. It
merely describes the inaccuracy that the rule is supposed to alleviate and does not, by itself, provide
a sufficiently precise way of distinguishing circumstances where its use is appropriate from those
where it is not." /d. at 496. White properly calls for a year 2 "reconciliation event" analysis (i.e.,
functional year 2 correlative adjustment analysis in this Article's terminology) of whether income
realized in year I should be recognized in year 2 when it is apparent that the assumed events on
which income was removed from the tax base in year I never occurred. /d. at 502-04. Del Cotto
and Joyce believe, as do the authors of this Article, see infra text accompanying notes 444-51, that
the transactional equity policy of Hillsboro "applies whether the prior benefit was a deduction or
an exclusion, and . . . the reach of the rule is not limited to later inconsistent events, but extends
to promote more generally the objective of consistency in the treatment of later events." Del Cotto
& Joyce, supra note 411, at 478.
430. 460 U.S. at 384-85.
431. /d. at 383-84. When the inconsistent event or the concluding event of the transaction
occurs in the same tax year, all events are taken into account in year I. See, e.g., Spitalny, 430
F.2d at 198; Ballou Constr. Co. v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 375, 378 (D. Kan. 1985); cf. United
States v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1954) (similar distinction made under "claim of
right" rule).
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transaction. 432 The Court held that the tax benefit doctrine overrode the exemption
of section 336 because the purpose of section 336 is to "prevent recognition of
market appreciation that has not been realized by an arm's-length transfer to
an unrelated party rather than to shield all types of income that might arise
from the disposition of an asset. " 433 In addition, the court held that the assignment
of income doctrine already had been applied, notwithstanding section 337. to
prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation by shifting income earned by the
corporation to its shareholders who have a lower tax rate. 434 Because the tax
benefit rule already had overriden section 337, 435 the policy of parity between
sections 336 and 337 mandated application of the tax benefit doctrine to a
section 336 transaction. m
4.

Conclusion

The doctrines of assignment of income and clear reflection of income started
out with the correct policies of taxation of income to the person who earns it
and prohibition of liquidation of a corporation as a means of avoiding the clear
reflection of income principle. However, when applied to contingent items distributed in complete liquidation, the courts erroneously limited both doctrines
to tax accounting "accrual" concepts-clear reflection of income was not applied
beyond traditional tax accounting accrual systems and assignment of income was
limited to accruable income. Thus, definitional minded judges lost sight of the
deep structure policy of a minimum distortion of income. While T's sale of
contingent income items to P pursuant to a section 337 transaction can be
resolved properly under the more functional Storz approach of focusing on the
earner of income rather than on accrual concepts, this approach will not solve
the problem of year I distribution of contingent items, the value of which
cannot be determined until year 2 when T no longer exists. Closing T's transaction
in year 1 by estimating the claim merely raises the problem of correlative
adjustments in year 2. The tax benefit doctrine does not resolve the problem
either, but its development of a year 2 balancing entry, counterweight, or
correlative adjustment to the annual accounting principle points the way to the
correct conceptual solution which will be discussed next.

432.

460 U.S. at 385-86.

When the later event takes place in the context of a nonrecognition provision of
the Code, there will be an inherent tension between the tax benefit rule and the
nonrecognition provision. We cannot resolve that tension with a blanket rule that the
tax benefit rule will always prevail. Instead, we must foucs on the particular provisions
of the Code at issue in any case.
/d. (footnote and citations omitted).
Justice O'Connor sketched areas other than liquidation in which tax benefit and nonrecognition
policies may conflict: (I) a gift of previously expensed supplies; (2) bequest of an expensed asset;
and (3) personal use of an expensed asset. /d. at 386 n.20. For commentary on such noted intersections
and others (particularly § 351) see Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 490-95; Note, supra note
394, at 1358-78, 1386-92; Comment, supra note 425, at 1279-84, 1286-91.
433. 460 U.S. at 398.
434. /d. at 398-97.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 406-07.
436. 460 U.S. at 400; see infra note 467.
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CORRELATIVE ADJUSTMENTS FOR CLEARER REFLECTION OF INCOME

A.

Premises for Clearer Reflection of Income Model

Courts have characterized clear reflection of income models as a "necessary
counterweight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle . . . . "~.n
The fundamental doctrinal failures at both the T and T shareholder levels with
respect to a liquidating distribution of contingent items have arisen from an
absence of deep structure analysism and a tendency to create legal fictions that
appear to work well enough in the initial case at bar, but subsequently lead
courts astray. 439 These failures are compounded by the mechanical approach to
the Code that the courts often adopt:wo The starting point for the clear reflection
of income model is that contingent income items, by their very nature, cannot
be handled under the annual accounting principle that separates year I and year

437. Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring)
(describing the true character of the tax benefit doctrine). Bittker describes Tannenwald's insight
as a perceptive comment. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 269.
438. In some of the discrete doctrinal areas in which year 2 transactional correlative adjustments
to the annual accounting principle have been fashioned judicially, the Supreme Court and lower
tribunals have not explored underlying policy (e.g., year 2 deduction under the claim of right doctrine,
see infra text accompanying note 460; year 2 restoration of percentage depletion as to advanced
royalties in excess of production, see supra note 358; and the Kirby Lumber cancellation of
indebtedness doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 510-16). In others, such as the Crane-Tufts
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 484-508, the Court recently has explored the policy
underlying the doctrine but failed to correct past judicial errors. See infra text accompanying note
518. The Supreme Court's reasoning in Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil lies between Crane and Tufts
in clarity: Skelly's "double benefit" terminology points toward the underlying clearer reflection of
income policy. See infra text accompanying notes 463-76. Only in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank is the
underlying policy explored fully and clearly. See supra text accompanying notes 423-27. The underlying
policy of the open transaction alternative of closing year I with a year 2 transactional correlative
adjustment has been explored less frequently by the courts. See infra note 442.
439. These fictions generally were cast as an accretion to wealth in year 2 as if it were realized
in year 2. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. 370, 381 (1983) ("recovery" under the tax
benefit doctrine); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 14 ( 1947) (economic benefit from buyer's
taking property subject to a non-recourse liability); Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275, 286
( 1944) (recapture of percentage depletion on advance royalty, through the fiction that termination
of lease releases property with value equal to the year I percentage depletion); United States v.
Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. I (1931) (year 2 accession to income through freeing of assets previously
offset by cancelled obligation). Conceptually the income was realized in year I; in year 2 it is
recognized through a transactional correlative adjustment. Cf. White, supra note 391, at 486. However,
these fictions, once created, take on a life of their own as may be seen in Justice Stevens' dissent
in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting), or for that matter the Tufts
opinion itself. See infra note 452.
440. The most mechanical approach has been the Tax Court's limitation of the assignment
and clear reflection of income doctrines to tax accounting accrual concepts in derogation of clear
reflection of income. See supra text accompanying notes 335-36. In addition the Tax Court and
other courts extended the Crane doctrine to create a fictional "sale" whenever property subject to
nonrecourse debt is disposed of in the following transactions: (I) by gift, Guest v. Commissioner,
77 T.C. 9 (1981); or (2) by abandonment, Freeland v. Commissioner 74 T.C. 970 (1980). In some
instances such a fictional sale may trigger consequences arguably not consistent with a mere year
2 transactional correlative adjustment, such as when a gift of encumbered property (with a purchase
money liability less than basis) to a charity triggers the bargin-sale rules. Ebben v. Commissioner,
783 F.2d 906 (9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, Arrowsmith has been read as creating a fictional sale in
year 2. See infra note 468.
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2 transactions. By definition a contingent item arising in year 1 cannot be
ascertained finally until year 2 ..w 1
When a transaction has effects in two tax years, cases that have originated
primarily in the Supreme Court, have evolved two alternative modifications to
the annual accounting principle. These exceptions ensure clearer reflection of
income. One transactional exception, discussed extensively above, is to hold the
transaction "open" and defer reporting until year 2 when the entire effect of
the transaction is determinable. 442 The reporting of the transaction in year 2
retains the same character that it would have had in year 1 had it been completed
in year 1. This maintenance of character is necessary to approximate transactional
reporting. Both gain and loss transactions can be held open!•-'
An alternative transactional exception to the annual accounting principle
that generally is preferred to open transaction reporting 444 is to "close" the
transaction in year 1 based on the best assumption possible at that time with
respect to its ultimate outcome. To the extent that the final development of the
transaction in year 2 proves the original assumption wrong, a transactional
"correlative adjustment" or balancing entry is made in year 2 reversing the tax
effects of the assumption in year 1. This adjustment is necessary in order to
more clearly reflect the taxpayer's income. Thus, a year 2 correlative adjustment
is a necessary counterweight to the annual accounting principle. 44 j The year 2

441. See Note, supra note 238, at 65.
442. Open transaction-deferred basis reporting is discussed supra in text accompanying notes
218-33. Deferred basis reporting with constant-character constitutes a transactional exception to the
annual accounting principle designed to reflect the taxpayer's income more clearly. See supra text
accompanying notes 232-33. Cases have not focused on open transaction year 2 reporting and closed
transactional year I reporting, with year 2 transactional correlative adjustment, as alternatives to
handling contingent items. A detailed analysis of the factors to be used in chosing between the two
alternative exceptions to the annual accounting principle is beyond the scope of this Article.
443. A loss transaction in year 2 is held "open" unless, a "closed and completed transaction"
exists, Treas. Reg. § 1.165-l(d)(l) (1960), or if a claim for reimbursement with a reasonable prospect
of recovery exists, id. § 1.165-l{d){2).
444. This is an intuitive conclusion. Gain, basis, and loss are held open only in sales or
purchases that have a contingent price or losses that may be reimbursed. The Crane, tax benefit,
claim of right, and cancellation of indebtedness doctrines all close year I and provide some form
of correlative year 2 adjustment to cancel out the year I inclusion. In such latter areas the transaction
is held open only when the year I assumption is unlikely {e.g., nonrecourse acquisition liabilities
in excess of fair market value). Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 {9th Cir.
1977); cf. Graft v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 944, 948 {1984); Zappo v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 77,
88 {1980). Note that an all-or-nothing approach almost always prevails-open or closed. A riskadjusted ye~r I reporting usually is not available under these doctrines. See Illinois Power Co. v.
Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 {7th Cir. 1986).
445. The year 2 transactional correlative adjustment to the annual accounting period has been
perceived most clearly by judges {and perhaps commentators) in the tax benefit area. See Hillsboro
Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 377-79, 378 n.IO, 381, 383. See generally Bittker & Kanner, supra note
231, at 270; White, supra note 391, at 495-96. Even in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the deep structure policy of clear reflection of income through year 2 transactional
adjustments was not unanimous. 460 U.S. at 403, 406-09 {Stevens, J ., dissenting in part) {opposes
transactional equivalence and would require a year 2 recovery). Justice Marshall joined in Justice
Stevens' opinion. /d. at 371. Justice O'Conner saw this same transactional equivalence as underlying
the year 2 deduction under the claim of right doctrine. See id. at 377-78 n.9; cf. United States v.
Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 686 n.5 {1969) {year 2 claim of right deduction does not necessarily
equal tax consequences of year I receipt-analogous to approach under tax benefit rule). Commentators also have grasped the conceptual relationship between the inclusion component of the
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correlative adjustment must be of the same character as the reported item in
year 1.""6 However, because a correlative adjustment in year 2 must reverse or
back out the transaction in year 1, the balancing entry must have the opposite
tax effect of the entry in year 1. Thus, if the transaction in year 1 is reported
as a deduction, the transactional correlative adjustment in year 2 must be an
addition to income of the same character as the year 1 deduction. 447 Conversely,
if the transaction was reported in year 1 as income, the transactional correlative
adjustment in year 2 is a deduction of the same character. 44 x The same underlying
approach comes into play when the transaction in year 1 constitutes an exclusion
from income. The correlative adjustment in year 2 is an inclusion in income
with the same character as the item would have had if it had been includable
in income in year l. ""9 All this is directed at the deep structure of preventing
distortion of income. 450 Neither the year 1 open transaction with year 2 deferred
reporting, nor year 1 closed transaction with year 2 correlative adjustment
exception, effect exact transactional reporting because they do not account for
bracket and rate changes. 451 The time value of money is accounted for only in
the open transaction-contingent payment modifications of the annual accounting
principle. 452
tax benefit rule and the deduction component of the claim of right doctrine. Bittker & Kanner,
supra note 231, at 281-82; Note, supra note 224, at 995. The claim of right doctrine is a judicial
and legislative departure from the annual accounting principle enacted in order to harmonize a
transaction's tax consequences when it is finally closed with its tax treatment in an earlier year.
See generally Dubroff, Claim of Right Doctrine, 40 TAx L. REv. 729 (1985).
Some commentators properly perceive such transactional equivalence as being the policy core
of the Crane doctrine, the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine, and the tax benefit doctrine. Del
Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; see also Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt and
the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. REv. 277, 282-84 (1978); Bittker & Thompson, Income From the
Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber, 66 CALIF. L. REv.
1159, 1165-66 (1978). See generally Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 131-39. The deep structure policy
produces a clearer reflection of income than the absence of a year 2 correlative adjustment, given
that year I cannot be reopened judicially or administratively. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at
380 n.ll; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; White, supra note 391, at 495-96, 50405.
446. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276; Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 105-06 (citing
Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952)). The authors agree that Arrowsmith reflects
the characterization component of the year 2 correlative adjustment and underlies the characterization
component of alternative open transaction-deferred basis reporting.
447. See Bittker, supra note 445, at 282-84; Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276; Rosenberg,
supra note 234, at 105-06.
448. See supra text accompanying note 427.
449. See Bittker, supra note 445, at 282-84; see also infra text accompanying notes 516-17;
Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 475-76.
450. See Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 476-78; cf. White, supra note 391, at 495
n.60.
45 I. See, e.g., Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380-81 n.l2 (tax benefit year 2 inclusion);
Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284 (1953) (claim of right year 2 deduction). These and
other potential inequities, caused by the absence of a pure transactional approach, have lead various
commentators to advocate reopening year I or in year 2 using year I rates and brackets and
imposing interest from year I on the taxpayer or the government, depending on whether the year
2 correlative adjustment is an addition to or a deduction from income. See Note, supra note 224,
at 1014-15 nn.96 & 97. The strongest argument to the contrary is that when the statute of limitations
has run on year I, a correlative adjustment would be required when the adjusting event occurs.
Thus, reopening year I as long as the statute of limitations has not run would lead to a proliferation
of the rules. See infra note 467.
452. See supra text accompanying note 202.
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Case Law Matrix for Transactional Correlative Adjustment
a.

Tax Benefit and Claim of Right Doctrines

The majority in Hillsboro National Bank acknowledged that the balancing
entry portion of the above modelm undergirds the inclusionary component of
the tax benefit doctrine which is now codified partially in section Ill, ~ 5 ~ and
the deduction component of the "claim of right" doctrine which is now codified
partially in section 1341. 455 As discussed above, the tax benefit rule requires the
inclusion in year 2 income of amounts deducted in year 1 to the extent that
the year I deduction results in a tax benefit. The tax benefit rule applies when
year 2 events are "fundamentally inconsistent"~ 5 b with the year I deduction.
The purpose of the rule is to effect transactional equivalency. The exclusionary
aspect of the doctrine which provides for no year 2 inclusion to the extent that
the year 1 deduction does not give rise to a tax benefit also is codified partially
in section 111. 457
The claim of right doctrine requires a taxpayer to report as income in year
1 amounts received in that year under a "claim of right." The taxpayer later
may end up repaying the amounts reported in year 1.~sH If the taxpayer must
make a repayment in year 2 due to a fundamentally inconsistent event, articulated
in this context as repayment under "compulsion," 459 the doctrine grants the
taxpayer a deduction in year 2 rather than reopening year 1..w• Section 1341

453. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 412-15.
454. For a brief description of I.R.C. § Ill (West Supp. 1986), see supra note 403.
455. I.R.C. § 1341 (West Supp. 1986) is discussed infra in note 461. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank's
acknowledgment of a rough transactional equivalency approach to the claim of right doctrine in
the context of a year 2 deduction is discussed supra in note 445.
456. See supra note 429.
457. See I.R.C. §Ill (West Supp. 1986).
458. See North American Oil v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). See generally Dubroff, supra
note 445, at 733 (the three classic elements of the year I inclusion component of the doctrine are:
"(I) receipt by a taxpayer of money or other property, (2) control by the taxpayer over the utilization
or disposition of money or property, and (3) assertion of some claim of right or entitlement by
the taxpayer to receipt"). Note that the third element may no longer be necessary. /d.
459. Under the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model, the year 2 repayment of
the amount included in income in year I, pursuant to the claim of right doctrine, is deductible in
order to back out the item included in income in year I, based on the assumption that the taxpayer
would not repay the item. Cf. Dubroff, supra note 445, at 749 n. 104 ("A reverse application of
the [tax benefit] doctrine could permit deduction of repayments of items previously included in
income."). The "compulsion" requirement boils down to a perceived obligation, contractual or
legal, to repay the amount existing in year I at the time of the receipt of the item. See id. at 753·
55. Thus, payment pursuant to an obligation that first arose in year 2 would not come under the
deduction component of the claim of right doctrine. Such analysis explains the following correctly
decided, but poorly reasoned cases. Pahl v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 286 (1976); Blanton v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 527 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1967).
460. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has barred reopening year I with respect to
items repaid in year 2 because such reopening was violative of the annual accounting principle; any
deduction of amounts received under a claim of right in year I would be allowed in the year of
repayment (year 2). See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 284-85 (1953); United States v.
Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). See generally Dubroff, supra, note 445, at 730-31. Skelly Oil explained
that the refusal to reopen year I and instead allowance of a deduction in year 2 was "dictated by
Congress' adoption of an annual accounting system as an integral part of the tax code." Skelly
Oil, 394 U.S. at 681. The Court in Skelly aUuded to the issue of whether a year 2 deduction for
a repayment of an item reported previously under the claim of right doctrine arose under a specific
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affects partially transactional reporting, by giving a covered taxpayer a year 2
deduction for his year 2 "involuntary" repayment of an item on which he did
not have an unrestricted claim. This deduction is calculated at a level that is
equal to the greater of his year I or year 2 marginal bracket and rate.~hl No
interest is credited to the taxpayer from year I. ~62

b.

Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil and Year 2 Character

The character of the year 2 adjustment under both doctrines must match
the character of the year I event in order to back out or reverse the year I
transaction. This principle underlies the results of United States v. Skelly Oil
Co.•hJ and Arrowsmith v. Commissioner. 4 M Simplifying the Arrowsmith facts,
the former T shareholders received a liquidating distribution in year I from T
in which their amount realized was, say, $1000 and their basis was $600. This
basis included all noncontingent T liabilities assumed, or taken by the shareholders. Thus, the T shareholders reported a $400 capital gain in year I. In
year 2, the former T shareholders as transferees of the liquidated T were forced
to pay T's creditors $100 with respect to a theretofor contingent T liability.
Consequently, a year 2 correlative adjustment of a $100 capital loss was necessitated to back out the $100 year I capital gain that had been computed on
the erroneous assumption that the T shareholders' basis in their stock was only
$600.•M The events of year 2 make it apparent that the basis actually was $700.
Thus, T shareholders' transactional gain was $300, not the $400 capital gain
reported. Therefore, the year 2 $100 capital loss achieves rough transactional
parity.

Code provision, but the Court did not decide whether the provision was § 162 or § 165. /d. at
683-84. The authors believe that the year 2 deduction is an extra-Code deduction that is allowed
in order to cancel out the item reported as income in year I.
461. l.R.C. § 1341 provides that the year 2 tax is the lesser of the tax computed with a
deduction for the year 2 repayment or the tax for the current year computed without the deduction
minus the tax savings that would have resulted if the income under the claim of right had not
been included in the prior year. l.R.C. § 134l(a) (West Supp. 1986). One commentator criticizes
the availability of using the tax rates for either the prior or current year:
Nor is there any sound policy reason for providing a windfall to the chance taxpayer
who finds that a deduction in the restoration year wiU result in greater tax savings.
Rather to achieve conceptual consistency and assure fairness among taxpayers, the
transaction should be viewed as a whole and the taxpayer required to adjust his prior
year's tax liability, thereby receiving as a refund or credit only that amount which he
actually overpaid.
Note, supra note 224, at 1014. This commentator advocates that year I should be reopened while
the model suggests a transactional correlative adjustment in year 2. In Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, Justice
O'Connor supported a year 2 adjustment. 460 U.S. at 377. In dissent, Justice Blackmun advocated
reopening year I in certain circumstances. /d. at 425 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). See infra note 426.
See generally Dubroff, supra note 445, at 730-31 (discussion of alternatives).
462. See Note, supra note 224, at 1013.
463. 394 u.s. 678 (1969).
464. 344 u.s. 6 (1952).
465. The illustration in the text ignores time value of money considerations. See infra text
accompanying notes 542-52. Some commentators properly perceive Arrowsmith as supporting the
"same character as year I" aspect of year 2 transactional equivalence correlative adjustments to
the annual accounting principle. See Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 106-07; Schenk, supra note 271,
at 338. Both Rosenberg and Schenk cite Bittker & Kanner, supra note 231, at 276, who, using the
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In Arrowsmith, the taxpayer argued that the year 2 payment was an ordinary
expense because each tax year stands on its own and there was no sale or
exchange in year 2. In response to this argument, the Court reasoned that the
annual accounting principle is not breached by considering all year 1 and year
2 transaction events in order to classify properly the nature of the year 2 payment
for tax purposes. 466 The Court stated that the annual accounting principle only
precludes reopening and readjusting the year 1 return. 467 From this statement
some commentators have concluded that Arrowsmith merely stands for the
principle that if year 1 and year 2 transactions are "integrally related," the
year 2 transaction takes its character from the year 1 transaction even when
this characterization results in the year 2 transaction not backing out the year
1 transaction. 46 H Other commentators, more perceptively, have articulated that
the deep structure policy of clearer reflection of income consists of the following

"relation back" terminology of Arrowsmith's progeny, albeit without any citations, properly and
succinctly reasoned as follows:
When the inclusionary branch of the tax benefit rule is applicable, it is necessary
to determine whether the taxable recovery constitutes ordinary income or capital gain.
In making this determination the courts often impress the character of the original
transaction on the recovery, rather than viewing it as an isolated transaction. When
employed, this relation-back doctrine taxes the recovery as ordinary income if the
earlier loss or expense was deducted from ordinary income; conversely, the recovery
can, and usually does, constitute a capital gain if the earlier deduction was a capital
loss.
Bittker & Kanner supra note 231, at 276. See generally Lee & Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A
Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. RtcH. L. REv. 473, 507-09 (1981); cf. Rabinovitz, supra
note 229, at 100-01 (discusses cases supporting "event-counter event" reading). On occasion, Congress
has seen the relationship between Arrowsmith and the year 2 transactional adjustments. See generally
Note, supra note 224, at 1021. Traditionally the Arrowsmith doctrine has been limited to year 2
transactional correlative adjustments to closed year I transactions. See Lee & Murphy, supra at
538. However, the better view is that the Arrowsmith year 1-year 2 characterization equally applies
to year 2 payments under the open transaction doctrine. Schenk, supra note 271, at 325-29; cf.
Rabinovitz, supra note 271, at 101. Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Arrowsmith,
relied upon Corter and Westover, which are seminal open transaction constant character decisions,
as analogous authority for the proposition that year I may be looked at to determine the character
of a year 2 transaction. Commissioner v. Arrowsmith, 193 F.2d 734, 735 n.4 (2d Cir.), ofj'd, 344
U.S. 6 (1952). Other views of Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil are disscussed infra at note 468.
466. 344 U.S. at 8. The annual accounting principle and sale or exchange requirement are
discussed supra in text accompanying notes 224-28 & 270.
467. 344 U.S. at 9. Some would not raise the annual accounting principle to such an absolute
bar to reopening year I on the basis of subsequent events in year 2. See Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank,
460 U.S. at 422, 425 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 224, at 1015 (apply year I rate
and bracket plus interest in year 2, even if year I is now closed by the statute of limitations). For
a good policy discussion in favor of year 2 transactional correlative adjustments over reopening
year I or treating year 2 as unrelated, see Dubroff, supra note 445, at 730-31. Justice O'Connor
pointed out that if the statute of limitations has run on year I before the inconsistent event occurs,
a correlative adjustment still will be needed when the event occurs in year 5. Hence, reopening
year I merely proliferates the annual accounting rules. See Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 37879 n.IO. From a revenue point of view, Congress probably would prefer a year 2 adjustment, at
least in the contingent income area, because parity of treatment as to T and P would mandate
that P be entitled to a year I basis adjustment, possibly depreciable and, hence, possibly more
valuable than the year I income, if any, that is recognized by T retroactively.
468. See Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 104.
Properly construed, therefore, Arrowsmith stands for no broader proposition than
that a gain or loss, if closely enough related to a sale or exchange in an earlier year,
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factors: (1) the necessity of a consistent character correlative adjustment in year
2 to back out a closed year 1 transaction; or alternatively (2) maintaining year
1 character when a transaction that was held open in year 1 has been closed
in year 2. 469 These commentators also have asserted that Arrowsmith merely
reflects the character component of both the year 2 correlative adjustment and
the year 2 closing of the transaction that was held open from year 1. 470
In Skelly Oil the Supreme Court more clearly articulated the policy underlying
Arrowsmith.4' 1 Skelly Oil involved a year 2 deduction for amounts included in
income under a claim of right in year 1. The year 1 income generated percentage
depletion deductions equal to 27 .50Jo of the included income. 472 The Court reduced
the year 2 deduction for the repayment of the amount included in income in
year 1 by the percentage depletion deduction allowed in year 1 in order to
prevent an inequitable result. 473 The Court concluded that: "[a]ny other approach
would allow respondent [the taxpayer] a total of $1.27 1/2 in deductions for
every $1 refunded to its customers. " 474 The Court was of the opinion that the
avoidance of an inequitable result was supported by the rationale underlying
Arrowsmith. The Court stated that:
The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see; if money
was taxed at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would
be accorded an unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally
deductible from receipts taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income. m

may be treated as arising out of a sale or exchange, notwithstanding the absence of
a sale or exchange in the year in which that gain or loss must be accounted for.
/d. With this assumption, Rabinovitz reasoned that if a taxpayer reported a net § 1231 gain in
year I (under a claim of right), the year 2 repayment would be treated as a year 2 § 1231 loss
netted in year 2 against any year 2 § 1231 gains. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 103-04; accord
Schenk, supra note 271, at 367-68. Rabinovitz acknowledges that such an approach could result in
year I capital gain-year 2 ordinary deduction. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 104. Under the year
2 transactional correlative adjustment model this rule is incorrect. Either the year I § 1231 transaction
should be recomputed on the basis of year 2 event and the necessary year 2 correlative adjustment
should be made to approximate this result, cf. Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182 (1975), or,
year 2 simply should back out all or a portion of the year I § 1231 transaction, cf. Rev. Rul. 67·
331, 1967-2 C.B. 290. However, in no event should a year 2 fictional sale or exchange of a § 1231
asset be netted with actual year 2 § 1231 transactions.
469. See supra notes 446 & 465.
470. /d.
471. Unlike Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 129, and Schenk, supra note 271, at 338-41, the
authors believe that Skelly Oil and Arrowsmith flow from the same principle-that transactional
equivalence in year 2 (through correlative adjustments to "closed" year I reporting or through year
2 open transaction-deferred reporting) requires the same character in year 2. to avoid distortion of
income. Skelly Oil is an example of the transactional equivalence of the correlative adjustment and
Arrowsmith an example of the character of the adjustment. It may be that the issue actually is
one of semantics: how we define the doctrine.
472. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. at 679.
473. !d. at 684.
474. /d.
475. /d. at 685. The Skelly Oil majority viewed the case before it no differently.

In essence, oil and gas producers are taxed on only 72 1/2% of their "gross income
from the property" whenever they claim percentage depletion. The remainder of their
oil and gas receipts is in reality tax exempt. We cannot believe that Congress intended
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The avoidance of inequitable results, often articulated as avoidance of
"double deductions, " 476 is at the heart of the year 2 transactional correlative
adjustments-balancing entry counterweights to the annual accounting principle.
Unfortunately, the judicial and scholarly focus on "characterizing" year 2 transactions by year 1 events has lead both astray to the extent that the year 2
payment conceptually involves an interest factor. That element should have
resulted in an interest deduction to the payor and interest income to the payee,
as discussed more fully below. 477

c.

Exclusions From Income of Loan Proceeds or Inclusion of Purchase
Money Debt in Basis: Crane, Tufts, and Kirby Lumber

The pattern of exclusion in year 1 with inclusion in year 2, as a transactional
correlative adjustment, lies at the heart of Crane v. Commissioner.m This notion
was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Tufts419 at the
same time that the court distinguished the tax benefit and cancellation of
indebtedness rules. 480 Moreover, the policy also constitutes the deep structure

to give taxpayers a deduction for refunding money that was not taxed when received.

/d. Rabinovitz argues that Arrowsmith does not stand for the quoted rationale, which he refers to
as a "double deduction" theory. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 87, 94 n.43; accord Schenk, supra
note 271, at 339-40. Rabinowitz raises the technical point that because prior to 1969 a net long
term capital loss could offset ordinary income dollar-for-dollar up to $1000 with the excess carried
forward indefinitely, an Arrowsmith-type repayment could result in the capital loss offsetting ordinary
income. Rabinovitz, supra note 229, at 87-88. First, Rabinovitz argues that if a sale of a capital
asset in year I produces no gain, an ordinary deduction in year 2 for repayment under § 1341
would not produce a double deduction. !d. at 94-95. Thus, he sees Arrowsmith as creating a year
2 sale or exchange rather than applying Skelly Oifs tax benefit rule. Second, Rabinovitz argues
that Arrowsmith should apply to income amounts received in year 2 to retain the same character,
but no double deduction is present. /d. at 95. While literally no "double deduction" is present in
such circumstances, avoidance of distortion of income mandates year 2 transactional adjustments
10 the annual accounting priciple. Double deduction is an inartful term denoting clearer reflection
of income, and should not be taken literally. See infra note 525. Thus, Skelly Oil read Arrowsmith
correctly. Both of these decisions, as well as decisions like Crane and Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank, reflect
this policy. See infra text accompanying note 495.
476. See, e.g., Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212, 215 (3d Cir.) (quoting Crane v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); Skelly Oil, 394 U.S.
at 684; Bishop v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 1105, 1111 (M.D. Ga. 1971).
477. See infra text accompanying notes 542-52.
478. Crane, 331 U.S. at 15-16. The Court, after pointing out that Mrs. Crane had taken
depreciation deductions calculated upon a basis that included the nonrecourse liability in her "cost,"
concluded:
The crux of this case, really, is whether the law permits her to exclude allowable
deductions from consideration in computing gain. We have already showed that, if it
does, the taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss of assets.
The Sixteenth Amendment does not require that result any more than does the Act
itself.
/d. (footnote omitted).
Arrowsmith also considered prior years to classify year 2 for tax purposes, Arrowsmith, 344
U.S. at 8-9. Skelly Oil interpreted the Code in order to preclude double deductions and read
Arrowsmith as resting on this premise as well. Skelly Oil, 394 U.S. 684-85.
479. 461 u.s. 300, 309-14 (1983).
480. The Tufts majority reasoned that the rationale for treating recourse and nonrecourse debt
alike in "amount realized" is that they are treated alike with respect to basis. Thus, it reasoned
that inclusion of nonrecourse debt in "amount realized" is necessary to avoid untaxed income in
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basis for the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine promulgated in United States
v. Kirby Lumber Co. 481 Unfortunately the legal fictions chosen to explain the
year 2 income adjustment in traditional "income" realization terms, in Crane
and Kirby, initially obscured understanding of the deep structure policy, similar
to the recovery fiction in the tax benefit doctrine. 482 This misconception led to
bizarre results that ultimately triggered obfuscatory piecemeal statutory stabs at
corrections. 483
i.

The Crane Decision

In Crane, the taxpayer, by bequest, acquired an apartment building subject
to a mortgage of $255,000 and accrued interest. The building was appraised for
estate tax purposes at a value that was equal to the debt and accrued interest.
After leasing the property for seven years and taking $25,000 in depreciation
deductions based upon this $255,000 value, the taxpayer sold the property subject
to the mortgage, to a third party for $3,000 cash, and paid $500 in sale expenses. 484
The taxpayer argued that "property" under the predecessor to section 1001(b)
meant the "equity of redemption," that is, the net value that was sold. 485 The
Court ruled that "property" had the same meaning for acquisition, depreciation,

year I and an unwarranted basis increase because the assumption on which the year I exclusion
and basis increase were premised was that the mortgagor would repay the loan. Tufts, 461 U.S.
at 309-10. Tufts saw an affinity between the Crane doctrine and the tax benefit rule, id. at 310
n.8, and the cancellation of indebtedness rule. ld. at 311 n.ll. However, the Court distinguished
both rules on the basis of their mechanical differences. See infra text accompanying notes 494 &
509.
481. 284 U.S. I (1931 ). The corporate taxpayer issued bonds at par and in the same year
repurchased them in the open market at below par. The Court distinguished its prior decision in
Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), which had held that no income was recognized
upon repayment of a foreign loan with devalued marks because the borrowed money had been
invested in an enterprise that failed, on the grounds that in Kirby "there was no shrinkage of assets
and the taxpayer made a clear gain." Kirby, 284 U.S. at 3. The Court further reasoned that "(a)s
a result of its dealings it made available $137,521.30 assets previously offset by the obligation of
bonds now extinct." /d. For a criticism of these rationales, see infra notes 512 & 514.
482. See supra note 438.
483. See infra note 507.
484. Crane, 331 U.S. at 3. While the taxpayer claimed and was allowed $25,500 in depreciation
deductions, id. at n.2, the allowable depreciation was $28,045.10. Accordingly the Commissioner
reduced Mrs. Crane's basis by this larger allowable depreciation. /d. at 4; see United States v.
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927) (basis reduced by greater of allowed or allowable depreciation). Moreover,
the taxpayer obtained no tax benefit from the bulk of the allowed deductions. Cain, From Crane
to Tufts: In Search of A Rationale for the Taxation of Nonrecourse Mortgagors, II HoFSTRA L.
Rev. I, 14 (1982) (citing the Record). Under the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model
no adjustment would be needed for the excess of "allowable" depreciation over "allowed," because
such excess was not accounted for in the taxpayer's income. Furthermore, to the extent of no tax
benefit the prior deduction or exclusion should be a universal feature of the doctrine. See supra
note 432. Crane also was decided incorrectly with respect to the amount. See Cain, supra at 2829.
485. Crane, 331 U.S. at 3-4, 6. The Court stated that:
Petitioner reported a taxable gain of $1,250.00. Her theory was that the "property"
which she had acquired in 1932 and sold in 1938 was only the equity, or the excess
in the value of the apartment building and lot over the amount of the mortgage. This
equity was of zero value when she acquired it. No depreciation would be taken on a
zero value. Neither she nor her vendee ever assumed the mortgage, so, when she sold
the equity, the amount she realized on the sale was the net cash received, or $2,500.00
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and sale, and thus "amount realized" from "sale . . . of property" meant
property value on disposition valued free from liens. 4 x6
In the case of a sale when the purchaser assumed the taxpayer's personal
liability the pre-Crane case law held that the taxpayer did not have to receive
money or other property to be taxed. The Crane court stated that "the taxpayer
was the 'beneficiary' of the payment in 'as real and substantial [a sense] as if
the money had been paid it and then paid over by it to its creditors." ' 4 x7 In
the case of nonrecourse liability, the Crane Court reasoned that in reality:
[A]n owner of property, mortgaged at a figure less than that at
which the property will sell, must and will treat the conditions of
the mortgage exactly as if they were his personal obligations. If he
transfers subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and
substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another yx
This focus on "economic benefit" analysis constitutes a striking example
of the Court's erroneous couching of the analysis in terms of year 2 accessions

This sum less the zero basis constituted her gain, of which she reponed half as taxable
on the assumption that the entire property was a "capital asset."
/d. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
486. !d. at 12. The Crane court first looked at the § IOOI(b) definition of gain from the
disposition of property. This definition characterized gain as the amount realized over the adjusted
basis of the property and then defined "property" for purpose of basis (and depreciation) as the
taxpayer's legal rights in the property undiminished by the (nonrecourse) liability on the grounds
of: (I) ordinary sense of the word; (2) past administrative interpretation; and (3) difficulty of an
annual redetermination of basis for depreciation purposes as principal payments are made. /d. at
6-10. Once "property" was "valued" on the date of acquisition as the property free of liens, "the
property to be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing." /d. at 12. Thus, the essence
of Crane was "consistency." See Cain, supra note 484, at 20, 22. However, the seeds of controversy
were planted with the factoring of the consistency requirement in the term "amount realized." See
infra text accompanying notes 496-98. This controversy could have been avoided by a more explicit
year I assumption (loan payment), year 2 counterevent (loan not paid) analysis.
487. 331 U.S. at 13 (brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564
( 1983 )). Hendler, however, held that assumption and payment of recourse indebtedness resulted in
the taxpayer being the beneficiary of the discharge of indebtedness through such a pay-over rationale.
United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564, 566 (1938). However, even in the context of recourse
indebtedness, economic benefit from the assumption of, and perforce transfers merely subject to,
recourse indebtedness is a fiction, especially when the taxpayer remains liable secondarily. Cain,
supra note 484, at 25-26. Therefore, transfer of property with recourse indebtedness that is not
immediately paid off should have been decided under the model rather than under an economic
benefit analysis. Cf. Note, Jackson Reanalyzed: Preventing Tax-Free Escape Upon Transfer of a
Partnership Interest, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 317, 340, 348 (1985).
488. 331 U.S. at 14. This "economic benefit" approach undoubtedly was influenced by
"accessions 10 wealth" biases and was seriously flawed conceptually. Bittker, supra note 445, at
281-82, stated that:
The Court, of course, was- correct in asserting that the owner of mortgaged property
must keep up the payments if he wants to retain the property and that for this period
of time, he must treat the debt as a personal obligation whether he is personally liable
or not. It does not follow, however, that the benefit to him from transferring the
property subject to the mortgage is the same in both cases. If you crave gourmet
meals, you must pay for them so long as your addiction continues; but once you
break the habit, you need pay only for those you bought on credit in the past, not
for those that you will skip in the future. So it is with mortgages. Nonrecourse
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to wealth.4x 9 However, the Court also fashioned an "equitable" result argument
that was consistent with a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment analysis.
The Court stated that:
She [the taxpayer] was entitled to depreciation deductions for a
period of nearly seven years, and she actually took them in almost
the allowable amount. The crux of this case, really, is whether the
law permits her to exclude allowable deductions from consideration
in computing gain. We have already showed that, if it does, the
taxpayer can enjoy a double deduction, in effect, on the same loss
of assets}'~<'
In Tufts the Supreme Court reviewed Crane and abandoned its economic
benefit requirement and, hence, the controversial footnote 37 .49 ' The Tufts' Court
relied upon Crane's equitable basis. The equitable basis in Tufts was couched
in terms of a nonrecourse loan being treated as true debt. 492 The Court concluded
that:
Because no difference between recourse and nonrecourse obligations is recognized in calculating basis, Crane teaches that the
Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse nature of the obligation

obligations can be disregarded as soon as the property is sold, given away, or abandoned;
personal liability persists even after the property has been disposed of, whether the
new owner assumes of takes subject to the debt.

/d. The Supreme Court abandoned the economic benefit rationale in Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was influenced strongly by the above quoted passage to find
Crane without support misinterpreting Crane's prohibition of double deductions policy. Tufts v.
Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058, 1060 n.4 (5th Cir.l981); see Cain, supra note 484, at 28. See generally
infra note 525.
489. One commentator argues that the Crane Court, by precluding double deductions, meant
only to endorse the absolute nature of the "allowed or allowable" depreciation rules (i.e., basis
must be reduced year by year by allowable depreciation to prevent timing distortion that results
from the taxpayer picking the year to sell the property and taking a loss based on an unreduced
basis). Cain, supra note 484, at 31. More likely, the Crane Court meant to embrace the policy of
avoidance of distortion of income through a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. See supra
note 475. The Tufts majority carefully skirted the validity of the double deduction theory by resolving
the question on another ground. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.IO. In our view this is semantics. Cf.
supra note 471. The double deduction rationale, however, is but an inartful articulation of the
policy of avoiding distortion of income otherwise arising from the annual year 2 transactional
accounting priciple through correlative adjustment. See infra note 525.
490. 331 U.S. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
491. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310-12 n.ll.
492. /d. at 313.
In the specific circumstances of Crane, the economic benefit theory did support
the Commissioner's treatment of the nonrecourse mortgage as a personal obligation.
The footnote in Crane acknowledged the limitations of that theory when applied to
a different set of facts. Crane also stands for the broader proposition, however, that
a nonrecourse loan should be treated a a true loan. We therefore hold that a taxpayer
must account for the proceeds of obligations he has received tax-free and included in
basis. Nothing in either § IOOI(b) or in the Court's prior decisions requires the
Commissioner to permit a taxpayer to treat a sale of encumbered property asymmetrically, by including the proceeds of the nonrecourse obligation in basis but not
accounting for the proceeds upon transfer of the encumbered property.

/d.
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in determining the amount realized upon disposition of the encumbered
property. He thus may include in the amount realized the amount
of the nonrecourse mortgage assumed by the purchaser. The rationale
for this treatment is that the original inclusion of the amount of the
mortgage in basis rested on the assumption that the mortgagor incurred
an obligation to repay. Moreover, this treatment balances the fact
that the mortgagor originally received the proceeds of the nonrecourse
loan tax-free on the same assumption. Unless the outstanding amount
of the mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively
will have received untaxed income at the time the loan was extended
and will have received an unwarranted increase in the basis of his
property. The Commissioner's interpretation of § lOOl(b) in this
fashion cannot be said to be unreasonable. ~3
4

While Tufts acknowledged some affinity of this rationale with the tax benefit
doctrine, Justice Blackmun claimed that his analysis differed. "Our analysis
applies even in the situation in which no deductions are taken. It focuses on
the obligation to repay and its subsequent extinguishment, not on the taking
and recovery of deductions. " 4~4 In reality the year 2 transactional correlative

493. /d. at 309-10 {footnote omitted). This passage encapsulates the conceptual confusion in
the Tufts opinion. It espouses a "true debt" approach {nonrecourse debt is to be treated the same
as recourse debt), that supports on one level the "two-step" analysis, and in some significant
instances, conflicts with a year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. /d. Yet the opinion's stated
rationale for adopting a true debt approach to "amount realized," namely a year 2 balancing of
a year I assumption that the taxpayer would repay the loan, is equivalent to the year 2 transactional
correlative adjustment component of the model. See supra text accompanying note 445. The Tuft's
year 2 balancing rationale is derived from Bittker, supra note 445, at 282, 284. The inclusion of
the year 2 transactional adjustment in the "amount realized" produces character results inconsistent
with the "two-step" analysis. Coven, Limiting Losses Attributable to Nonrecourse Debt: A Defense
of the Traditional System Against the At-Risk Concept, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 41, 76 {1986); see also
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 114-18. The transactional adjustment also frequently is inconsistent
wiih the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment. See infra note 497. The Tufts opinion implicitly
rests on an assumption that the courts in this context should bow to the will, or better interpretation,
of the Commissioner as effectuating rough justice. See infra note 496.
494. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.8. Ironically, Justice Blackmun recognized the year 2 transactional
correlative adjustment basis of the benefit rule in Hillsboro Nat 'I Bank:
It came into being, apparently, because of two concerns: {I) a natural reaction against
an undeserved and otherwise unrecoverable {by the Government) tax benefit, and {2)
a perceived need, because income taxes are payable at regular intervals, to promote
the integrity of the annual tax return. Under this approach, if a deduction is claimed,
with some justification, in an earlier tax year, it is to be allowed in that year, even
though developments in a later year show that the deduction in the earlier year was
undeserved in whole or in part. This impropriety is then counterbalanced {concededly
in an imprecise manner, see ante, at 378 n.10, 380-81 n.l2) by the inclusion of a
reparative item in gross income in the later year.

460 U.S. at 423 {Biackmun, J., dissenting). When, however, year I was barred by the statute of
limitations in year 2, Justice Blackmun would reopen year I. See supra note 467. Perhaps the fact
that he dissented in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank motivated this semantic distinction. More likely, the
Court's recent experience in Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank with the flavoring of a policy oriented transactional
adjustment analysis over the traditional legal fiction approach {recovery theory) led to Tuft's retention
of Crane's traditional legal fiction of "amount realized," albeit rationalized with a transactional
adjustment analysis. See Comment, Some Reflections on Commissioner v. Tufts: Mrs. Crane Shops
at Kirby Lumber, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 929, 930-31 n.l5, 971-72 {1983).
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adjustment that backs out a year 1 assumption shown in year 2 to be erroneous
underlies both doctrines. 4 Y5 However, the fiction chosen in Crane and reaffirmed
in Tufts-that the "amount realized" includes the amount of any liability whether
recourse or nonrecourse, 4 % presumably in order to achieve parity of nonrecourse
debt with recourse debt,m-ultimately lead to inequitable results that remain
only partially redressed by Congress.m In Crane the character of the amount

495. See supra note 445.
496. In Crane, the Court regarded the issue as definitional: (I) the meaning or "construction"
of the term "property" for purposes of basis at acquisition (and hence, basis for depreciation
purposes), Crane, 331 U.S. at 6-7, 9; and (2) "the 'amount realized' from 'the sale . . . of
property."' /d. at 12. "If the 'property' to be valued on the date of acquisition is the property
free of liens, the 'property' to be priced on a subsequent sale must be the same thing." /d. The
Court's reliance upon an "administrative construction" was secondary. /d. at 7. Commentators
correctly point out that the Crane construction of "amount realized" was quite strained. Rosenberg,
supra note 234, at 92-95.
In Tufts, the Court shifted from its own construction of the term to heavy reliance upon the
Commissioner's interpretation. 461 U.S. at 310. The Court acknowledged that the Commissioner
could have chosen other approaches: (I) non-inclusion of nonrecourse debt in basis and, hence,
also in amount realized, id. at 308 n.5; and (2) bifurcation of the transaction upon disposition
with the excess of nonrecourse debt over fair market value of property securing the debt being
characterized as cancellation of indebtedness. /d. 310-1 I n.l I. In short, different adjustments could
have been made in year 2 or in year I; the choice was that of the tax administrator.
497. The Tufts' majority stated that Crane rested on approval of the "Commissioner's decision
to treat a nonrecourse mortgage in. this context as a true loan." Tufts, 461 U.S. at· 307; see also
id. at 308 n.5, 309, 313. See generally Bittker, supra note 445, at 282. Tufts' treatment of nonrecourse
debt as true debt logically would produce parity between recourse and nonrecourse debt. Whether
this is the case when property is transferred in satisfaction of recourse debt in excess of the fair
market value of such property remains unclear. On the one hand, the Service's general litigation
position, accepted by most (but not all) reported decisions, has been that such transfer of property
with a value less than the recourse debt constitutes a sale or exchange of the property, with the
full amount of the recourse indebtedness being included in the amount realized. See, e.g., Peninsula
Properties Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 84, 91-92 (1942); accord Zappo v. Commissioner 81
T.C. 77 (1983) (fair market value of property transferred to satisfy debt not discussed). On the
other hand, various regulations, Treas. Reg.§ I.IOOI-2(c) ex. (8) (1980), Treas. Reg.§ 1.1017-(b)(S)
(1956), as well as the most extensively reasoned, recent decision, Danenberg v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 370 (1979) have adopted a "bifurcation" analysis under which a transfer of property in
satisfaction of debt is divided into two parts: (I) a sale or exchange up to the fair market value
of the property transferred; and (2) the excess of the debt over the fair market value of such
property is treated as cancellation of indebtedness income, subject to the various exceptions to, and
deferral of such income under such doctrine. In short, Tufts' treatment of nonrecourse debt, in
the context of a transfer of property as giving rise to sale or exchange income and not partially
to cancellation of indebtedness income, does not conflict with the majority judicial approach with
respect to satisfaction of recourse indebtedness by the debtor's transfer of property with a fair
market value less than the amount of debt satisfied. The Tufts treatment conflicts with the minority
approach. Commentators before and after Tufts have advocated a two-step approach to disposition
of property in satisfaction of both recourse and nonrecourse debt. The two-step approach requires
sale or exchange treatment up to the fair market value of the transferred property and cancellation
of indebtedness treatment for liability discharged in excess of the fair market value of such transferred
property. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 484, at 5-7 (suggesting many alternative rationales to achieve
such a bifurcated result). The majority in Tufts, however, rejected expressly a two-step analysis.
461 U.S. at 310-11 n.ll. While in many, if not most, instances the two-step analysis would produce
results consistent with the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment approach of this Article, in
some significant areas (principally post acquisition indebtedness) it would not. See infra note 508.
498. Treatment of the taxpayer's gain, upon the disposition of encumbered property, as capital
gain (under § 1231), to the extent that such gain arose from prior depreciation or ACRS deductions
that reduced his basis below the amount of the encumbrance, generates distortion of income.
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 131-133; see also Evans v. Commissioner, 264 F.2d 502, 513-14 (9th
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realized, ordinary income, backed out the earlier ordinary depreciation deductions
because the depreciable apartment building did not constitute a capital asset
under the then applicable statute. •<J<J Ironically, the actual taxpayer in Crane had
enjoyed only scant tax benefits from the depreciation deductions. ~(M) With the
advent of section 123 JS01 disposition of such assets could yield a capital gain,
including a Crane-created gain. Congress expressly intended for the ordinary
income treatment of the recapture rules of sections 1245 and 1250 to overturn
this result-"a partial codification of the tax benefit rule. "~ 02 Unfortunately,
due to the mechanics of this route and the political compromises with respect
to real estate improvements, the effort has proved to be only partially successful. ~ 0 -'
Moreover, the Treasury and other commentators often have speculated that a
"gain" deferred in year I is a gain forgotten in year 2. ~o• Because both the
Commissioner and Congress have acted, in the context of the past judicial error,
including the year 2 correlative adjustment in amount realized, courts are now

Cir. 1959) (traces early Treasury oppositiOn, to the combination of ordinary income depreciation
deductions and capital gains treatment upon disposition). Long aware of such distortion, Congress
enacted § 1245 in 1962 to "recapture" depreciation previously taken as to business personalty by
recharacterizing, as ordinary income, gain otherwise taxable as capital gain. Comment, supra note
494, at fJ'/9 n. 234. A proposal to apply the same rule to business realty was not enacted at that
time. /d. Instead, in 1964 § 1250 was enacted to recapture only the excess of accelerated depreciation
over straight line depreciation. The stated theory behind § 1250 was that gain on the sale of business
real estate may result from gradual inflation in the economy as well as depreciation taken despite
the lack of exhaustion of wear and tear of the property. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
132 (1964), reprinted in 1964-1 (Part 2) C.B. 635-43; Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle
and The Lake, 20 TAX L. REv. 285, 286 (1965). One suspects that the true basis for less stringent
treatment of recapture of depreciation with respect to real estate improvements is to be found in
the real estate lobby rather than in conceptual sources. The trend since 1964 has been to increase
gradually the stringency of real estate depreciation recapture to the point that if accelerated deductions
are taken under ACRS for non-residential real estate, total recapture as under § 1245 is provided.
See I.R.C. §§ 1245 (a)(l), (a)(5) (West Supp. 1986). Statutory depreciation recapture has been characterized as a "tax benefit" concept. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20; O'Hare, Statutory
Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principal of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of
Corporation and Shareholders, 27 TAx L. REv. 215, 216 (1972); Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 110.
Thus, recapture of depreciation on business real estate often will not recharacterize sufficiently the
§ 1231 gain to the full extent of prior depreciation deductions. Indeed, the facts of Tufts illustrate
clearly that the gain arose from depreciation deductions, but due to the inadequacy of § 1250 recapture, the gain was treated overwhelmingly as capital gain. Commentators have suggested fictions and
other approaches that virtually would result in total recapture as to debt financed real estate. The
comments conflict with respect to whether this is contrary to Congress' intent. Compare Rosenberg,
supra note 234, at 109-112 with Comment, supra note 494, at 975.
499. Capital assets initially included business land and depreciable trade or business property
and remained unchanged throughout the years that the taxpayer in Crane took depreciation deductions
(1932-1938). Crane, 331 U.S. at 3; see Rabinovitz & Shashy, Properties of Property: Indigestion
from Corn Products, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 964, 967 (1975). However, in 1938 Congress removed
depreciable trade or business property from the definition, but nondepreciable realty remained within
the capital asset definition. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, 52 Stat. 447 (1938) amending § 117(a)(l)
of the initial Revenue Act of 1938. See generally Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra at 967.
500. See Cain, supra note 484, at 14-15. The issue of the extent to which rules such as the
"no tax benefit" aspect of the tax benefit doctrine should apply to all year 2 transactional correlative
adjustment rules is interesting, but beyond the scope of this Article.
501. The predecessor of § 1231 was enacted in 1942. I.R.C. § 117(j) (1942). See generally
Rabinovitz & Shashy, supra note 499, at 968-69.
502. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 386 n.20.
503. See supra note 498.
504. Cain, supra note 484, at 5 n.26; see supra note 307.
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"obliged to bow to the will of Congress" 505 or the Commissioner506 at least
when one or the other directly has addressed the problem. However, Crane and
Tufts work a rougher approximation of transactional equity than the tax benefit
and claim of right manifestations of the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment
model. This result is due to an analytical defect with respect to the character
of income through the "amount realized" fiction. While commentators have
offered fictions to reconcile either the Crane or cancellation of indebtedness
doctrine, 507 these fictions generally have overlooked the fact that the cancellation
of indebtedness doctrine in its case-law and statutory forms also constitutes a
flawed manifestation of the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model. ~ux

505. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.10. The majority's opmaon, in response to
Justice Blackmun's view that year I should be reopened to account for inconsistent events in year
2 as long as the statute of limitations has not run, reasoned that even if the judicial origins of
the tax benefit rule supported that approach the Court still would be obliged to follow the partial
codification of the tax benefit rule in § Ill, which contemplates a year 2 correlative adjustment
when the taxpayer did receive a tax benefit to a deduction in year I. /d. At least Justice O'Connor
apparently does not view this principle as limited to the tax benefit rule because her concurring
opinion in Tufts primarily turns on the fact that the Commissioner historically had included the
year 2 correlative adjustment in amount realized. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 320 (O'Connor, J ., concurring);
see supra note 496. In short, generally once Congress (or perhaps the administrator) has acted in
reliance upon an erroneous judicial approach, by building other provisions premised on such
conceptual approach or partially codifying the doctrine itself, subsequent courts will not correct
past errors. /d. In the case of the Crane fiction, the subsequent enactment of §§ 1245 and 1250
clearly were premised upon inclusion of debts on depreciable property in the amount realized. Hence,
a direct reversal of Crane's inclusion in amount realized would render the political compromises,
particularly in § 1250, a nullity.
506. The Court in Tufts was careful to indicate that other conceptual approaches to the
transactional correlative adjustment other than inclusion in amount realized were permissible, but
the Commissioner had chosen the "amount realized" route and hence, courts should follow it as
a reasonable interpretation. See supra note 505.
507. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 484, at 6, 34-35, 44-45, 50-51, 59-60; Rosenberg, supra note
234, at 107-29.
508. The judicial and codified forms (§§ 108 and 1017) of the cancellation of indebtedness
doctrine vary in three substantial ways from the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment model.
First, the judicial adjustment-of-purchase price exception now embodied in §§ 108 and 1017's reduction
of tax attributes alternative to year 2 recognition of cancelled debt. Second, the judicial and statutory
exception for debtors insolvent in year 2 when the debt is cancelled. Third and most significantly,
the year 2 characterization of cancellation of indebtedness income as ordinary income in all circumstances. The first two exceptions have been criticized widely by commentators as conceptually
deficient. See Bittker & Thompson, supra note 445, at 1162, 1166; Comment, supra note 494, at
936-38. However, we believe the characterization issue is the most significant. Commentators believe
generally that income from discharge of indebtedness is always ordinary. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra
note 234, at 114, 126. Indeed, Congress in its 1980 reworking of §§ 108 and 1017 stated that "the
rules of the bill are intended to carry out the Congressional intent of deferring, but eventually
collecting within a reasonable period, tax on ordinary income realized from debt discharge." S.
REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980), reprinted in 1980-2 C.B. 625. Such deferral generates
an increase in ordinary income through the reduction of ordinary deductions in future years, but
such deferral is limited to transactions in which encumbered property is not transferred by the
taxpayer. Thus, a distinction should be drawn between situations when a debt is discharged and
the taxpayer retains encumbered property, and when the discharge accompanies a transfer of the
property from the taxpayer. Furthermore, a distinction should be drawn for the model between
purchase money indebtedness and debt placed on property after acquisition. The first type of debt
is included in basis, the later is not. Under conventional doctrine both are included in the amount
realized (at least when the debt is nonrecourse) when the taxpayer disposes of the property.
Cunningham, Payment of Debt with Property-The Two-Step Analysis After Commissioner v. Tufts,
38 TAx LAW 575, 583 n.53 (1985). However, when the liability was included in the basis and
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Kirby Lumber

The Tufts Court also distinguished the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine.509 In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. ,510 the progenitor of that doctrine,
the corporate taxpayer purchased some of its bonds on the open market at less
than their issue price. The Kirby Court distinguished its prior decision in Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.s' 1 which held that a taxpayer realized no income from
the repayment of foreign debt with marks that had fallen in value because the
locus proceeds had been invested in an enterprise that failed so that "the
transaction as a whole was a loss." 512 The Court stated that "there was no

depreciation taken, distortion of income arises by characterizing the gain as capital gain, as discussed
above. See supra note 498. On the other hand, when the taxpayer places an encumbrance on
property after he has acquired it, in effect, he is mortgaging current appreciation. Based on the
assumption that the taxpayer will repay the loan, it is not included in income and the taxpayer is
not treated as having sold the property. When the taxpayer does not repay the loan in year 2, the
appreciation from year I is realized. Consequently, in such circumstances the gain attributable to
the subsequent indebtedness should be capital gain. For example, assume that the taxpayer's basis
in a capital asset is $60 (financed with the purchase money mortgage of $60). The current fair
market value of the capital asset is $100 and the taxpayer increases his indebtedness from $60 to
$100 and pockets the $40 in loan proceeds. The taxpayer's basis remains $60. Subsequently in year
2, the fair market value of property declines to $60. At this point, assume that the taxpayer transfers
the property to the lender in satisfaction of the entire $100 indebtedness (either because the
indebtedness is nonrecourse or because the lender does not find it worth while to pursue the debtor
for the balance of the debt). The taxpayer's basis remains $60. Under traditional analysis, the
transfer of the property in satisfaction of nonrecourse indebtedness and probably in satisfaction of
recourse indebtedness, results in an amount realized of $100 from which the $60 basis is subtracted
resulting in a capital gain of $40. This result is in fact the correct result in this situation. Under
the two-step analysis advocated by many commentators, see supra note 497, the sale or exchange
portion would be limited to the fair market value of the property ($60) resulting in no sale or
exchange gain and consequently, there would be cancellation of indebtedness of $40 ordinary income.
Because the taxpayer actually has sold the $40 in appreciation in the property in year I (which we
only know in year 2) the proper character of the $40 gain in year 2 is capital gain. However, the
$40 should not be viewed as a part of the amount realized. Rather, the correlative adjustment in
year 2 should be backing out the assumption that there was no sale of the asset in year I. Because
we now know that there was a sale, there should be a $40 capital gain in year 2. While this result
compons with the traditional sale or exchange analysis, the traditional sale or exchange analysis
produces an incorrect result when the debt is acquisition indebtedness and subsequently, depreciation
is taken. See supra note 498.
509. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll. "The Commissioner also has chosen not to characterize
the transaction as cancellation of indebtedness. We are not presented with and do not decide the
contours of the cancellation-of-indebtedness doctrine." /d. The Court acknowledged that under one
view the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine rested on the same initial premise as the Tufts' analysis
(i.e., an obligation to repay), but the Coun saw the freeing-of-assets rationale (with its purported
inapplicability to nonrecourse indebtedness), the insolvency exception, and the automatic ordinary
income result of the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine as differing from its analysis. /d. Commentary has pointed out that the Tufts decision misread some of these exceptions or doctrines.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 494, at 957-58, 959 n.l56. The commentary has suggested various
harmonizing modifications to either the Crone doctrine or the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine.
A premise of this Article is that the same underlying rationale supports both doctrines, but that
the couns have misapplied both doctrines.
510. 284 U.S. I (1931). Bittker points out that the taxpayer in Kirby Lumber did not issue
the subsequently repurchased bonds for cash, but rather in exchange for its own preferred stock
with dividend arrearages. Bittker, Income for the Cancellation of Indebtedness: A Historical Footnote
to the Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J. CoRP. TAx'N 124 (1977).
511. 271 u.s. 170 (1926).
512. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3. In fact, the Court's decision in Kerbaugh-Empire on the
surface rested on two different theories: (I) a subsequently overturned definition of "income" as
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shrinkage on the assets and the taxpayer made a clear gain."s 13 The Court also
reasoned, cryptically, that as a result of the bond purchase at a discount, the
taxpayer "made available . . . assets previously offset by the obligation of
bonds now extinct .... [The taxpayer thus] realized within the year an accession
to income . . . . "S 14 The "transaction as a whole" and "freed assets" rationales
have been criticized soundly as conceptually ill-founded and leading "to a
confusing patchwork of rules and exceptions . . . . "sis The Kirby Court should
have relied explicitly upon a year 1 exclusion-year 2 transactional correlative
adjustment analysis. In the words of a leading commentator "borrowed funds
are excluded from gross income when received because of the assumption that
they will be repaid in full and that a tax adjustment is required when this
assumption proves erroneous. "S 16 The adjustment under the year 2 transactional

limited to "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, including profit gained
through sale or conversion of capital," 271 U.S. at 174; and (2) that the in effect cancelled debt
was equalled or exceeded by a five year string of business losses financed by the money borrowed,
that was more than the cancelled debt, so that "[t)he result of the whole transaction was a loss."
/d. at 17S. Both of these arguments were directed at a traditional accession to wealth definition
of income, that, as shown supra at note 438, is erroneous. Note that during the tax years in which
the losses were incurred, there was no net operating loss carry over provisions in the Code. See
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 3S9 (1931). Consequently, one could argue that the
cancelled debt had not given rise to a tax benefit. Much later, courts held that the tax benefit
exception overrode the cancellation of indebtedness rule. See Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 13944. Commentators have argued that Kerbaugh-Empire is limited under current law, if it is still valid
at all. See id. at 122, 129; Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1163; Eustice, Cancellation of
Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv.
22S, 243 (19S9). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently reversed the Tax Court and
held that "when the accession to wealth resulting from the cancellation of indebtedness is otherwise
income, Kerbaugh-Empire does not prevent the taxation of gain." Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,
790 F.2d 1409, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986).
The transaction-as-a whole analysis commonly is thought to serve as the conceptual basis for
the judicial adjustment-of-purchase price approach. See supra note S08; Eustice, supra at 243-4S;
Rosenberg, supra note 234, at 122. The rationale provides that by adjusting basis (or under the
current statutory framework basis or other tax attributes) the income recognized is postponed, see
supra note S08, and if postponed long enough, it will be possible to determine whether the transaction
as a whole resulted in gain or loss. In effect this is an open transaction alternative in year 2, rather
than in year I, pursuant to a year 2 correlative adjustment framework.
Sl3. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3.
Sl4. /d. The error in viewing year 2 transactional correlative adjustments in terms of traditional
accessions to wealth in year 2, rather than as income in year I that is recognized in year 2 is
discussed supra at note 438. This passage is the source of the freeing-of-assets theory that the Court
in Tufts used to distinguished the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine from the Crane doctrine.
Tufts, 461 U.S. at 311 n.ll. Indeed, the Tax Court has held the cancellation of indebtedness doctrine
inapplicable to a discharge of nonrecourse liability on the grounds that no assets are freed. See
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. IS, 32-33 (1979) (The taxpayer argued for application
of cancellation of indebtedness in order to use insolvency exception or to defer recognition through
adjustments to basis under § 1017. Instead the Tax Court applied Crane doctrine.).
The freeing-of-assets theory also supports the judicial rule that an insolvent debtor realizes
income only to the extent his assets exceed his liabilities after the cancellation. Lakeland Grocery
Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289-292 (1937). See generally Comment, supra note 494, at 964
n.l83. Commentators have pointed out that the underlying basis of this doctrine probably is that
you shouldn't kick someone when he is down. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1160;
Eustice, supra note S 12, at 246.
SIS. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 1162, 1166; see also Comment, supra note 494,
at 936-38.
Sl6. Bittker & Thompson, supra note 44S, at 116S; see also Comment, supra note 494, at
944.
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correlative adjustment model in most cases should have been ordinary income
recognition in year 2 similar to Kirby Lumber. This is true because the "sale
or exchange" and "capital asset" requirements for capital gain or loss treatment
were not met in year 1 viewed with the hindsight of year 2 events. Cancellation
of postacquisition indebtedness, in connection with transfer of the encumbered
asset however, should yield capital gains treatment under the model.m Here
too, Congress intervened after chaotic case-law development to require recognition
of ordinary income only when a deferred adjustment was not possible. 518
In summary Crane, Tufts, and Kirby Lumber ultimately rest on a year 2
correlative adjustment to back out the tax consequences of an erroneous year
1 assumption. However, courts must yield in the first instance to the "reasonable"
administrative interpretation of "amount realized" as implementing the correlative
adjustment, albeit with character imperfections-an interpretation relied upon
by Congress in the depreciation recapture provisions, refined, as it were, in the
crucible of political compromises. The courts also must yield in the second
instance to the congressional preference for deferral of the year 2 correlative
adjustment.

2.

Conclusion: Understanding the Correlative Adjustment Model

A fundamental to a correct understanding of the transactional correlative
adjustment model is that when the correlative adjustment in year 2 is an income
adjustment, the traditional definition of income as accession to wealth actually
does not occur in year 2. 519 The accession to wealth occurred in year 1, but is
taken into account in year 2 in order to achieve a "rough transactional parity
in tax" with a similar transaction with all events occurring in year 1. 520 Thus,
a theme running throughout the mature case-law manifestations, but not the
legislative codifications of the model is that value is determined in year 1 not
year 2.m The deep structure in this situation provides a clearer reflection of
income than the annual accounting principle normally would yield. 522 Equally
fundamental to the deep structure is the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that
the case-law doctrines of assignment of income, open transaction or recovery
of basis reporting, 523 and even the annual accounting principle, 524 merely are

517. See supra note 508.
518. /d.
519. See White, supra note 391, at 504.
520. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 383. Year 2 correlative adjustments are not a precise
way of dealing with year 1-year 2 problems due to rate changes. /d. at 378 n.IO. See generally
supra note 451. "While annual accounting precludes reopening the earlier year, it does not prevent
a less precise correction-far superior to none-in the current year, analagous to the practice of
financial accountants." 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll.
521. See supra note 412.
522. Hillsboro Nat'/ Bank, 460 U.S. at 380 n.ll ("This concern with more accurate measurement
of income underlines the tax benefit rule and always has."); see Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note
411, at 477-78 {underlying principle of tax benefit, claim of right, Kirby Lumber and Crane-Tufts
doctrines is "to prevent distortion of a taxpayer's true economic picture-to prevent a false reflection
of a taxpayer's true economic gain"). All these rules rest upon the assumption that tax results
which truly reflect ecomonic gain always further, and never conflict with, congressional, administrative,
or judicial tax policies. /d. at 478.
523. See supra text accompanying note 241.
524. See supra text accompanying note 226.
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administrative rules, designed in the first two instances to reflect income more
fairly.
The courts, however, initially did not fashion these doctrines based upon
a conceptualization of the model. Rather, the courts were guided, in the context
of year 2 income adjustments, by a desire to prevent the effect of a double
deduction or unwarranted tax benefit. 525 Unfortunately, the early decisions adopted
legal fictions couched in terms of accessions to income in year 2 in order to
justify the year 2 transactional adjustments. These fictions usually worked well
enough in their initial context, but with mechanical rather than functional
application by their progeny, came to yield unsound results.
Subsequently, Congress stepped in repeatedly with piecemeal legislation that
was increasingly technical, sometimes inconsistent, and that often contained
provisions that obscured the pattern of the model. Moreover, once Congress
acted, courts were forced to bow to its will, even when the legislature codified
past judicial error. In light of the above discussed problems, what is left for
the courts and the drafters of regulations? When Congress has not spoken
directly, courts, or on occasion the drafters of regulations, may and should

525. The double deduction rationale of Crane initially was interpreted by the courts as a term
of art to prevent unwarranted tax benefits. See Millar v. Commissioner, 517 F.2d 212 (3d Cir.
1978). In Millar, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the failure to include a nonrecourse
debt in amount realized would result in "the type of double deductions of which the Supreme
Court so clearly disapproved in Crane." /d. at 215; see also Millar v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 656,
662 (1977) (Sterrett, J., concurring) ("Petitioners have received a tax benefit of economic substance
attributable to the use of their Crane basis. When the property is disposed of the petitioners must
account for these deductions."). Similarly, the Tax Court in Tufts required inclusion of a nonrecourse
debt in the amount realized, even though the debt exceeded the fair market value of the securing
property. Tufts v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 756, 765-66 (1978). Following Crane and Millar, the
court stated that "since the total liability has been taken into consideration in determining other
tax consequences of the transaction [i.e., basis and depreciation], the total liability must be included
in the amount realized when the property is transferred." /d. at 766. The views expressed by the
courts implicitly equate "double deduction" with its underlying foundation- "clear reflection of
income." See Cain, supra note 484, at 39-40; Del Cotto & Joyce, supra note 411, at 473-78.
This broad interpretation of "double deduction" hit a significant snag when the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals heard Tufts on appeal. Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly misunderstood the transaction in question. The taxpayer
excluded a nonrecourse debt from gross income in year I and constructed an apartment complex.
/d. at 1059. By including the loan in the basis of the building, the taxpayer was entitled to greater
depreciation deductions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court finding no
"double deduction" because the depreciation deductions attributable to the debt would be "recaptured" by a corresponding decrease in the basis of the property. /d. at 1061. If the taxpayer
decreased his basis and included the debt in amount realized, he would be "taxed twice on the
same component of gain." ld. Nevertheless, a "double deduction" (or more properly a "double
exclusion") did in fact exist because the taxpayer excluded the loan proceeds from income and also
excluded the relief from indebtedness from amount realized. See generally Del Cotto & Joyce, supra
note 411, at 476. The court's failure to account for the initial exclusion of the loan proceeds may
be attributable to its literal reading of "double deduction" in Crane. The court merely looked for
a "double deduction" with respect to depreciation deductions and could not find one.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but did not utilize the "double
deduction" rationale. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310 n.IO. Nevertheless, the Court reached the right result
with respect to the amount of the gain. However, accounting for prior receipt of loan proceeds
and depreciation deductions, by including them in amount realized or reducing basis, respectively,
will lead to an improper characterization of the gain. See supra notes 493, 457 & 469. For additional
discussion of the "double deduction" rationale, see Cain, supra note 484, at 39-40; Del Cotto &
Joyce, supra note 411, 473; Comment, supra note 494, at 930-35.
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respond to year I and year 2 issues keeping the transactional correlative adjustment model in mind. Contingent income is such an area.

B.

Correlative Adjustment Model for T Level
Treatment of Contingent Income

Conventional doctrine holds that a liquidating T which distributes a contingent claim in year I under section 336, does not realize income taxable in
year I under the recapture income exceptions to section 336 through 338 if
either of the following are true: (I) the distribution accompanies a sale to P
of the rest of T's asset in a transaction to which section 337 applies; or (2)
the distribution is pursuant to a sale of a controlling interest of T stock to P
in connection with P's section 338 election. 526 Conventional wisdom also holds
that in a section 337 transaction in which T is not in existence in year 2, when
the distributed claim matures or first can be valued, neither T nor its former
shareholders as transferees are chargeable with a T level tax. 527 This state of
events encouraged some judges and the Service to attempt "rough justice" by
closing the transaction outside at the T shareholder level on the date of distribution
in order to produce both ordinary income and partial capital gain at the
shareholder level to compensate for T's escaped inside income tax. 528 Unfortunately, two wrongs do not make a right. The reverse transmutation of what
should constitute capital gain under the model to partial ordinary income usually
will not offset the sum of the inside T level ordinary income tax avoided and
an outside T shareholder capital gains tax on the net gain. Thus, T shareholders
would fare better than if they had never incorporated. On the other hand, if
T remained in existence until year 2, it would be liable for taxes in year 2
under the assignment of income doctrine because the income that T earned
earlier now could be "accrued. " 529 This situation presents serious implications
for discontinuity with section 338.
Notwithstanding the conventional misidentification of clear reflection of
income with accrual tax accounting principles, the actual rationale for not taxing
T in year I is administrative convenience530 because the claim is difficult to
value in year I. However, Burnet v. Logan 531 indicates that such administrative
rules on occasion must yield to necessity. An example of such a situation is a
contingent claim that must be valued in year I for estate tax purposes. 532 Thus,
T could be taxed in year I, but if subsequent events in year 2 show the assumed
value put on the transaction in year I to be incorrect, a correlative adjustment
will be necessary in year 2 when T is no longer in existence. In light of these
possibilities, it would be advisable to defer reporting the transaction until year
2 because fewer year 2 adjustments would be necessitated and more transactional
accuracy would result.m
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
cases. See

See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

text accompanying notes 335-39, 348 & 385.
text accompanying note 338.
text accompanying notes 265-66.
text accompanying notes 333, 339 & 349.
text accompanying note 328.
283 U.S. 404 (1931); see supra note 237.
See authorities cited supra at note 241.
Justice O'Connor makes a strong argument for a year 2 correlative adjustment in all
supra note 467; see also supra note 461.
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The prior law broke down at this point because T no longer was in existence
in year 2 when the income was initially deemed to be "earned." The answer
to this conventional doctrine rationale is that the income was not earned in
year 2. Rather, it was actually earned in year 1, ~_~.~ but could not be measured
in year 1. Any year 2 T level income from a contingent claim is not a traditional
accession to wealth in year 2, but rather, a rough approximation of transactional
accounting that is far better than no approximation at all.m Thus, in order to
avoid a distortion of income with respect to contingent items in the context of
a cost-basis corporate acquisitions, the courts should effect an equitable solution
of correlative adjustment following the premises of the model.
This Article recommends a judicial or regulatory adoption of a transactional
correlative adjustment in year 2 to a surrogate for the then liquidated T, that
is, the former T shareholders as transferees of a hypothetical year 2 T level
inside tax. This correlative adjustment, in conjunction with modification of the
time value of money regulations applicable to contingent income, effects a
transactional approximation to collection in year 1 by T. Such a year 2 additional
tax is preferable to both avoidance of the T level taxation with no other
adjustments and the rough justice of taxing the former T shareholders in year
2 on their outside gain, in part, on an ordinary basis under closed transaction
reporting. This approach also is preferable to section 341 for that matter. A
year 2 adjustment is chosen because the annual accounting principle remains in
effect, with respect to the courts and the Treasury, to the extent that year 1
transactions cannot be reopened to make an adjustment for year 2 events. 536 It
is true, on a tabula rasa that reopening year 1 and making an adjustment of
open years would effect transactional justice better than the correlative adjustment
in year 2. Yet this approach, as noted by Justice O'Connor in Hillsboro, 537 does
not solve the problem when the subsequent event is not in year 2 but in year
5 after the statute of limitations has run on year 1. In that case, a correlative
adjustment in year 5 would be necessary-a proliferation of rules. Therefore,
consistency between year 5 and year 2 requires correlative adjustments in both
years, absent congressional intercession.
The suggested T level model provides that the former T shareholders should
be taxed in year 2 as transferees for the constructive year 2 income of T in
addition to their outside gain on the distribution. A determination of rates for
the year 2 hypothetical T level tax should start at T's top bracket in year I.
It is true that such an "exact" tax benefit approach did not fare well the last
time around, 538 but there is support for such an approach in the temporary
regulations. 539 While the former T shareholders are taxed twice under this approach-once on the outside net value of the distributed claim in year 2 or
year 1, and twice as the transferee for the hypothetical T level tax in year 2that is exactly what is supposed to happen with respect to claims, contingent
or otherwise, earned by T in the ordinary course of its business. Sections 337

534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying note 519.
supra text accompanying note 520.
supra text accompanying notes 224-28.
supra note 467.
supra text accompanying notes 230-31 & 451.
infra text accompanying notes 503-07.
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and 338 never were meant to shield such inside income. However, the outside
former T shareholder level gain should be reduced by the surrogate hypothetical
inside T level tax liability.
C.

Correlative Adjustment: Open Transaction Model for Shareholder
Level Treatment of Contingent Income

The open transaction-recovery of basis approach was the more common
response to a contingent income item at the T shareholder level. The major
defect in this case-law approach was its failure to account for the time value
of money element. 54" The cases should have imputed an interest factor into the
contingent amounts in order to reflect income clearly. The proposed and temporary time value of money rules adequately handle this problem. 541 However,
when these rules are not applicable, the courts should apply an interest factor
as discussed below.
Year 2 income adjustments to a transaction closed in year I, for example,
should retain the same character as the payment in year I in order to back out
the deduction or exclusion in year 1. 542 However, the year I closed value of an
excluded contingent claim should be a discounted value in year 2. This is necessary
to reflect the fact that the contingent payments were to be received in the future.
This discount is the equivalent of interest, 543 and hence, when the year 2 payments
are received, courts conceptually should treat an appropriate portion of the
payments as interest. Only the balance should retain the year I character. 544 The
year 2 discount payments are not backing out the year I transaction, but stand
on their own in year 2 as the equivalent of interest. Hence, these discount
payments should be ordinary income to the former T shareholders.
The year I closed transaction-year 2 correlative adjustment approach was
rejected by the conventional doctrine because of a flawed understanding of the
Arrowsmith doctrine. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Campagna v.
United States, 545 refused to apply Arrowsmith to year 2 payments that were
fixed in amount in year I, but contingent with respect to collectability, and that
exceeded the amount at which the payments were closed when distributed in a
complete liquidation in year I. The court reasoned that Arrowsmith and its
progeny "involve[d) situations where the tax treatment of a subsequent adjustment
of an earlier sale or liquidation is determined by considering the nature of the
earlier transaction. " 546 In the case of payments in excess of the closed amounts,
"the payments actually made in the disputed tax years were at all times unconditionally required to be made .. ," 547 so that no adjustment was being made.
Under the model, to the extent that payments in year 2 exceed the year I closed

540. See supra text accompanying notes 426, 452 & 477.
541. See supra text accompanying notes 202-08 & 214-15.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 445-50.
543. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965); 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra
note 104, at 108.
544. See Note, supra note 224, at 1014-15 nn.96-97.
545. 290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961).
546. /d. at 685; see supra note 276.
547. Campagna, 290 F.2d at 685. The Campagna approach has been criticized severely. Note,
supra note 238, at 78-79; see also supra note 276.
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amount plus an interest factor, the earlier transaction in fact is being "adjusted."
Namely, the earlier year 1 closing assumed that the taxpayer would receive only
the closed amount plus interest. Payments in excess of this base prove that the
earlier assumption was wrong. Hence, a correlative adjustment for additional
income must be made in year 2. In order to backout the earlier exclusion from
income, the character of that correlative adjustment must be the same as the
earlier excluded income would have been, capital gains in most instances. 5•K
When the proposed and temporary time value of money 5 •~ or accounting
rental and service rules 55" would be applicable transactionally to a year 2 payment
of a T level contingent claim distributed in connection with P's acquisition of
T's assets or stock, courts could pursue either of the following strategies: (1)
fashion under the model an appropriate interest charge (presumably equal to
the applicable test rate), in which case regulations and the Code would not
impute interest; or (2) not judicially impute interest, in which case the regulations
would impute such interest. Simplicity militates that the latter approach be
followed. 551 When, however, the legislative rules are not properly applicable, as
in the case of a liquidating distribution of a T owned contingent claim arising
other than from T's sale or exchange of property, providing services, or renting
property, the courts should follow the model to appropriately impute an interest
factor for the year 2 payments under such a claim at both the former T
shareholder and ultimate obligor levels. 552

D.

Conclusion

For forty years the Service, courts, and commentators have sought a rationale
that supports the T and T shareholder model's result, particularly at the T
level. 553 The suggested year 2 transactional correlative adjustments analysis scarcely
extends the "open-closed with correlative adjustment, character remains the same"
clearer reflection of income transactional model that is fully supported, even
mandated in our view, by existing Supreme Court precedents. 55• The suggested
surrogate T level tax is a year 2 correlative adjustment that more clearly reflects
income that was not reported properly in year 1 through exclusion from T's
tax base in its final tax year (year 1). 555 The same "general principle" of clear
reflection of income underlies the tax benefit and the other transactional exceptions to the annual accounting principle. 556 When the drafters of the section
338 regulations (discussed below) incorporate by reference "general principles

548. See supra text accompanying notes 442-43.
549. See authorities cited supra note 541.
550. See supra note 221. See generally Whitesman, Section 467: Tax Planning for DeferredPayment Leases, 5 VA. TAX. REV. 345 (1985).
551. See supra note 467.
552. See supra notes 543-45.
553. See supra text accompanying notes 243 & 314; Farer, supra note 242, at 531-532 ("the
distributee would . . . be liable both for the corporate income tax and for a capital gains tax.");
Note, supra note 238, at 62 (tax former T shareholders as transferee for year 2 hypothetical T
liability).
554. See supra text accompanying notes 437-552.
555. See Cunningham, supra note 508, at 581 n.39; White, supra note 391, at 504.
556. See supra text accompanying notes 441-52.
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of law," 557 they should consider these deep structure principles as well as conventional doctrine. The drafters of the regulations could continue to rely on a
year 2 "continuation" of Old pss in which the burden is then borne by either
the Neo-T or the former T shareholders as transferees. 559 Instead of a fiction
that generates discontinuities with section 337 if Neo-T is the surrogate, the
drafters should embrace explicitly the year 2 transactional correlative adjustment
model in the section 337 and 338 regulations.
V.

SECTIONS

337

AND

338

AND CONTINGENT INCOME ITEMS:

INTO THE ~ELSTROM

A.

Introduction

Contingent income items can arise in three contexts in connection with a
P cost basis acquisition of T's assets or stock. First, P may purchase T's assets
or stock for consideration consisting, in part, of a contingent amount such as
a percentage of postacquisition T production or profits. 51\(' This transaction is
known as an "earnout. " 561 Second, T's assets may include a contingent claim
that P purchases pursuant to T's complete liquidation to which section 337 562
applies or is deemed purchased by Neo-T in a section 338 transaction. 563 Third,
T's assets may include a contingent claim that T distributes in a complete
liquidation governed by section 336 pursuant to a section 337 bulk sale of its
assets, 564 or in connection with P's purchase of control of T and election of
section 338, resulting in a deemed section 336 distribution. 565
The 1982 Conference Report and the 1982 "Blue Book" Staff General
Explanation, addressed contingent T level income in the earnout context. 566

557. See infra text accompanying note 574.
558. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU> ex. (4)(v); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)3T(h)(l)(i), 1.338(b)-3T (h)(2)(i)-(ii)(A) (1986); supra text accompanying note 343.
559. See supra note 334. Use of Neo-T as a surrogate or transferee for Old T, rather than
the former T shareholders as surrogates leads to discontinuities between §§ 338 and 337 transactions.
See infra text accompanying notes 640-43.
560. Only the contingent payout by a P corporation for the old T stock transaction is addressed
by the legislative history. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338 (1986); see also infra text accompanying
notes 566 & 603. Commentators also focused solely on the contingent purchasing corporation payout
in year 2. See, e.g., Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3), at 12-39 to -47; Ginsburg, supra
note 35, at 287.
561. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3), at 12-39 to -47.
562. The typical operation of § 337 is described supra in text accompanying notes 14-25.
563. The paradigm operation of § 338 is set forth supra in text accompanying notes 35-38.
564. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. This combination bootstrap acquisition (distribution to T shareholders of assets not desired by the purchasing corporation) and § 337 sale of
the balance of T's assets was the breeding place for the classic avoidance of corporate level taxation
abuse. See infra text accompanying note 652.
565. See supra text accompanying note 38.
566. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at 537. The Report stated that:
[l)n some cases, recapture items may be includible in income for a period during which
the target corporation is included in a consolidated return of the acquiring corporation.
Where, for example, there is an adjustment for the purchase price for its stock based
on post-acquisition date earnings of the target corporation, there may be additional
amounts of recapture income. Such additional income is to be separately accounted
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Contrary to the general tenor of the 1982 legislative history of section 338/~
the Conference Report and 1982 Joint Committee Staff treated Neo-T as accounting separately for any contingent T level recapture income in year 2. 5M At
least the format of the 1982 version of the deemed Old T bulk sale was perhaps
reconcilable with this approach because the deemed sales price equalled P's basis
in its T stock properly adjusted for Old T's liabilities and other relevant items.
In addition, P's basis would include its contingent payments in year 2. 5 ~'~ The
current version of section 338(a), which will have retroactive effect, measures
Old T's deemed sale price by the fair market value of its assets as of the
acquisition date. 570 Nevertheless, the proposed 571 and temporary section 338 regulations generally provide that the price at which Old T is deemed to have sold
its assets in such a contingent payment context must be redetermined to take
into account "adjustment events," occurring after the acquisition date, such as
year 2 contingent P payments. 572 These Regulations provide that Neo-T must
separately take this adjustment into account in year 2 as an item of Old T as
if recognized by Old T in its year 1. Old T's year 1 is deemed to end on the
acquisition date. This adjustment cannot be offset by Neo-T's year 2 income,
loss, credit, or other item, but it can be offset by any Old T unexpired NOL
carry forward as of the end of year 1. 573
The temporary section 338 regulations purport to incorporate "general law
principles" in fashioning these rules. These regulations provide that:
Pursuant to general principles of tax law, the price at which old
target is deemed to have sold its assets shall be adjusted to take into
account adjustment events occurring after the acquisition date. In
making such an adjustment, recognition of income (or loss) ... with
respect to the deemed sale of assets is not precluded because the
target is treated as a new corporation after the acquisition date. To
the extent general tax law principles require seller to account for

for and may not be absorbed by losses or deductions of other members of the acquiring
corporation's affiliated group.
/d. The 1982 Bluebook more succinctly provides the same. 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note 35, at 13335.
567. See supra notes 109 & 566.
568. See supra note 566.
569. I.R.C. § 338(a)(l) (1982) (as amended in 1984); see 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at
995-96.
570. See supra note 98. Under conventional authority, a sale at the T level for fair market
value would result in a closed transaction, and any year 2 payments received in excess of such
closed value would be characterized as ordinary income due to the absence of a sale or exchange
in year 2. These payments probably would not be sheltered by § 337. See supra text accompanying
notes 267-70.
571. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-IT to -3T were adopted as proposed regulations. 51 Fed.
Reg. 3634-35 (1986).
572. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l)(i) (1986). The term "adjustment events" is defined
as increases (or decreases) in the consideration paid for recently or nonrecently purchased Old T
stock, reductions in T's liabilities included in the adjusted basis as of the beginning of the day
after the acquisition date, and Old T liabilities that have become fixed and determinable. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-IT(b)(2)(ii) (1986).
573. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i), (ii) (1986).
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adjustment events, target . . . shall make such an accounting, which
may result in reporting income, loss, or other amount. ~
57

The underlying thrust of these regulations is that Old T continues in year
2, or even year 5 or 25, and it recognizes the contingent item in year 2, 5, or
25 575 under an exact tax benefit approach. This is accomplished by recomputing
a hypothetical increase in Old T's year 1 tax, subject to a deemed section 337
shield including the year 2 contingent item that Neo-T must report in year 2. 571'
Thus, the temporary regulations effect a melange of consolidated return and
separate return year principles. 577 The general tax benefit rule and reopening of
year 1 as articulated seem to violate the annual accounting principle. More
significantly, the proposed temporary section 338 regulation's approach of deemed
continuation of Old T in year 2, with Neo-T as surrogate, results in a lack of
parity between sections 337 and 338 in some instances. m 1f this approach is
extended to contingent items held by Old T on the acquisition date, it could
result in the year 2 contingent payment being attributed to the wrong taxpayer. 57"
The suggested model would eliminate these section 337-338 discontinuities. The
model is more consistent with existing judicial and administrative exceptions to
the annual accounting principle and results in less distortion of income than
the conventional doctrine or the proposed and temporary section 338-3T regulations. Hence, the final regulations should adopt explicitly the model with
respect to both section 337 and 338 regulations.

B.

Contingent Payments in the Legislative History of Section 338

Before continuing, a quick review of the mechanics of section 338(a) will
prove helpful. Section 338(a) separates the deemed bulk section 337 sale by Old
T to P into two transactions. The first transaction is a sale of Old T's assets
at fair market value in a single transaction to which section 337 applies. This
sale is deemed to take place on the date P acquires control of T. 5 xo The second
is a purchase by Neo-T of all of such assets, beginning the day after the

574.
575.

Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l )(i) (1986).
T.D. 8072, 1986-11 I.R.B. 7.

Although included in new target's return, such income, loss, or other amount is
separately accounted for as an item of income, loss, or other amount of old target.
Therefore, such income, loss, or other amount may not be offset by income, loss,
etc. of new target . . . . Also, . . . net operating losses and net capital losses of old
target may be carried forward to offset income items described above.
/d. at 10. Examples illustrating subsequent adjustments to adjusted gross-up basis more clearly
articulate that the year 2 income is recognized by Old T and Neo-T merely reports this year 2 Old
T income. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v) (1986).
576. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i), 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v) (1986).
577. The separate return principle has the support of legislative history. See supra note 566.
For a discussion of the separate return approach, see Dunn, The New Consolidated Return Regulations
May Preempt the Field in Determining the Allowance of Operating Losses, 23 TAX L. REv. 185
(1968).
578. See infra text accompanying notes 640-43.
579. See infra text accompanying notes 651-62.
580. See supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
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acqwsitlon date. ~x 1 Congress stated that generally Neo-T is treated as a new
corporation with a clean slate of tax attributes. ~x 2 As discussed above, the purpose
of this bifurcation was to put Old T's recapture income from the deemed section
337 bulk sale into a separate return for the short tax year of Old T. This
income is not includable in either Old T's or P's consolidated group. ~x., In the
original 1982 version, section 338(a)(l) used P's adjusted cost basis as the deemed
sales price of the deemed section 337 bulk sale. ~x• Today the fair market value
is used to determine the deemed sales price. m Neo-T's basis in its assets equals
P's purchase price increased by "recently purchased stock" and adjusted for
liabilities and other re.levant items. ~xn Of course, the whole point of this statutory
exercise is the taxation of Old T only on its "recapture income," albeit in a
separate return. <x 7

I.

The 1982 Version of the Section 388 Deemed Bulk Section 337 Sale

Under the original version of bifurcated sale, a contingent purchase price
by P posed problems because Old T's sales price could not be determined until
P's total cost was determined in the year 2. The House and Senate Tax Conferees
were aware of this problem of contingent income in 1982. The conferees pointed
out in the Conference Report accompanying the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 that:
[R]ecapture items may be includible in income for a period during
which a target corporation is included in a consolidated return of the
acquiring corporation. Where, for example, there is an adjustment to
the purchase price for its stock based on post-acquisition date earnings
of the target corporation, there may be additional amounts of recapture
income. Such additional income is to be separately accounted for and
may not be absorbed by losses or deductions of other members of
the acquiring corporation's affiliated group.~xx
The unarticulated premises of the above conclusion in the legislative history~x"
is that part of P's contingent purchase price may be allocated in year 2 to T's
recapture items, thereby increasing their fair market value in that year and

581. See supra text accompanying note 100.
582. See supra text accompanying notes 109 & 567.
583. See supra text accompanying note 99.
584. See supra note 569.
585. See supra text accompanying note 98.
586. See supra text accompanying note 101.
587. See supra text accompanying note 99.
588. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 760, supra note 37, at 632; accord 1982 BLUEBOOK, supra note
35, at 135.
589. The implication of the legislative history cited supra in note 558, is that the Neo-T will
report the additional recapture income triggered by the year 2 contingent payment in year 2. This
impliction conflicts internally with the discussion adjacent to recapture items in the Conference
Report in which T is treated as a new corporation; indeed, the report states that the "target
corporation is treated as a 'new' corporation after the acquisition date for all purposes relating to
its tax liability either as the selling or purchasing corporation." H.R. CoN F. REP. No. 760, supra
note 37, at 537.
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particularly in the case of statutory depreciation recapture, thereby increasing
the "recapture income. " 5<J<1 In addition, such redetermined recapture income is
allocated to Neo-T in year 2 and not in year I. 5y 1

2.

1984 Version

The House Bill (H. R. 4170), 592 which evolved into the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, contained amendments to section 338m which provided that the
deemed sale price by Old T was to be "fair market value" just as the final
1984 provision mandates. The House provision for the determination of NeaT's basis in its constructively purchased assets would have treated the assets of
Old T as being purchased by Neo-T at an amount equal to their "adjusted fair
market value. " 5Y4 The House bill mandated that the regulations provide "proper
adjustment" for contingent P payment and other items with respect to both
Old T's deemed sales price and Neo-T's basis. 5y 5 Note that the commentators
on the original section 338(c)(l) suggested treatment of contingent P payments
as another "relevant item" under the original section 338 basis and deemed
sales provision. 596 The House Committee Report adopted that suggestion: the
fair market value of the assets under the House version properly would have
been adjusted in order to determine the price at which the assets were deemed
sold and purchased for contingent payments and other relevant items. "The
consideration to be paid by the acquiring corporation may depend, for example,
on the amount of the acquired corporation's liabilities which are not fixed on
the acquisition date or on the post-acquisition date earnings of the acquired
corporation.'' m

590. In statutory depreciation recapture, the fair market value of the disposed of property is
a ceiling on the statutory recapture. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1245(a)(l) (West Supp. 1986). Only by
increasing the fair market value can depreciation recapture be increased.
591. Neo-T only can be included in the consolidated return of the acquiring corporation in
the tax year ending after Old-T's acquisition date. See I.R.C. §§ 1501, 1504(d) (West Supp. 1986).
592. H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 612(d)(5)(a) (1984).
593. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, H.R. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. 98-369, §
712(k)(l) (1984).
594. See supra note 592.
595. H.R. 4170, supra note 592, at § 612(k)(5)(8), would have amended § 338(b) by adding
a new paragraph 5 that authorized regulations providing proper adjustments to the deemed purchase
price for Neo-T and deemed sales price for Old T "for contingent payments and other relevant
items." The accompanying Committee Report provided as follows:
The fair market value and the adjusted fair market value of the assets are to be
properly adjusted under regulations, in determining the price at which the assets are
deemed sold and purchased, for contingent payments and other relevant items. The
consideration to be paid by the acquiring corporation may depend, for example, on
the amount of the acquired corporation's liabilities which are not fixed on the acquisition
date or on the post-acquisition date earnings of the acquired corporation. In some
cases, the aggregate bases in the stock of the acquired corporation held by the acquiring
corporation on the acquisition date may exceed the fair market value of the assets on
such date. Proper adjustment to the basis of assets may be made to reflect such excess.
H.R. REP. No. 432 (Part 2), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1622 (1984).
596. Ferguson & Stiver, supra note 19, § 12.05[3], at 12-41 to -42; Ginsburg, supra note 35,
at 286-87.
597. H.R. REP. No. 432, supra note 107, at 1622.
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The Conference compromise also bifurcated the treatment of the Old T and
Neo-T transaction, by treating Old T's sales price as fair market value. 59"
However, reference to contingent payment adjustments (to the deemed sale and
deemed purchase) was deleted from the final 1984 Act. Moreover, the Conference
Committee Report was silent with respect to contingent payments. 5 w However,
in describing the new deemed sale at fair market value by Old T the "Bluebook"
General Explanation of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, states that ''there
was no intention to change the treatment under prior law of contingent payments
and liabilities.' '"""1
C.

Proposed Temporary Section 338 Regulations

The proposed temporary section 338-3T regulations purport to incorporate
such prior law in the form of "general tax law principles. """ll However, they
apply such general principles in year 2 in the context of a P contingent payment
for Old T stock in a manner that is unprecedented both judicially and administratively.@ These regulations contain a year !-year 2 construct, which provides
that Old T must recognize in year 2 gain or loss arising from a year 2 change
in Old T's deemed sales price that is reported by Neo-T in year 2.1\()J However,
Neo-T's year 2 tax on income or loss resulting from such change is determined
as if such gain or loss had been recognized "[t]o the extent general tax law
principles require seller to account for adjustment events"""14 in Old T's taxable
year ending on its acquisition date (year 1).""15 The acquisition date is deemed
to be the date that P acquired 80% control of T's stock. Neo-T must account
separately, in year 2, for such year 2 income as an item of Old T,""16 subject

598. See H.R. 4170, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. § 712(k)(l) (1984).
599. See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1220-21 (1984).
600. 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 996.
601. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(i) (1986).
602. A major thesis of this Article is that the courts in dealing with contingent items that
have effects in two tax years have but two options: (I) hold the transaction open in year I, with
the year 2 reporting taking the same character as the transaction would have had in year I, but
at the taxpayer's year 2 rates and brackets; or (2) close the transaction in year I on the best
assumption possible and, if such assumption proves untrue in year 2, back-out the earlier reported
transaction with an item of opposite effect (deduction for income, income for deduction). The backout transaction should be of the same character and should be taxed at the year 2 rates and
brackets. It appears that, absent express statutory authority, the regulations have but the same two
choices. Indeed, Professor Lee over a decade ago stated, in an opinion letter based upon: (I) the
open transaction doctrine; (2) the tax benefit rule; (3) the claim of right doctrine; and (4) the
Arrowsmith doctrine, that Treasury regulations reopening year I on the basis of an assumption
proving untrue in year 2 or even year 20 were invalid. See Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(c)(2) (as amended
by T.D. 6841 (1965)). Thus, if the proposed and temporary § 338 allocation regulations literally
reopened year I, they clearly would be invalid. Reopening year I to determine the tax, but not
imposing interest on any deficiency or refund until year 2, probably is invalid as well. Cf. supra
note 451. Congress, however, can use year I brackets, rates, and income to determine the shape
of a year 2 correlative adjustment. See supra notes 455 & 461 (discussing § 1341 ).
603. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T(h)(2)(i) (1986).
604. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(l)(i) (1986). The term "adjustment events" is defined
supra at note 572.
605. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(h)(2)(i) (1986). Acquisition date is defined supra in text
accompanying note 98.
606. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T(h)(2)(ii)(A) (1984).
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to Old T's tax attributes unexpired as of the end of such year.'"'7 The temporary
regulations'"'8 specifically defer the treatment of any year 2 (or 5 or 25) original
issue discount, arising out of the year 2 payment, to the regulations under
sections 1274, l275(d), and 483.'"1'} These regulations would impute interest into
the year 2 contingent payment, based on the years lapsed since year l, 610 thereby
reducing the principal payment portion of the contingent payment. The principal
payment portion is the only portion that the temporary section 338 contingent
income regulations apply to specifically. 611
The proposed and temporary section 338 regulations allocate P contingent
payments in year 2 to Neo-T's assets in that year under a "residual method"
of allocation formula. 612 This allocation formula limits generally such year 2
allocation to year l fair market value which is defined as the fair market value
on the day following the acquisition date. 613 Thus, all year 2 contingent payments

607. /d. Ginsburg suggested that in the case of contingent income in year 2, Old-T's year
unexpired NOL should be available to offset such income. Ginsburg, supra note 35, at 287.
608. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU) (1986).
609. These regulations are discussed supra in text accompanying notes 202-23.
610. The mechanics of imputed interest, including the applicable interest rates are set forth
supra in text accompanying notes 202-08.
611. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU) (1984).
612. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-2T(b), (c) (1986).
In some cases a taxpayer who has purchased a going business at a premium (that
is, the price that it has determined exceeds the apparent aggregate fair market values
of the tangible and intangible assets, including goodwill and going concern value) might
take the position that it is entitled to allocate an amount in excess of fair market
value to the basis of individual assets. Relying on one interpretation of the judicial
and administrative authorities, the taxpayer would separately value each of the acquired
assets and allocate the premium among all the assets (other than cash and cash
equivalents) in proportion to their relative fair market values in a so-called "secondtier allocation."
Proposed and temporary regulations recently issued by the Treasury Department
under section 338 mandate a residual method of allocation (and prohibit a secondtier allocation) in determining the basis of assets acquired in a qualified stock purchase
for which a section 338 election is made or is deemed to have been made, i.e., a
stock purchase which is treated as a purchase of assets for tax purposes. The deemed
purchase price of the assets if first reduced by cash and items similar to cash, and
is then allocated sequentially to two defined classes of identifiable tangible and intangible
assets; any excess is allocated to assets in the nature of goodwill and going concern
value. After the reduction for cash items, no amount may be allocated to any asset
in the next two classes in excess of its fair market value.
S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Second·tier allocation and
residual allocation are discussed in Krieger, Tax Accounting: New Section 338 Regs Provide for
Use of Residual Method in Goodwill Allocation, 13 J. CoRP. TAx'N 159, 162-63 (1986).
Due to the difficulty in valuing the goodwill and going concern value, the drafters of the
temporary regulations decided to value and assign basis to other assets first with the residual excess,
if any, being assigned to goodwill and going concern value. Preamble, supra note 202. Of course,
the fact that goodwill generally is nonamortizable undoubtedly was a major reason for designing
the residual method contained in the § 133 regulations. SeeS. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
251 (1986).
613. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l) ( 1986); Temp. Treas. § 1.338(b)-3T(d)(l) (1986).
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would be allocated to goodwill, 614 unless P's base price for control of T was
less than the fair market value on the deemed purchase date. 61 ~

I.

Validity of the Regulation's Year /-Year 2 Construct

The temporary and proposed regulations treat Old T as continuing until
year 2, as may be seen in Example (4) of Temporary Regulation 616 section l338(b)-3TU). In Example (4), P purchased control of Old T on January 1, 1987
and timely elected section 338. 617 In 1990 (Year 4) P makes a contingent payment
(an earnout)m for the stock of Old T. This payment is allocated in part to
section 1245 property because P's base price was less than fair market value. 61 ~
As a result, additional income is recognized
by old T for 1990 on the deemed sale of old T's
must be reported on the consolidated return of
1990, but it is separately accounted for and may
losses or deductions of P or of new T. 620

under
assets.
new T
not be

section 1245
This income
[Neo-T] for
absorbed by

The 1982 legislative history treats Neo-T or new T as a new corporation,
either as the selling or purchasing corporation, and with respect to tax liability,
Neo-T has a clean slate of tax attributes. 621 This treatment raised the presumption
that Old T was dead. While the 1984 House bill specifically would have addressed
the problem of contingent payouts at the T level, 622 the 1984 Conference bill
left prior general principles undisturbed. 623 Under such principles a liquidated T

614. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(g) (1986), provides a special rule for allocating a basis
increase (or decrease) resulting from adjustments directly relating to income produced by a particular
contingent income asset (e.g., a patent, copyright, or secret process), under which fair market value
is redetermined in year 2 and used as the ceiling for allocation rather than year I fair market value.
See generally T.D. 8072, supra note 575, at 10.
615. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4) (1986).
616. /d.
617. /d.
618. /d.
619. /d.
620. /d. § 1.338(b)-3T(j) ex. (4)(v).
621. S. Rep. No. 494, supra note 37, at 193. This same legislative history also stated that
recapture income includible in income for a subsequent tax year in which the target is included in
a consolidated return of the acquiring corporation, is to be accounted for separately, presumably
by Neo-T. /d. at 194; see supra note 588. These two references do not, however, dictate that Old
T should be treated as continuing in year 2. The references are perfectly consistent with a conceptual
model under which year 2 transactional correlative adjustments are made, rather than reopening
year I with such correlative adjustments being reported separately by Neo-Ts. However, the inconsistencies that this continuation of Old T approach produces with a § 337 transaction in which
Old T is liquidated in year I are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 640-43.
622. See supra text accompanying notes 107 & 595.
623. The absence of any provision or reference in the conference bill and report is displayed
supra in text accompanying notes 598-99. The 1984 BLUEBOOK, supra note 104, at 996, however,
states that Congress did not intend to change prior general principles. Although the 1984 Bluebook,
as is the case with all bluebooks, is not strictly legislative history, because it is written after the
bill is enacted and is not passed upon by the House or Senate Committees, many courts give it
significant weight because the writers of the bluebooks also write the committee reports. See, e.g.,
Bank of Clearwater v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 289, 294 (1985) ("(A]Ithough said Joint Committee
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that is no longer in existence in year 2 when the contingent income matures,
is not taxable in either year 2 or year 1.624 Assuming, arguendo, that Old T
continues, the articulation of the temporary regulations result, through measurement of Old T's year 2 income625 by recomputing its year 1 income and then
including the hypothetical increase in year 1 tax in Old T's year 2 income,
smacks of a legislative solution626 and contravenes existing general tax principles.
The annual accounting principle bars reopening Old T's year 1.627 Technically,
however, the temporary regulation's solution does not constitute reopening year
1 if interest is not charged from year 1 by the Treasury on Neo-T's year 2
addition to income. 628 Nevertheless, the recomputation of year 1 income and
the subsequent addition to year 2 income as articulated is closer to a legislative
solution than the existing judicial year 2 correlative adjustment exceptions to
the annual accounting principle. 629
The model differs from the temporary regulations because the model assumes
that Old T does not continue. This assumption is consistent with the legislative
history. Therefore, in year 2 the correlative adjustment cannot be made to the
same taxpayer's year 2 income. Accordingly, the model is not bound by the
existing precedents' prohibition of no "exact" tax benefit. In addition, in
calculating year 2 adjustments the model uses Old T's year 1 top bracket rate
as the starting point for computing a hypothetical year 2 tax that is to be added
to some taxpayer's year 2 income. 630 The final regulations should do the same.
The premises of the model are consistent with the existing general case law
principles, 631 however, the proposed temporary and section 338-3T regulation's
premises are not. Note that the temporary regulation's solution of determining
the amount of the year 2 addition to tax by recomputing Old T's year 1 tax
is a perfectly acceptable legislative solution. 632

2.

Impact of Time Value of Money Principles

The proposed time value of money regulations first separate the contingent
P payments for the Old T stock from the noncontingent or fixed payments. 633

explanation . . . does not rise to the level of authority given to legislative history, we do not
percieve it as totally worthless or unenlightning. It is common knowledge that the congressional
staff of the joint committee works very closely with members of Congress in drafting legislation
and undoubtedly has 'eyeball knowledge' of the fundamental purpose of a given piece of legislation.
Absent any definitive legislative history that is more revealing, . . . it is proper nevertheless, in
the absense of any comparable contrary assertions, to give substantial weight to this explanation.");
see also Federal Power Comm'n v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 411 U.S. 458, 472-73 (1973);
Reed v. United States, 743 F.2d 162 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1984). The retention of general principles
when the statute is silent would be the case in any event.
624. See supra text accompanying notes 335-39, 348, 366, 383, 385 & 398.
625. See supra text accompanying note 620.
626. See supra note 602.
627. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
628. Cf. Note, supra note 224, at 1013-15 (discussing failure of Congress to provide for interest
in the context of I.R.C. § 1341).
629. See supra text accompanying notes 453-518.
630. See supra text accompanying notes 444-51.
631. See supra text accompanying notes 453-525.
632. The committee staff could have benefitted from an earlier deep structure analysis that
would have avoided the problem of regulations that override the annual accounting principle and
that are based solely on an erroneous reading of general principles and on sparse legislative history.
633. See supra text accompanying note 204.
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If the year 2 contingent P payment does not provide adequate interest for the
years elapsed since year 1, the proposed regulations bifurcate the year 2 payment
into a principal payment equal to the discounted year 1 value of the total
contingent P payment made in year 2 and the balance is considered interest. 634
The proposed and temporary section 338 (contingent payment) regulations
expressly state that the examples illustrating year 2 payment by P of theretofore
contingent amounts are "exclusive of interest." These regulations make a cross
reference to the regulations under sections 1274, 1275(d), and 483 for rules that
characterize deferred contingent payments as principal or interest. 63 s Implicitly,
therefore, the year 1-year 2 separate return construct of contingent payment
allocation and income portion of the proposed and temporary regulations may
apply only to the principal portion of the year 2 P contingent payment. The
principal portion of the contingent payment is considered to be earned by Old
T in year l/36 but the interest portion is not. 637 Indeed, when the contingent
payment claim is distributed to the former T shareholders on the acquisition
date, the entire OlD is earned by the former T shareholders. 638 A subsequent
distribution could result in some OlD at the T level, but it should be a consolidated
return item of Neo-T in year 2. 639 The final regulations should address this
situation.

3.

Year 2 Section 338 Earnout Discontinuity with Actual
Section 33 7 Transaction

The proposed and temporary section 338-3T regulations (governing year 2
contingent payments), illustrate a year 2 increase in Neo-T' s separate return
recapture income that arises from a year I noncontingent P price that is less
than the fair market value of Old T's assets plus a year 2 contingent P payment. 640
Thus, Neo-T would be taxed in year 2 only to the extent that the P contingent
payments are allocable as of year 1 or year 2 to assets that generate recapture

634. See supra text accompanying notes 206-08.
635. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-3TU> (1986).
636. See supra text accompanying notes 519-20.
637. Cf. Stewart's Trust v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 682, 692-94 (1975) (when income is
attributable to services rendered after distribution of property, assignment of income does not apply).
Similarly, when interest is earned after the assignment of the property, the assignment of income
doctrine should not apply in year 2.
638. This analysis would apply when Old T distributed, in connection with acquisition of its
stock or assets, an existing contingent claim to its shareholders, to the extent the OlD accrued after
the distribution. Any OlD that had accrued prior to the distribution would indeed be an item
attributable to Old T and hence, subject to correlative adjustment in year 2. With respect to a
purchasing corporation's contingent purchase price note, the payment normally would be distributed
almost instantaneously from Old T to the fonner target shareholders, or more frequently the claim
would go directly from P to the former T shareholders, with the result that OlD would not be
attributable in any way to Old T or for that matter to Neo-T.
639. Old T could seU its assets to P, in part or whole, for a contingent purchase price and
hold such contingent claim for up to a year after the sale utilizing the full distribution period of
§ 337. See supra text accompanying note 61. In such a case, OlD in the contingent claim "earned"
from the date of sale to the date of distribution would be an Old T item resulting in a correlative
adjustment in year 2 to the former T shareholders.
640. For a description of the allocation procedures under the temporary § 338 regulations and
a year 2 reallocation to property, other than goodwill or going concern value, when the base price
is less than fair market value in year I, see supra note 10 I.
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income or other exceptions to the section 337 General Utilities shield. 641 The
section 337 shield would continue to apply in year 2 to contingent income
allocable to a nonrecapture item.
Yet in a T asset sale structured as a section 337 transaction T is liquidated
usually in year 1. Under conventional doctrine, when T distributes a contingent
payment obligation to its shareholders T is not taxed in year 1 for any additional
recapture income that might arise in year 2 due to the contingent payments.
This is true because the contingent payments cannot be valued in year 1. 642
Moreover, because T will not be in existence when the contingency is resolved
under an earnout in year 2, conventional doctrine would not tax Old T in year
2 for any recapture income created by the contingent payments. In contrast, in
a section 338 contingent earnout transaction the proposed and temporary regulations as shown above would tax Neo-T in year 2 as to P's contingent purchase
price payments made to the former T shareholders in year 2 to the extent they
create additional recapture income. Thus, contrary to the intent of Congress,
new discontinuities would be created under the proposed and temporary regulation's approach. 643
The model would tax the Old T shareholders as a surrogate for Old T in
year 2 in both a section 337 and section 338 transaction. The model addresses
the fact that Old T no longer exists and imposition of the year 2 income and
accompanying tax on an appropriate successor is necessary to avoid distortion
of income. Thus, discontinuity is eliminated. In a legislative context, perhaps
an explicit election with respect to whether Neo-T, P, or the former T shareholders
would be responsible would be appropriate.

4.

Contingent Income Items Retained by Neo-T or Distributed to
Former T Shareholders in "Bootstrap Acquisition,

The proposed and temporary section 338 allocation regulations do not speak
of allocation to assets, or recognition by Old T or New T, of year 2 payments
of contingent income items held by Old T and owed by third parties. This lack
of attention presumably is because the year 2 payments would not affect P's
cost and, hence, the allocation formula. Bear in mind, however, that the proposed
and temporary regulation's underlying assumption that Old T continues in year
2 subject to general law principles644 logically would dictate an application of
general principles to an Old T continuing in year 2 in regard to contingent
income items that it distributed or continued to hold from year l.

a.

Sections 337 and Deemed Section 337 Sale by T of Contingent
Income Items

Under the majority conventional doctrine that equates assignment and clear
reflection of income with accrual of income, if T sells a contingent item to P

641. For "recapture income" exceptions to the shield of§§ 336-338, see supra text accompanying
notes 16-22, 60 & 99.
642. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 425-36.
643. See supra text accompanying note 97.
644. See supra text accompanying notes 574-75.
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pursuant to a complete liquidation to which section 337 applies, T would not
be taxed in year 1 at the time of the sale. Similarly, because Old T would not
be in existence at the time that the contingent item matured in year 2, the
contingent item would not be taxed in year 2. 645 However, the more functional
approach taken in Storz v. CommissionerM6 would tax T at the time of the sale
of the contingent claim on its fair market value. If P later collected a greater
amount from the purchased claim than P's allocated basis, the entire excess
would be ordinary income because it did not arise from a sale or exchange.M 7
In contrast under section 338, Old T similarly would be taxed on the sale
of the contingent claim in year 1. However, consistent with the proposed and
temporary regulation's year 2 continuation of Old T approach, if later amounts
were collected, Neo-T would be treated as having received the additional amounts
as a surrogate of Old T, the year 1 seller, rather than as Neo-T the purchaser.
Under the conventional doctrine, additional payments received by a seller in
year 2 relate back for character to the original transaction in year 164M except
for the appropriate discount factor. 649 In year 2, Neo-T would be taxed only
on the amount of the claim that gives rise to "recapture income" in year 2.
In many instances this would be the entire principal amount if the contingent
claim were for services rendered by Old T. However, a contingent claim could
carry a capital character. An example of such a contingent claim is a claim for
damages to goodwill or additional sales price of a capital asset. Under the model
and the section 338 year 2 continuation of a seller (Old T) approach, such
additional amount, excluding any interest discount, would be shielded by the
deemed section 337 shield. 650 In short, the temporary section 338 regulation's
year 2 continuation of Old T with respect to contingent income could produce
another, albeit narrow, discontinuity with a comparable section 337 transaction.
Such a discontinuity would arise when Old T is no longer in existence in year
2 and thus escapes tax on any year 2 contingent payments.

b.

Distribution by T of Contingent Income Item

When Old T distributes the contingent claim to its shareholders in connection
with a section 337 or 338 transaction-a classic bootstrap acquisiton- 651 the
greatest discontinuities and potential for abuse arise. In a section 337 transaction
such abuse constitutes the classic misfortune of avoidance of T level income. 651
A liquidating T is not taxed under conventional doctrine at the liquidation in

645. See Storz v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 84, 92-94 (1977), rev'd, 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir.
1978). See generally supra text accompanying notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 425-36.
646. 583 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1978).
647. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
648. See supra text accompanying notes 237-56.
649. See supra text accompanying notes 542-44.
650. In most instances the discount would not be taxable at the Old T or Neo-T level, but
rather, at the former T shareholder level. See supra note 639.
651. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 31, 38 & 40.
652. See, e.g., Note, supra note 238, at 78 (precociously advocating that open transactiondeferred basis reporting should continue at the former T shareholder level, while the Old T level
problem of escaped income due to its nonexistence in year 2 "should be resolved by the attribution
of the income from the distributed contingent rights to the corporation with the shareholder being
held derivatively liable as a corporation's distributee"); see also Farer, supra note 242, at 531-32.
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year 1 because the claim cannot be valued. 653 Moreover, because a liquidated
T is not in existence when the claim matures in year 2, the liquidated T is not
taxed under conventional doctrine. 654 Similarly, the shareholders of a liquidated
T are not taxed directly for this year 2 T level tax, notwithstanding the fact
that an outside closing of the transaction at the T shareholder level may have
occurred. 655
Issues arise with respect to whether these "general principles" would apply
at the T level in a section 337 transaction when the former T shareholders in
effect "close" the sale to P transaction outside by not electing out from the
section 453 installment reporting transaction. The T shareholders are not likely
to elect out despite the receipt of a contingent claim permitting basis recovery
because of factors that outweigh the ability to use basis recovery outside for
the distributed contingent claim. 656 The failure to elect out apparently did not
make a difference under conventional doctrine and should not make a difference
under section 337. If the bootstrap acquisition is structured so that the value
of the T stock redeemed could be used as a valuation for the contingent claim
(for example, a non pro rata redemption), a different result might obtain. 657 If,
however, the former T shareholders receive the contingent claim pro rata, and
in particular, if they do not turn in any T stock, this curb on the T level abuse
would not be available.m
In contrast, under section 338, following the logic of the proposed and
temporary section 338-3T regulations, if Old T distributes a contingent claim
to the Old T shareholders, in connection with the sale of control of its stock
followed by a section 338 election by P, Neo-T could be taxed in a separate
return as a continuation of Old T with respect to the principal portion of the
distributed contingent claim when it matures in year 2. 659 In year I section 336

653. See supra text accompanying notes 304-18. While these authorities deal with open and
closed transactions primarily at the shareholder level, the same principle should apply at the corporate
level.
654. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 383, 385, 398 & 424-36.
655. See supra text accompanying note 258.
656. See supra text accompanying note 41.
657. In a non pro rata distribution of a contingent claim in exchange for stock of some
shareholders, but not others, the value of the surrendered stock can be determined by reference to
the value of the stock that is not surrendered. See B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 23, ,
11.03, at 11-12 n.21. Once the value of the surrendered stock is determined, the value of the
contingent claim received for the stock can be determined in year I under the barter-equation
analysis. Cf. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-l(d)(2)(ii) (1986).
658. Rev. Rul. 56-513, 1956-2 C.B. 191, 192, provides that in a pro rata distribution (in the
context of a partial liquidation under § 346(a) of prior law) the number of shares deemed to be
surrendered is calculated by solving the following ratio:
x
cash distributed
total shares
fair market value
outstanding
of net assets
where x equals the number of deemed shares surrendered. See also Rev. Rul. 74-544, 1974-2 C.B.
I08 (same calculation).
If a contingent item with an unascertainable fair market value is distributed, one could not
use this ruling to determine the number of shares deemed to be surrendered. As such, one could
not back into the value of the contingent item as suggested supra in text accompanying note 657.
659. Following the assumption of the regulations that Old T continues in year 2, see supra
text accompanying notes 616-20, under conventional doctrine Old T would be taxed in year 2 with
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is deemed to apply to the distribution, rather than section 311. 660 In this instance
under conventional doctrine Old T would not be taxed under section 336 (or
section 311 for that matter) because the contingent claim cannot be valued at
the time of the distribution in year 1. 661 However, because under the rationale
of the proposed and temporary section 338-3T regulations, Old T continues to
live on in year 2 with Neo-T as its surrogate, presumably Neo-T will be taxed
in year 2 when the distributed contingent claim matures pursuant to a separate
return approach. 662 Unless P has discounted its purchase price for the Neo-T
liability with respect to the contingent income, the former T shareholders would
enjoy a windfall. The former T shareholders enjoy capital gains treatment outside
without any inside T level toll charge because the toll charge is borne this time
by Neo-T. In short, not only does discontinuity between sections 337 and 338
occur in the context of a distribution of a contingent claim, but the direction
of the proposed and temporary regulations probably is incorrect in this context
when applied to the party that bears the ultimate tax liability.

5.

Adoption of the Model

Under the model, the T level tax that is applied to contingent income items
maturing in year 2 (in transactions other than a sale of the item) would be
taxed in year 2 to the former T shareholders who receive the contingent payments
as transferees for a hypothetical Old T corporate level tax. Such an assessment
is necessary in order to prevent distortion of Old T's income. The rates for
this year 2 hypothetical T level corporate tax should begin at T's top marginal
bracket in year I. True symmetry with existing year 2 transactional correlative
adjustment judicial precedents would require use of the former T shareholders
actual year 2 income. However, recognizing the equitable origin of the year 2
transactional correlative adjustment in this virgin area, courts might feel less
restrained in the absence of an actual Old T, to fashion a more equitable year
2 correlative adjustment using Old T's marginal year I rates. 663 This transferee
"inside" tax would be in addition to the "outside" former T shareholder level
tax, 664 but the "inside" tax probably should be subtracted from the outside

respect to the principal portion of the distributed claim, even though the claim already has been
distributed to the former T shareholders. See supra text accompanying notes 333, 334, 341 & 349.
The special treatment of the OlD or discount portion of the contingent payment is discussed supra
in note 639.
660. See supra text accompanying note 38.
661. See authorities cited supra in notes 335-39, 348, 366-67, 398 & 425-36.
662. See supra note 659.
663. The predecessor to the Federal Circuit, in its development of the tax benefit doctrine,
recognized that such rule was equitable in origin. In shaping the tax benefit recovery of the deduction,
the Court of Claims initially applied the year I rates and brackets in year 2. Perry v. United States,
160 F. Supp. 270, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1958). However, a decade later the Court of Claims reversed itself,
still acknowledging that the year 2 adjustment was equitable, but refusing to follow the ultimate
logic of such premise (i.e., year I brackets and rates), on the theory that "any change in the
existing law rests within the wisdom and discretion of the Congress." Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1967). Because the Court of Claims in Perry used
only year I brackets and rates without an interest charge, its approach produced precisely the same
effect as the proposed and temporary § 338-3T regulations. If such an approach is not within the
power of the courts, surely it is not within the power of the tax administrators, absent specific statutory
authority.
664. See supra note 539.
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payment. In addition, if a year 1 transaction is "closed" and subsequently
amounts in excess of the closed value plus an appropriate interest charge are
received in year 2, these amounts should retain the same character as the original
transaction. 665 Year 2 income items arise from a correlative adjustment and,
hence, partake of the same character as the year 1 transaction. 666 To the extent
that the distributed contingent payment would have been shielded in year 1 by
section 337 or deemed shielded by section 337 in a section 338 transaction if
its value were determinable, the income and the correlative adjustment in year
2 should be shielded analogously to the exclusion under the (no) tax benefit
doctrine. In a sale of a contingent item in year 1, Old T would be taxed in
that year and no year 2 correlative adjustment would be necessary.

a.

Contingent P Purchase Price: Earnout

In the context of a P contingent "earnout" component of P's purchase
price, the former T shareholders in a section 337 asset sale would be taxed in
year 2 as transferees of a hypothetical Old T corporate level tax when the P
contingent payments were received. This treatment applies notwithstanding the
fact that Old T is no longer in existence. The tax is imposed in addition to
the former T shareholders' outside tax on the liquidation of T that was reported
either on the installment method or basis recovery method. However, the section
337 shield should apply in year 2 to the extent that it would have applied in
year 1, and in many instances the contingent payment will not generate additional
hypothetical Old T level recapture income.
Following the model, in a section 338 transaction the former T shareholders
would be liable as transferees for any year 2 hypothetical T corporate level tax
on recapture income arising from contingent P earnout payments. Theoretically,
the same economic effect would be obtainable by the proposed and temporary
regulation's approach of imposing tax liability on Neo-T in a separate year 2
return as a continuation of Old T, provided that P had discounted or reduced
the earnout formula in anticipation of such tax liability. However, the possibility
that P and the former T shareholders will fail to consider this potential NeoT tax liability, 667 and the loss of simplicity that results from one set of rules

665. See Note, supra note 238, at 92-93.
666. See supra text accompanying notes 542-48.
667: There appears to be no hard data on the extent that taxpayers actually use § 338, much
less the extent that a purchasing corporation discounts its purchase price for the Old T recapture
tax in year I to be borne by Neo-T. Anecdotal discussions with leading tax practitioners at tax
conferences over the past several years, as well as with local practitioners at such conferences,
support the assumption that most acquisitions of public targets take the form of purchases of stock
by a purchasing corporation or an affiliate, perhaps cast in the form of a cash option merger
without a § 338 election, because the purchasing corporation's purchase price will not justify
economically the § 338 election's immediate tax costs. In other words, to the purchasing corporation,
the § 338 election consists of a comparison between immediate costs of the recapture income tax
accompanied by a gradual recovery of stepped-up basis by Neo-T over a period of years, with no
immediate tax costs accompanied, however, by a carry-over basis (and lower depreciation deductions)
in the acquired assets. Conversely, in the context of a small non publicly traded T, most purchasers
that have the negotiating advantage acquire assets rather than stock (i.e., a § 337 transaction).
There are, however, many transactions in which § 338 imposes particular advantages. See supra
note 106.
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for a section 337 earnouts (former T shareholders as surrogates) and another
for section 338 earnouts (Neo-T as surrogate), militates toward utilizing the year
2 hypothetical T level tax model in section 337 and 338 earnout transactions.
The existence of one set of rules for section 338 P contingent payment earnouts
and another for section 338 bootstrap acquisiton distribution of a T held
contingent claim, when the former T shareholders constitute the proper surrogate,
also militates towards utilizing the model.
b.

Sale or Deemed Sale by T of a Contingent Item

When T sells a contingent item to P, or in the case of a section 338
transaction, Neo-T retains the contingent item, T's year 1 sale or deemed sale
would trigger assignment of income to Old T under the conventional doctrine 66s
and the model, 66 ~ to the extent of fair market or ascertainable value in year I.
The year 2 transaction should not require any adjustments at the former T
shareholder level because the T shareholders do not receive any additional
payments. Logically, however, if the model were joined with the proposed and
temporary section 338 regulation's concept of Neo-T as a year 2 continuation
of seller (Old T), any additional payments received by Neo-T above the year
1 fair market value purchase price should be viewed as a correlative adjustment
in year 2 to the year I transaction. 670 Thus, the character of the year 2 payments
on the claim would follow the character of the claim and, thus, in some cases
would be shielded in whole or in part by a year 2 correlative adjustment deemed
section 337 shield. This shield would create discontinuity with section 337 when
P holds the contingent claim at its year 1 purchase price and excess year 2
payments receive ordinary status either because of the conventional doctrine's
lack of a sale or exchange or because of the deep structure's similarity to
discount. 671
Parity between section 337 and section 338 transactions would be obtained
by the final regulations excluding contingent claims held by Old T that are
collected by Neo-T in year 2 from the Neo-T continuation of the seller in a
separate return concept. The final regulations should be modified in this manner
in order to obtain parity with section 337. Accordingly, Neo-T, as a member
of P's affiliated group, would treat the year 2 excess payments as any other
purchaser of a (contingent) discounted claim would-as ordinary income. A
preferable approach simply is to abandon use of Neo-T as the surrogate for
Old T in all contingent income transactions and instead use the former T
shareholders as the proper surrogates. 672

668. See supra text accompanying notes 362-65.
669. In the authors' opinion, assignment of income should apply to the T in year I when it
sells a contingent item in that year, even if the sale is pursuant to § 337.
670. See supra text accompanying notes 542-48.
671. See supra text accompanying notes 269 (sale or exchange requirement) & 543 (similarity
to discount).
672. Of course, when the contingent claim has been sold rather than distributed to the former
T shareholders, they should not be taxed in year 2 on the excess over the purchase price. Nor
should Neo-T bear any tax as to the discount factor in year 2 because Neo-T did not earn it.
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Distribution by T of a Contingent Item

When T distributes a contingent claim to some or all of its shareholders
in connection with a section 337 or 338 transaction, the model is needed to
reflect income clearly. Under the model, in the case of a section 337 transaction,
the former T shareholders would bear the hypothetical T level tax within year
2 with the same character and shield as if T had received the payment in year
1. Thus, the "transmutation" of income abuse673 finally would be halted. The
section 337 shield is more likely not to be available with respect to the year 2
payment of the contingent claim than in an earnout transaction. Contingent
claims held by Old T often originate in the ordinary course ofT's business and
hence, should not be shielded by section 337.
Following the logic of the proposed and temporary section 338 regulations,
Neo-T would be taxable in year 2 in a section 338 transaction in which both
of the following are true: (I) Old T distributes a contingent claim to its
shareholders in connection with the section 338 election pursuant to P's purchase
of control of T; and (2) Neo-T is in existence when the claim matures in year
2 and is able to serve as a surrogate for Old T's hypothetical year I addition
to tax that is attributable to recomputed year I income. This treatment produces
an absurd result because the full benefit of the contingent claim lays with the
former T shareholders. Moreover, P almost certainly would not, or could not,
discount accurately its purchase price for this potential year 2 Neo-T tax. In
this context at least, the former T shareholder surrogate model, rather than the
proposed and temporary regulation's year 2 continuation of Old T approach,
should apply in a section 338 transaction. Otherwise, not only would discontinuity
result, but Neo-T's income would be distorted severely, and the former T
shareholders would enjoy an unwarranted windfall.

d.

Conclusion

The temporary regulations purport to apply general principles of law in the
area of contingent item distribution. The model year 2 correlative adjustments
is derived from the policies underlying such general principles. The general
principles undercut conventional authority on contingent income in liquidations
and, hence, cost basis corporate acquisitions. The year 2 former T shareholder
surrogate for Old T hypothetical year 2 tax, derived from the year 2 transactional
correlative adjustment model, is consistent with deep structure general principles.
Accordingly, the final regulations could and should use the former T shareholder
surrogate model explicitly for both section 337 and section 338. Otherwise,
section 337-338 discontinuity, as well as distortion of income, will result.
VI.

LEGISLATIVE PRoPoSALs: "THE SoNG REMAINS THE SAME"

The Tax Reform Act of I986 repeals the T level shield of current sections
3II and 336-338, with a two year transitional rule for long term capital assets
of closely held small businesses. 674 Such amendments, however, do not eliminate

673. See supra text accompanying notes 257-66.
674. Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 631(a) and (b) repeal the corporate level General Utils. shield with
respect to new §§ 336 and 338. Section 631(d) also repeals old § 337 in its entirety. These amendments
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the contingent income problem. First, with respect to the closely held small
businesses, the statutory framework will remain the same until 1989, except for
the long term capital gain limitation. 675 While, with few exceptions,676 contingent
claims generally would not qualify as long term capital gain income, the denial
of the shield to property other than such capital assets does not produce a
different result because the assignment of income doctrine ordinarily would apply
to such assets but for their contingency and the fact that they cannot be valued
readily. This treatment continues to pose a problem for taxation in year I.
Therefore, the same year 2 correlative adjustment problem would arise and
hence, the same question of who is taxed, if anyone, on the inside T level
income in year 2 would be present.
In the case of a nonclosely held or large T, the same year 2 problem arises.
While in such circumstances T would recognize all gain or loss in year 1 under
the 1986 Code, 677 contingent items would still have to be accounted for in year
2. In such a sale of assets transaction, 678 the same problems remain because,
as before, T is liquidated in year 2. Additionally, in the section 338 transaction,
Neo-T or a carryover basis successor still is in existence in year 2. The 1986
Code requires, under new section 1060, both the buyer and the seller679 to allocate
the purchase price of any cost basis assets constituting a trade or business. 6 xo
This allocation must be made in the manner prescribed in section 338(b)(5). 6x1
The Senate Finance Committee Report, in which this provision originated, 6 x2
states that the "method adopted by the bill is identical to that provided in the
regulations under section 338 for allocating purchase price to assets following
a stock purchase . . . . Thus, both parties must use the residual method as
described in the [2T] regulations under section 338. " 683 The proposed and temporary section 338 regulations 684 governing year 2 adjustments, 685 including year
2 Old T level recapture income from year 2 contingent payments, 686 are contained,
however, in subsection 3T. 687 Thus, it is not clear whether new section 1060 is

generally apply to distributions, sales pursuant to a complete liquidation, and deemed asset sales made
after December 31, 1986. /d. § 633(c). A 2-year transitional rule applies to long-term capital gains
of closely held "small" corporations. /d. § 633(d).
675. Cf. Lee, supra note 54, at 1376-77.
676. For example, proceeds from an involuntary conversion of a capital asset, held for longer
than 6 months, are entitled to capital gains treatment. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(3)(ii) (West Supp. 1986).
677. See supra note 674.
678. Old § 337 is repealed. See supra note 674.
679. New § 1060's purchase price allocation rule applies to the transferee's basis in applicable
assets and the transferor's gain or loss. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (West Supp. 1986), enacted by Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 641(a); seeS. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-55 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 841,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-208 (1986).
680. New § 1060 applies to any transfer of assets, constituting a trade or business, with respect
to which the transferee's basis is determined wholly by reference to its purchase price paid for such
assets. I.R.C. § 1060(c) (West Supp. 1986).
681. I.R.C. § 1060(a) (West Supp. 1986). Section 338(b)(5) authorizes regulations governing
allocation of § 338 basis among the target corporation's assets. /d.
682. See H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 679, at 11-208.
683. S. REP. No. 313, supra note 679, at 254; see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T
(1986).
684. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T (1986).
685. For applicable adjustment events, see supra note 572.
686. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.338(b)-3T(h), U> (1986).
687. See supra text accompanying notes 601-11.
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intended to incorporate the contingent income provisions contained in the temporary and proposed regulations. To achieve parity between section 338 and section 337 in acquisitions involving contingent items, Congress should have addressed
explicitly the problem of year 2 contingent income at the old seller level. The
adoption of the model proposed in this Article would be the best approach. 688
VII.

CoNCLUSION: BAD DocTRINE AND Goon DocTRINE-HAs CoNGREss
DoNE BETTER?

The Supreme Court properly launched the principal case-Jaw doctrines that
should have resolved the T level and former T shareholder level aspects of
contingent claims arising in connection with sale of T's assets or stock. The
genesis of the assignment of income and open transaction doctrines, as well as
the Arrowsmith doctrine was functional-more clear and accurate reflection of
income. 689 Recently, the Supreme Court also has articulated a functional basis
for the tax benefit doctrine-a correlative or balancing year 2 adjustment to
achieve an approximation of transactional reporting. 690 Good doctrine must be
based functionally. Unfortunately, the lower courts' devolutionary mainstream
implementation of these doctrines with respect to contingent items, particularly
at the T level, historically focused on definitional accounting accrual rules rather
than on clear reflection of income. Definitional approaches tend to breed bad
doctrine. At present, the bad doctrine is rectifiable if the recent Supreme Court
direction in Hillsboro and Tufts is followed faithfully.
On three occasions Congress has addressed the contingent income liquidation/
sale of business problem. The first attempt was in the collapsible corporation
provisions that applied a surrogate penalty (conversion of long-term capital gain
to ordinary income) to the former T shareholders rather than taxing T inside
on its contingent income. 691 This statutory endeavor has been described aptly as
a "misfortune. " 692 Congress' second foray, the Installment Sales Revision Act,
provided an adequate basis for resolution of contingent payments at the former
T shareholder level in legislative regulations. 693 Unfortunately, political considerations resulted in the absurd retention of the case-Jaw basis recovery option. 694
Last, the "legislative history" of section 338 dealt with contingent income
at the T level, but only in the context of a P contingent purchase price in a
section 338 transaction. Moreover, the final resolution by the congressional staff
and tax administrators was to apply "general principles" to Neo-T as a continuation of Old T, contrary to the general tenor of section 338's treatment of
Neo-T as a new corporation with a clean slate of attributes. The common failure
in Congress' and the tax administrators' attentions thus far has been a failure
of deep structure analysis centering on clear reflection of income-a common

688. Otherwise, we predict that the § 1060 regulations probably will incorporate some form
of Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.338(b)·3T (1986), thus compounding the problem of the 3T regulation's
misapplication of general law principles. See supra text accompanying notes 616-32.
689. See supra text accompanying notes 238, 255, 324-28 & 464-76.
690. See supra text accompanying notes 453-55 & 492-508.
691. See supra text accompanying note 262.
692. See supra note 266.
693. See supra text accompanying notes 131-45.
694. See supra text accompanying notes 320-21.
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failure of tax reform. m Either Congress in amendments to new section 1060, or
the drafters of the final regulations covering year 2 recognition of income under
section 338 (and perhaps section 1060), can close this old abuse ofT level distortion of income. If Congress fails to address the problem, the courts could fill
the gap, but in an area that is restricted increasingly by technical statutes and
regulations, that option becomes circumscribed more tightly leaving only the choice
outlined in Dobson v. Commissioner. 696

695. See supra note 2.
696. 320 U.S. 489 (1943), reh'g denied, 321 U.S. 231 (1944). The Supreme Court, in effect,
deferred to the expertise of the Tax Court with respect to the tax benefit doctrine. One may expect
similar judicial deference to the expertise of the drafters of the regulations. See supra text accom·
panying note 506. Incidentally, the Dobson doctrine of special deference by courts reviewing the
Tax Court was rejected by Congress in the predecessor to I.R.C. § 7482(d) (West Supp. 1986). See
generally Rice, Low, Fact, and Taxes: Review of Tax Court Decisions Under Section //41 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 50 CowM. L. REv. 439 (1951).

